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ABSTRACT
PERCEPTION AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION:
A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY

by
RAYMOND RAINVILLE
This inquiry attempts to determine whether the assump
tion of objectivity usually made about scientific observation
is justified.

This is considered to be an important question

because it is usually assumed that scientific knowledge differs
from the rest of human knowledge precisely because it is ob
jective.

The belief in the objectivity of science is traced

back historically to the beginnings of science in Western
civilization.

In a brief historical analysis, it is revealed

that despite many important historical changes in our account
of scientific knowledge, there are two aspects of scientific
epistemology which remain constant.

These two aspects are

first, that scientific knowledge differs from the rest of
knowledge in that it is factual and second, that the scien
tific method is the only appropriate way to distinguish fact
from illusion.
This long standing tradition in the Western way of
knowing presents a unique difficulty to anyone wishing to
conduct an inquiry into the value of objectivity.

The diffi

culty arises from the fact that most available methods of
inquiry have the assumption of objectivity embedded in them.
vi

There is, for example, a tendency for methods to be either
analytical or experimental.

This division is believed to re

flect an underlying separation into subjective and objective.
A method was sought which was not prejudiced by having the
assumption of objectivity embedded in it.

The method settled

upon is called the method of anomalies, which is modeled after
the thought experiment.

Thought experiments were constructed

to produce information anomalous to the assumption of objec
tivity.
Three such anomalies to the assumption of objectivity
were produced by this inquiry.

The first anomaly demonstrates

the inseparability of logical and empirical elements in per
ception.

Specifically, it demonstrates that the real and the

illusory can only be separated after certain logical assump
tions are made.

This indicates that the logical assumptions

are as fundamental to the definition of the real as are the
sensory elements.

The second anomaly demonstrates the in

fluence of the whole on the experience of the parts in both
scientific measurement and in normal perception.

Specifi

cally, it shows that concepts or constructs define and select
the appropriate measurements to be taken, as well as those
to be ignored.

The third anomaly demonstrates that the qual

itative experience in observation and perception is, in part,
determined by the purpose of the observation or perception.
This means that the act of measurement or perception in part
determines the result of the perception or measurement.
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On the basis of the anomalies generated by the inquiry,
some important conclusions about the meaning of factual!ty are
derived.

A chapter is devoted to unearthing the various def

initions and meanings of the word "fact" within existing
theories of knowledge.

When each of these definitions of fact

is reviewed in light of the anomalies to objectivity, it is
concluded that none of the available definitions of fact are
able to deal with all three of the anomalies generated by the
inquiry.

On this basis, it is concluded that the notion of

factuality is misleading.
It follows that an alternative epistemological unit
is required to replace the notion of fact in our understanding
of scientific knowledge.
is described.

Such an alternative building block

In addition, a theory of scientific knowledge

which is not based on the assumption of objectivity is out
lined.

In such a theory, other units of knowledge than

logical and empirical elements would play an important role.
Some psychological elements of the alternative theory of
scientific knowledge, such as assumptions, whole and goals
are discussed.

viii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In 196*+, C.P. Snow published "two cultures", in which
he distinguished between the literary man and the scientifi
cally oriented scholar.

His central theme was that these men

represented the way in which scientific knowledge and literary
knowledge were growing steadily apart.

Each of the two cul

tures was evolving with separate values, methods and pictures
of the world.

At that time, the scientific culture appeared

to be the more viable in terras of affording us solutions to
our problems.

Or, as Snow put it, it gave us "hope".

No lit

erary man who read Snow's "two cultures" could have escaped
feelings of inferiority for not knowing the Second Law of
Thermodynamics.

Since that time there has been an increasing

recognition that our social and ecological fabric required
sensibilities which apparently are not available within the
scientific culture.

The promise that appeared to rest in

science and technology in 1956 appears far less promising in
1970.

The industrial might resulting from the application of

science and technology is a threat to both man's social and
biological continuation.

But whether we see science as a

positive or negative development in human culture, we cannot
deny that putting science in its proper place intellectually
and assimilating it into the general culture is a serious
problem.

It is a problem in both general sociology and in

the sociology of science.

Underlying this significant prob

lem is a problem in the psychology of knowledge.

These sociological and academic effects behoove us to
examine carefully the rationale for making a sharp distinction
between science and non-science, as well as for elevating
scientific knowledge to the pinnacle of human credibility.
One of the fundamental reasons for believing in science,
as well as for distinguishing it from other types of knowledge,
is our belief that science is objective or factual.

We know

scientific knowledge to be based on facts; facts in turn, are
based on observations.

Other aspects of human knowledge, such

as cultural tradition and folklore, though they are based on
experience, may call upon us for allegiance but not for the
same kind of credibility that we give science.
It appears that we evaluate our knowledge according
to our assessment of its origins.

This means that we are

using epistemological criteria for discriminating between
science and other aspects of human thought.

As indicated

above, it is not sufficient to say, as is often said, that
science is empirical while other forms of knowledge are not.
Since empirical merely implies that knowledge is based on ex
perience, no one will deny that contemporary religious and
artistic wisdom is a heritage from past experience.

To find

the basis of the distinction which sets science apart we must
learn to distinguish between kinds of experience.

Only objec

tive observations can give a proposition the stamp of scienti
fic truth, and not all of experience is considered to be
objective.

It is not accidental that we speak of a scientist's

laboratory experiences as observations while we speak of his
2

daily experiences as perceptions.

The words have a connota

tion of objectivity and subjectivity, respectively.
It is this separation of sensory experience into two
qualitatively distinct classes which is the basis of the
epistemological distinction between science and other kinds
of human knowledge.

Knowledge, scientific or otherwise, is

not generated by each individual, but rather is passed on to
us through language in a substantially accomplished form.

To

say that credibility of information depends upon its epistem
ological origins is merely to express the belief that we
evaluate knowledge according to the basis we believe it has
in experience.

It is important to stress that our assessment

of the experiential base for most of our knowledge is itself
a belief since, as we said before, knowledge is given to us
not directly through experience but as a second hand report
of experience.
If this reasoning is correct, the separation of ex
perience into subjective perception and objective observation
is of the utmost importance.

In the first place, it is one

of the bases for distinguishing the scientific from the nonscientific.

The belief in its objective origins is probably

the most significant reason for the credibility status that
science enjoys.

In the second place, the belief in the dis

tinction between these two kinds of experience is at the core
of a methodological debate between Snow's "two cultures".
It is apparent that the assumption of objectivity
plays an important role in distinguishing between scientific
3

and non-seientific knowledge.

It is therefore reasonable and

desirable to conduct an inquiry to determine whether or not
the assumption of objectivity is justified.

A study of the

history of the assumption of objectivity reveals that such an
inquiry must first of all deal with a serious methodological
difficulty.

This difficulty arises from the fact that all

currently available methods of inquiry have imbedded in them
assumptions which preclude the possibility of using them to
inquire into objectivity.
An inquiry into the assumption of objectivity is ob
viously a problem in epistemology.

A historical analysis

(Chapter II) reveals that the distinction between objective
and subjective knowing is of such long standing that problems
of epistemology and the disciplines for their study have been
defined as though the distinction were, in fact, valid.

If

we examine the present state of affairs with respect to epis
temological questions, we find two groups of scholars actively
engaged in problems of epistemology.
Psychologists make use of scientific methods to study
the epistemology of subjective experience.
of the psychology of perception.

This is the study

The study of object observa

tion is for the most part left to historians and philosophers
of science.

The psychology of perception and the philosophy

of science are the modern inheritors of the epistemological
question.

Nevertheless within these disciplines there is no

generally acknowledged need for an integration of these
respective fields.

The reason they do not see such a need is that they
have accepted the validity of the subjective/objective dis
tinction.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of

the psychologist who places his faith in the objective methodology of science to reveal to him the nature of subjective
experience.

Though this may not necessarily indicate a diff

iculty since both the analysts of science and the psychologists
may be justified in assuming the capacity of objective percep
tion, it is a serious difficulty, for anyone who wishes to
question that assumption.

It would not be logical to inquire

into objectivity with tools which have imbedded in them a
prejudice towards objectivity.

For this reason we find that

none of the current methods available is suited for our inquiry.
Psychologists may be divided into two groups, neither
of which is prepared to deal with an inquiry into objectivity.
The experimental psychologist has the usual assumption of
objectivity built into his method.

The phenomenological psych

ologist accepts the distinction between objective and subjective,
and defines his field of study in terms of the subjective.

The

other group of scholars who are interested in understanding
objective observation as it takes place in science have also
defined their philosophies and methods in such a way that they
are committed to the assumption of objectivity.

Scholars of

science who take an empirical approach are themselves committed
to the view that there are objectively observable facts about
science.

Students of science who are committed to an analytic

method are for the most part also committed to the view that

there is a significant analytic distinction between episteraic
and non-epistemic perception and that it is not different from
the more familiar objectivity/subjectivity distinction.

It is

not surprising to find that contemporary students of epistem
ology find themselves committed explicitly or implicitly to
the belief that there is an essential difference between ob
servation and perception.

This results in the fact that the

distinction between observation and perception is an implicit
aspect of one of the basic assumptions of logical positivism.
This basic assumption is that there is an essential difference
between analytic and synthetic knowledge.

Belief in this dis

tinction is couched in a variety of terminology; such as
formal and empirical, theoretical and factual, and conceptual
and observational.

Regardless of the terminology, this funda

mental distinction of logical positivism implies a difference
between observation and perception.
In Chapter III, a method is suggested which attempts
to hold the assumption of objectivity in abeyance.
the method of "thought experiments".

This is

Reasons are given for

believing that this method makes no prior commitment to the
analytic/synthetic distinction which is to say the distinction
between subjectivity and objectivity.

Instead it is committed

to the view that so called facts get their meaning from the
context of ideas and artifacts within which they are viewed.
The method which is suggested differs from the usual empirical
approach in that it does not propose to generate any new facts.
It also differs from the usual analytical approach in that it
6

does not rely on a normative analysis of language or logic.
Instead, it attempts to give old facts new meaning by changing
the context from that within which they are normally viewed.
The old facts which are appealed to are all relevant
to the assumption of objectivity.

The new context results

from holding that assumption in abeyance.

Chapter II

indicates

that the epistemic status of perception has been the subject
of study by two different groups of scholars.

Since both

these groups accept the assumption of objectivity, they have
conducted their inquiry into perception in "haughty isolation"
from one another.

The psychologist has generated facts about

perception but has seen no need to incorporate these "facts"
into his own methods of observation.

This is undoubtedly due

to the belief that a scientist's observations are a qualita
tively different class of perceptions than the subjective
experiencing of the subjects in psychological experiments.
On the other hand, historians and philosophers of science
who have analyzed the role of observation in science have
for the most part ignored the work of perceptual psychologists.^
These men have also seen no need to extend to the world of
daily experience their analytical insights about the influence
of perception on knowledge.

The method proposed in Chapter III

attempts to capitalize on the lack of cross-fertilization
between these two fields of study.
context for the

It is hoped that the new

old facts will develop from forcing a cross-

.
Notable exceptions are Kuhn (1962), Polanyi (1958)*
and Hanson (1958).
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fertilization of these two independently developed sources of
knowledge about perception.
If, as is maintained in Chapter II, psychologists and
the scholars of observation have worked in isolation from one
another because they both accepted the assumption of objectiv
ity, then it would seem reasonable to expect that holding the
assumption in abeyance will have the effect of bringing the
two fields together.

Bringing together facts from these two

disciplines tends to create anomalies to the assumption of
objectivity.

Anomalies are seen as information which contra

dicts our normal expectations.
ated, be

They may, as has been indic

well-known facts which do not become anomalous

until put in proper context.
Before we can bring facts from these two disciplines
to bear on the assumption of objectivity, it is necessary to
know what is meant by objectivity.

Chapter IV offers an

analysis of five important philosophies of knowledge cur
rently attempting to explain how we know.

The purpose in

reviewing these positions is to obtain an understanding of
the role of the assumption of objectivity within these var
ious theories of knowledge.

The analysis reveals that,

though the belief that objective knowledge is possible is
almost universally accepted by these various theories, the
exact formulations telling us how objectivity is achieved
differ significantly from one theory to the next.

One char

acteristic which most theories of knowledge are revealed to
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have in common, and which demonstrates the almost universal
commitment to the idea of objectivity, is the promotion of
an indubitable within each theory.

By an indubitable is

meant an element of knowledge which is given to us in such
a way that we can have no doubt about it.

The fact that each

of the theories promotes an indubitable indicates that the
belief in objectivity is very strong.

There is also little

agreement among these theories concerning how such indubitables become incorporated into knowledge.

However, the

lack of concensus concerning the way in which objectivity is
achieved seems to indicate a need to examine the possibility
that indubitables do not exist.
Chapter IV concludes that most theories of knowledge
subscribe to the possibility of objective perception of indubitables.

Such indubitables are generally believed to be

objective in that we can be certain in our knowledge of them
and confident in their independence of us.

Having made

explicit what is meant by the assumption of objectivity, the
next step involves presenting anomalies which contradict the
assumption.

Chapter V presents information anomalous to the

assumption of objectivity.
of information.

Each anomaly consists of two sets

One of the sets is taken from the psychology

of perception and the other is taken from the epistemology of
-

Transactiona1ism is the only exception.
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science.

The two sets in an anomaly consist of information

which is widely accepted by the specialists in the domains
which generated them.

What is unique about their presenta

tion in Chapter V is that they are paired together in a new
context.

That new context is the intention of our inquiry.

This means that the pairing of two sets of information is
based on the belief that each set has the same point to make
about the assumption of objectivity.

The combination of the

three anomalies serve as a systematic method for compiling
counterevidence to the assumption of objectivity.
pose of compiling counterevidence is twofold.

The pur

In the first

place, it gives us a method for evaluating whether or not
the assumption is justifiable.

In the second place, the

recognition of counterevidence will lay the groundwork for
establishing the conceptual and factual requirements of
alternative assumptions to that of objectivity.
In Chapter VI, an attempt is made to re-evaluate the
status of the assumption of objectivity in view of the anom
alies presented in Chapter V.

In doing so, the various candir

dates for the position of indubitable which were revealed in
Chapter IV are reviewed to see how each is affected by the
anomalies.

In Chapter VII, the broad outlines of a satis

factory resolution to the epistemological problems raised
by the anomalies to objectivity are discussed.

An attempt

to identify as clearly as possible a positive alternative to
the assumption of objectivity is connected to recent develop
ments in both perception and philosophy of science.
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Finally, Chapter VII attempts to present a picture
of science which does not depend on the assumption of objec
tivity, and traces some of the implications of such a view
of science.

These implications are discussed in terms of

three major changes that are suggested by the inquiry.

The

first is a revitalization of the psychology of knowledge.
The second involves identifying some of the negative effects
the assumption of objectivity had in preventing improvements
in the psychology of knowing.

Finally, alternative methods

of conducting scientific inquiry are indicated.

11

CHAPTER II
IDENTIFYING THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
Asking whether or not there is justification for dis
tinguishing between subjectivity and objectivity is a question
of epistemology.

Having developed an interest in such a ques

tion, one naturally peruses the existing intellectual and
academic specialties to find how such questions have been
treated.

To do so, the statement of the question must be

slightly changed.

It can be asked what segment of the intel

lectual community is interested in the role that the senses
play in knowledge.

When the question is stated in this way,

the answer is immediate and, that is, that both the psychol
ogists and epistemologists are interested in the role which
the senses play in the acquisition of knowledge.

Why then, we

ask, do we distinguish between the epistemologists and psychol
ogists?
The usual reason for distinguishing between a psych
ologist's and an epistemologist's interest in perception has
to do with their various purposes and methods in undertaking
that study.

Presumably, epistemologists are interested in

perception only to the extent that it plays a role in verifying
knowledge, while psychologists are interested in describing
the process by which sensory experience takes place.

That

such a difference in interest exists between psychologists
and philosophers is no doubt true.

Whether such a difference

in interest is sufficient reason to justify the wide gap that
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exists between the methods and conclusions of these two
at the present

groups

time is another question.

Hamlyn (1901) tells us that epistemologists are

inter

ested in perception only insofar as it can provide us with an
indubitable unit of knowledge.

Epistemologists are not inter

ested in how the senses work; they are, instead, interested
in finding an element in knowledge which can be given to us
in such a way that we can have no doubt about it.
ally that way has been perception.

Tradition

Within contemporary epis

temology, it is generally recognized that such perceptual
indubitable units are not available to the average person but
came to us only through the elaborate methodology of science.
Debates over the epistemic status of perception are currently
most viable and relevant in philosophy only within the phil
osophy of science.

(Collins, 1967)

Psychologists, on the other hand, have little or no
interest in establishing an indubitable unit of knowledge.
They merely wish to explain how sensory experiencing takes
place.

The ontological reliability of such sensory exper

iencing is a secondary interest.

In arriving at his "descrip

tion of perception," the psychologist will rely on scientific
methodology to establish the descriptive reliability.
Other than interest, the most obvious difference
between epistemologists and psychologists is one of methodology.
The philosopher of science who for the most part has inherited
the problem of establishing indubitables works either with
linguistic or historical analysis.
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The psychologist interested

in describing perception relies mainly on experimental obser
vation.

The question seems to be, is this methodological

difference between the two sufficient explanation for the
lack of interchange between the two disciplines in questions
of substance?

Given that each group has its own methods and

interest with respect to the problems of perception, should
there be any cross-fertilization between the two fields?
Epistemologists, after all, are not interested in the whole
of perception but merely in the fact that some of our percep
tions are ontologically reliable.

Psychologists, after all,

are not interested in abstract problems like ontological
reliability since for that they need only trust a long trad
ition of laboratory sciences.

This suggests that each group

uses the same rationale (basis) for ignoring the other, and
that this rationale is a stronger reason for keeping the two
groups separate than either interest or method.

The rationale

is that both groups rely on the achievements of science as
proof of the fact that objective perception is possible.

The

philosopher interested in epistemology considers it natural
to look within the philosophy of science to establish indub
itables since, after all, science has produced the knowledge
in which we have the most confidence.

Likewise, the psychol

ogist can accept his methodology on the basis of its long
tradition of success.
The separation between the psychologist's and epistemologist's interest in perception is very convenient in that it
allows them to ignore one another's work.

But it presents a

serious problem to this inquiry because it reveals that both
groups have already accepted as justified the assumption of
objectivity.

It is because the psychologist assumes that

scientific observations are a different class of perception
than those which he is studying that he can use observation
as a tool for studying perception.

It is because philosophers

accept the objectivity of scientific knowledge that they re
duce the problem of the indubitable to a problem in the phil
osophy of science.
In order to find an appropriate method for inquiring
into the validity of the objective/subjective distinction we
must look into some of the history of this distinction, since
it is obviously one which antedates current methods of dealing
with epistemological questions.

Such an examination will

assist us in evaluating currently available methods and in
discussing the conceptual requirements of a method appropriate
for an inquiry into the assumption of objectivity.
The division of the world into real and apparent, which
is the same as its division into the veridical and illusory,
antedates the current methods available for studying epis
temological questions.

The experimental method and the analy

tic method used by philosophers of science are relatively new
approaches for conducting science.

They have developed out of

a tradition which based its presumptions of objectivity on one
or another version of the distinction between real and appar
ent.

Though many aspects of the account of scientific know

ledge have changed drastically within the history of science,

15

two principles emerge which have remained constant despite
other important changes.

The first of these, hereafter

called the "principle of separation", involves a persistent
belief that the world could be separated into real and appar
ent.

The separation can either be stated in ontological

terms, such as real and apparent, or in epistemological terms,
such as veridical and illusory.

The second principle to

1
emerge, hereafter called the "principle of verification",
involves a persistent belief that what distinguishes real
from apparent is scientific method.

Let us now examine the

views of some of the earliest proponents of a science based
on observation so that we may see how these two principles
of scientific epistemology have remained constant.
Aristotle believed that the sensible qualities of
objects were not of the essence of the object, but were merely
a means of differentiating the object.

There is no doubt that

to Aristotle, writing about epistemology and perception were
synonomous tasks; therefore, one can understand much about
his metaphysics by studying his perception theory.

One can

see how the two balance each other.
By a 'sense1 is meant what has the power of receiving
into itself the sensible forms of things without the
matter.
This must be conceived of as taking place in
1
The reader must be warned against possibly confusing
what is here called the "principle of verification" with the
traditional positivists' verification principle.
The first
is here used only as a convenient tool for discussing some
of the historical developments.
16

the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress
of a signet ring without the iron or gold; we say that
what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or
gold, but its particular metallic constitution makes
no differences in a similar way. The sense is affected
by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding, out (sic) it
is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what
alone matters is what quality it has, in what ratio its
constituents are combined.
(Aristotle, 1952B, p. 656)
We can see that Aristotle distinguishes between real
and apparent by noting that he did not believe that the sensi
ble qualities were of the essence of things.

It follows for

Aristotle that not all sensible qualities are to carry equal
significance in knowledge.

In addition, his position is

consistent with the "principle of verification" when he holds
that science is uniquely qualified in telling us which sen
sible qualities carry significance.

Aristotle's "principle

of verification" relied upon consistency and coherence.
Sensory experience was to be considered veridical only when
it gave evidence consistent with our larger picture of
nature.
The neo-Platonism prevalent in the 16th and 17 th
centuries did much to promote the notion that the world of
appearance was a poor reflection which in itself could not
be trusted to reveal the underlying unity and harmony in the
universe.

Kepler (1952) sought to show that the real qualities

of the world were all quantitative and that the fundamental
differences were of number and not of qualities.

Though he

did not refer to the difference between quantity and quality
as primary and secondary, that distinction has persisted in
the physical sciences to this day.
17

Galileo made the distinction between primary and
secondary far more explicit and central to his work.

He

differed from Kepler in that he was interested in terrestrial
science and was an atomist who believed the fundamental units
to have only geometrical qualities.

He made the distinction

more explicit by clearly identifying the secondary qualities
with the senses.

These qualities were considered to be sub

jective and the primary qualities objective.

We can see this

in his own words.
But that external bodies, to excite in us these tastes,
these odours, and these sounds, demand other than size,
figure, number and slow or rapid motion, I do not be
lieve; and I judge that, if the ears, the tongue, and
the nostrils were taken away, the figures, the numbers,
and the motions would indeed remain, but not the odours,
nor the tastes nor the sounds, which, without the
living animal, I do not believe are anything else but
names, just as tickling is precisely nothing but a
name if the armpit and the nasal membrane be removed...
This form of the primary-secondary doctrine in Galileo
is worth a moments pause, for its effects in modern
thought have been of uncalculable importance.
It is
a fundamental step toward that banishing of man from
the great world of nature and his treatment as an
effect of what happens in the latter, which has been
a pretty constant feature of the philosophy of modern
science, a procedure enormously simplifying the field
of science, but bringing in its train, the big meta
physical and especially epistemological problems of
modern philosophy.
(Burtt, 195*+j P» 78)
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities
was a clear cut part of the scientific heritage to which Newton
paid tribute.

He was probably the first to apply the distinc

tion explicitly to color.

He makes it quite clear that to

speak of rays of light as having color is a "vulgarity", for
to speak "philosophically" and "correctly" the rays can only
18

be said to have properties that give rise to the sensation of
color.
Few did more to mold our conception of science than
Kepler, Galileo and Newton, and it is clear that they were
not alone in supporting the picture of the world which held
man's daily experience to be largely illusory.

That these

and other important physical scientists hold this epistemological and metaphysical position meant that only pictures
of the world concordant with that viewpoint could be consid
ered scientific.

There were also some important philosophers

who expanded on this doctrine, though for them the conse
quences of the doctrine more often led to divergent world
views.
The rationalism of Descartes rests in large measure
on his belief that perception is not epistemic.

He divided

the world into the cognitive and extensive realms.

The ex

tensive realm was made up of primary qualities, which were
not directly available to the senses.

The cognitive realm

was made up of secondary qualities, which gave rise to the
world of appearance.

To look upon the world through the

senses and to rely upon this information was seen by Descartes
as childish naivete.

Only through the application of reason

could one come to know the qualities of the extensive world.
The same division of primary and secondary qualities
was maintained by Locke (1952) though this led, in his case,
to empiricism.

The primary qualities of things could be

empirically determined because of their permanence, despite
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the variation in their secondary qualities; for example "take
a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has
still solidity, extension, figure and mobility:

divide it

again, and it retains still the same qualities.

These are

also the qualities which can be detected by more than one
sense."

(Locke, 1952, p. 298)
Combining the doctrine of primary and secondary

qualities with an empirical philosophy is not quite as simple
as it seems in the preceding quotation.

We can see in the

next quote from Locke, the precursors of Berkeley's and Hume's
skepticism.
Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the
insensible parts of bodies, on which depend all their
secondary qualities, there is yet another and more
incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote
from a certain knowledge of the co-existence or
inco-existence (if I may so say) of different ideas in
the same subject; and that is, that there is no dis
coverable connexion between any secondary qualities
and those primary qualities which it depends on."
(Locke, 1952, p. 316)
From Aristotle to Locke, we can see that those who
believe in a science based on observation also believe in the
"principles of separation and verification".

The exact form

of the "principle of separation" did, of course, differ in
some important details.

For example, Aristotle distinguished

between these sensory qualities which displayed the natural
order, and all the other qualities which were not significant
differentia.

The neo-Platonists believed that only these

observables which displayed mathematic harmonies were real.
These early distinctions became a more formalized version of
the "principle of separation" in the doctrines of primary and
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secondary qualities which persisted until Berkeley and Hume,
and which still persist among some practicing scientists.
There are also variations in the way the principle of verif
ication was expressed.

For example, Aristotle believed that

coherence and consistency were the methods by which science
could distinguish true from false propositions while the neoPlatonists relied upon mathematic harmony as a criterion for
truth.

Among the believers in the primary/secondary distinc

tion, there were those, such as Kepler, who believed that the
mark of scientific method is quantifiability and those who,
like Locke, believed that science dealt only with qualities
which remained the same when perceived by any of the senses.
Despite these many significant variations, it should be noted
that all of these men believed that only certain aspects of
human experience could be trusted and that only the special
methods of science could distinguish these aspects from the
rest of experience.
The next important group of theorists of science
changed our account of scientific knowledge significantly,
though they did not abandon the "principles of separation and
verification".

The important transition is marked by Berkeley

and Hume’s challenge of the primary/secondary distinction.
Berkeley took issue with the notion of primary and
secondary qualities because of his epistemic principle,
est percipi".

"esse

This marks a very significant turning point in

the development of a distinction between subject and object.
Berkeley laid to rest the argument that the real world is
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made up of more permanent qualities than the ones we are
capable of perceiving.

He did this on the basis of a princi

ple of knowledge which asserts that all knowledge must ultim
ately be reduced to perceivables.

We can see in this principle,

the origins of the positivists' principles of verification.

"I

see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it and I am sure nothing
cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted:

it is therefore real.

Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tart
ness, and you take away the cherry."

(Berkeley, 1952, p. 117)

Hume made use of the phenomenalist reductionist prin
ciple to challenge the prevalent view of science which was
current in his day.

That is to say, he applied the "to-be-is-

to-be-perceived" principle to many of the scientific ideas such
as the Newtonian view of cause, time and space, and succeeded
in challenging their credulity.

Only those propositions which

had an immediate connection with sensory experience were con
sidered to be scientifically verified.

All other propositions

were considered to be tautological or nonsensical.
Hume's analysis of causality rests on a similar
principle of reductionistic phenomenalism.

Causality is an

idea, which must be reduced to the constant conjunction of
impressions if it is to be meaningful.

In this connection it

is interesting to note that Berkeley and Hume were both
extremely critical of Newton's notion of absolute time and
space.

Their criticism of Newton's time and space were essen•i

tially no different than those adopted by the Vienna Circle.
V
A more detailed account of reductionistic principles
of verification used by phenomenalists is given on pages 73 -8 1 •
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Before the British empiricists, the "principle of
separation" was understood in such a way that certain sensory
experiences were inherently subjective while others were inher
ently objective.

The British empiricists maintained that all

sensory experience is indubitable:

the problem is to separate

sensory experience from normal daily consciousness.

In normal

consciousness, language and other habits deceive us into
attributing equal status to propositions which are very diff
erent in origin.

Our frequent use of words, such as left and

right, may mislead us into believing that these terms have a
basis in reality, that is, similar to objects such as tables
and chairs.

In fact, "left" and "right" are organizational

conventions, logical in origin, while "table and chair" are
labels for a class of experience, empirical in origin.
Newtonian time and space, according to Hume and Berkeley, are
merely logical principles, like our number systems and have no
basis in reality since they cannot be perceived.

Science is

the most reliable method for producing knowledge since it
substitutes experiments for experience, and in doing so sep
arates the formal from the empirical.

It should be noted that

the "principles of separation and verification" are still an
essential aspect of this account of scientific epistemology.
Verification, in this approach, means an immediate basis in
sensory experience, best arrived at through scientific exper
imentation.

"Separation," in this context, is between the for

mal and empirical as parts of experience.
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Since the beginning of British empiricism, there have
not been any significant changes in the overall view of
scientific knowledge.
logical positivism.

British empiricism has developed into
The many steps by which this evolution

took place are covered in considerable detail in Chapter IV.
But in essence there is little difference between Berkeley's
"to-be-is-to-be-perceived" and contemporary, slightly more
sophisticated principles of verification.

The essential point

which unites them is that one can distinguish objective exper
ience by making certain that it has a basis in sensory exper
ience.

More recent versions have added the safeguards that

these experiences must involve publicly observable and repeatable operations.
The "principles of separation and verification", des
pite the many variations in the manner of their expression,
remain essentially unchanged aspects of scientific epistemology.
It was suggested earlier that something more than interest and
method separated epistemologists and psychologists in the
pursuit of an account of knowledge.

That "something more" is

a prior commitment of both disciplines to the principles of
separation and verification.

Both groups of scholars accept

that there is objective and subjective perception.

Because

of his interest in knowledge, the epistemologist can dismiss
the psychology of perception since he is only interested in
objective observation.

He limits his interest to objective

observation because it is here he believes that he will find
a description of the process by which man establishes an

2b

indubitable.

The psychologist, on the other hand, is inter

ested in a description of man's use of his sensory capacities.
He accepts as part of his scientific tradition the use of
these capacities as a method of scientific inquiry, but he
also wishes to understand their use in other contexts.
Commitment to the assumption of objectivity antedates
the contemporary separation of epistemological interests into
psychology and philosophy of science.

How, then, can we rely

on either of these methods as tools appropriate to inquire
into the assumption of objectivity?

Let us examine in turn

the status of each discipline's capacities to deal with the
question of objectivity.
It has already been indicated that by virtue of inter
est and methodology, experimental psychologists have only a
secondary interest in the ontological veridicality of percep
tion.

That secondary interest is usually expressed in terms

of demonstrating the conditions under which perception can be
influenced by other processes.

For example, psychologists

are interested in demonstrating the influence of motivation
in bringing about a misperception.

Whenever they are involved

in this secondary interest, psychologists rely on physicalistic
methods to obtain the "correct" description of the stimulus
and consider any deviations from this description to be an
illusion.

In doing so, they indicate their belief that the

methods of physicalistic observation are qualitatively differ
ent from normal perception.

As was pointed out before, this
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belief is also indicated by the fact that perception is
studied by the method of observation.
Experimental psychology is committed to the subject/
object epistemology primarily because experimental psychology
developed in the late nineteenth century at a time when it
was widely accepted as a credential of science that scientists
were capable of making objective observations.

The question

as to whether or not objective observation was possible could
not be asked once the answer had been presumed by the method
ology.

If we look at the current status of the psychologist's

philosophy of science we find a division which parallels the
subject/object position that we have repeatedly come across.
The two predominant ideologies in contemporary psychology are
behaviorism and phenomenology.

These two camps are in agree

ment that there are two worlds - the subjective and the
objective.

On almost everything else, they are in substantial

disagreement.

(Koch, 196*+)

That behaviorism and phenomenology agree about the
subject/object split is very significant in understanding why
neither school is prepared to deal with the subject of this
inquiry.

The purpose of this inquiry is to see whether there

is any basis for making the assumption of objectivity.

Such

a question is obviously motivated by an interest in the psych
ology of science.
If this is properly a question of psychology, why is
it that behaviorism and phenomenology are not prepared to deal
with it?

The answer seems to be that by virtue of accepting
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the separation between subject and object, each of these
predominant schools of psychology have defined its subject
matter around the question almost as though they were
deliberately skirting the question.

The behaviorist cannot

evaluate the assumption of objectivity because he defines
psychology so as to exclude anything which is not publicly
observable.

He wishes to study only man's behavior.

In reac

tion to this point of view, the phenomenologist defines his
subject matter so as to exclude anything which is publicly
observable.

He wishes to study man's experience.

Questions

about the psychology of science fall somewhere between these
two.

In particular the problem of assessing the role of

objective perceptions seems to be outside the grasp of either
of these points of view, even though it is clear that their
present juxtaposition is somehow related to the assumption
that such objective perceptions are possible.
Rogers, Koch,

Skinner,

(1953)

(196*+)

For historical and conceptual reasons, the methods
currently available within psychology are not well suited to
deal with the question we are asking about objectivity.

At

least, this is so if we are speaking of these methods as
isolated units.

The method suggested in the next chapter for

dealing with the assumption of objectivity will attempt to
make use of "psychological" phenomena, but it will do so in a
manner not consistent with either behaviorism or phenomenology.
Before the psychological phenomena can be rendered useful to
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this inquiry, we must examine the other approach to epistemological problems, which is the philosophy of science.
It was indicated earlier that the separation of
experience into objective observation and subjective percep
tion has led to the development of two separate academic
disciplines to deal with epistemological problems.

It has

also been indicated that because of historical and concep
tual commitments to the assumption of objectivity, the first
of these, experimental psychology, does not have methods
appropriate to the purpose of this inquiry.

We turn now to

an assessment of the method currently available within the
other academic discipline which deals with epistemic problems the philosophy of science.
One of the reasons that contemporary philosophers
who are interested in questions of epistemology turn to the
philosophy of science is that they believe science has the
only methods for establishing indubitables.

The reduction

of the field of epistemology into the field of philosophy of
science constitutes a judgment about the justifiability of the
assumption of objectivity.

The question we must ask to deter

mine whether there are methods currently available within
the philosophy of science to deal with the assumption of ob
jectivity is as follows:

do the methods which philosophers use

to study science have any inherent commitments concerning the
epistemic status of perception?

If they do, do these commit

ments preclude the use of these methods in this inquiry?

The

first thing which is of interest in answering this question is
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that philosophers of science are divided into two major groups
on the question of method.

These two groups are the empirical

and the analytical philosophers of science.

The first of

these two groups consists of those philosophers who believe in
an empirical approach to the study of science.

According to

this point of view, the study of science should itself be a
science.

Included within this group are some of the earliest

and now classical contributors to our understanding of science.
Notable among these are the work of Mills and Whewell.

There

is much in their account of science which contemporary students
would consider analytic.

For example, the two men debate pres

criptive questions such as "what is the proper scientific logic
of induction?"

Nevertheless, the method which both men agree

upon is empirical.

They both seek to establish the correct

ness of their own positions by supporting them with historical
"facts" within the history of science.

Their commitment to an

empirical approach seems to reveal their belief that scientific
methods are capable of differentiating between subjectivity and
objectivity.
Among the empiricist philosophers of science, the
question of this inquiry - that is, whether or not objective
perception is possible - is called the problem of semantics or
empirical significance.

(Stevens, 1939> Frank, 1957)

A strictly

empirical interpretation of the problem of empirical significance
puts this problem squarely in the domain of experimental psych
ology.

This is precisely the way scientists (as opposed to

philosophers) who write about science tend to see the problem.
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For example, Stevens (1939) has suggested that psychological
research on problem solving and concept formation is ground
breaking work in understanding science.

Helmholtz saw

quantification as the distinguishing feature of science, but
he saw in the rudimentary foundations of counting, a "psych
ological capacity" which is propaedeutic for quantification.
If we scrutinize closely what is done in counting an
aggregate or number of things, we are led to the
ability of the mind to relate things to things, to
let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent a
thing by a thing, an ability without which no thinking
is possible.
(Helmholtz, 1930? P» xiii)
The reasons psychologists have demonstrated little
enthusiasm for this problem within the science of science
have already been given.

Even though there has not been any

activity among psychologists attempting to integrate the prob
lem of empirical significance into their research on perception,
the reverse is not true.

That is to say, some philosophers of

science interested in the problem of empirical significance have
attempted to incorporate some principles of perception in their
account of scientific discovery.

In recent years, there has

been an increasing recognition among some philosophers of science
that the psychological must be included along with the logical
1
in order to obtain a genuine picture of scientific knowledge.
This is particularly true in giving an account of the "context
of discovery" within science.

(Kessel, 1968)

The inclusion

of psychological variables as well as the sociological factors
1
Notable among these are Kuhn (1962), Hanson (1958),
and Polanyi (1958)
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among this new group's account of scientific discovery has
had a very profound effect in shifting away from the trad
itional conception of scientific knowledge.

It has forced

a recognition that intuition, insight or creativity are more
important factors in the progress of science than had pre
viously been recognized.

Formerly, an inductive prejudice

as well as a desire to limit analysis to the logical and
exclude the psychological presented a picture of discovery
which has been called induction by enumeration.

According

to this view, scientific discoveries came about from induc
tive processes taking place in a series of repeated observa
tions.

This placed the burden of discovery primarily on

laboratory observation.

By bringing in psychological factors

the new empirical scientists of science have reduced the role
which laboratory observation plays in their account of
scientific knowledge.

They have, of course, not completely

eliminated objective observation from their account of
scientific knowledge.

For this group to do so would run

counter to their own methodology.

According to this school,

the role of observation is most significant in the "context
of justification".
For the purpose of this inquiry, even the limited
commitment represented by the belief that objective perception
is possible in the "context of justification" is more than
can be incorporated into the method.

For as soon as any

element of the assumption of objectivity makes its way into
the method of the inquiry, then we are using it as a tool
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when what we want is to make it the subject of inquiry.

There

is no doubt, however, that this inquiry was inspired by the
successes realized from the incorporation of psychological
factors into the epistemology of science by such men as
Kuhn, Hanson and Polanyi.

It is reasonable to expect that

the influence of psychological factors could potentially
change our account of justification as much as this new
group of empiricist philosophers of science have changed
our account of discovery.

The method of this inquiry must

incorporate the spirit of these accomplishments while ex
cluding the commitment to an empiricist's account of
justification.
As indicated above, there are two schools of phil
osophy of science.
method.

They are divided on the question of

We now turn to the second of these, which is the

analytical school.
Proponents of the analytic methodology argue that
public objects, such as science, are fundamentally normative
structures consisting of symbolic language which is controlled
by regulative principles.
Nagal, 1961)

(Ayer, 1952; Carnap, 1966 and

The appropriate method for determining the

correct use of this symbolic language

does notrest upon an

examination of its actual usage.

rules of the game of

The

chess are examples of such normative.structures and they
determine what a correct chess move is.
example, that children unaware of the

We

do not say, for

rules of the game, who

are playing with chess pieces, are playing chess.
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By the

same token, we cannot rely on our observation of individual
scientists at work correctly to define for us what is
science.
Though this is an accurate presentation of the
analytic point of view, it is by no means one to which all
analytic philosophers would assent.

A notable recent excep

tion is revealed in the work of Harris.
analytic point of view, Harris argues,

The traditionally
(MacKinnon, 1968-69)

has generated a methodology which involves interpreting
science by fitting a reinterpreted residue into a predeter
mined epistemological framework.

Rather, he suggests, the

philosopher must use the evidence afforded by the sciences
to provide a comprehensive and coherent conception of the
universe, and examine the methods actually employed in
scientific investigation to discover standards for the
reliability of this knowledge.
The various schools of analytic philosophy differ
with respect to methods of analysis and epistemic commit
ments.

In discussing models of the assumption of objectivity

in Chapter

IV, these schools are discussed with respect to

their epistemic commitments in particular.

At this point in

the discussion, it will suffice to say that these schools
maintain that science is the knowledge that is produced in
the form of language.

The philosophy of science, therefore

is the clarification of the meaning of these languages by
means of either exhibition or replacement analysis.

19665 Ayer, 1952)
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(Korner,

The word analytic is confusing because its precise
meaning varies from school to school.

For the logical atom-

ists (Russell, 19^3 and early Wittgenstein,'1922), it meant
essentially to reduce all propositions to atomic sentences,
the subject and predicates of which were objects and their
properties in the real world.

Analytic philosophers of a

positivist conviction (Ayer, 1959) wish by means of sorting
to clarify all propositions into three classes:

the analytic,

the synthetic, and the nonsense categories.
At first glance, it would appear that we have at last
struck upon a method which is explicitly non-empirical and
would therefore be most appropriate for this inquiry, since
we are attempting to avoid methods which have an inherent
prejudice towards objectivity.
case.

This, however, is not the

As we pointed out above, since the time of Berkeley

the principle of separation has been between analytic and
synthetic aspects of experience, rather than between inher
ently objective and subjective elements of sensory experience.
The analytic philosophers of science accept the analytic/
synthetic distinction.

They believe that an accurate under

standing of science can only be achieved if work is done in
both aspects.

The scientist with his experimental techniques

generates synthetic propositions but the ordering and clar
ification of such propositions is best achieved by individuals
trained in linguistic and logical analysis.

Consequently we

find that contemporary analytic philosophy of science is
committed to both the "principle of separation" and the

3>+

"principle of verification", which is to say, it accepts the
assumption of objectivity.
Nowhere is their commitment to the epistemic sound
ness of the analytic/synthetic distinction more evident than
with respect to the question which is of central concern to
this inquiry - that is, "what is the epistemic status of
perception?"

The majority of analytic philosophers of science

maintain that there is an essential analytic difference be
tween perception and scientific observation.

Not only do

they deny the relevance of psychological perception to know
ledge but they maintain that the whole problem of perception
is a metaphysical delusion.
For example, Ayer (1952) maintains that it is an
accident of our language that we cannot refer in a grammat
ically correct manner to the qualities of an object without
first using the grammatical fiction "thinghood"; that is,
the subject of a sentence is a thing on which its qualities
are predicated.

This accident leads us to believe erron

eously that the qualities are related to the thing rather than
being the mere sum of all the qualities.

The problem of per

ception is born from this linguistic delusion, since distinc
tions between real and apparent are made and create a
metaphysical substrata.
Thus the problem of showing how statements about
material things are related to observation-statements,
which is, in effect, the traditional problem of
perception, might be thought to require for its
solution that one should indicate a method of trans
lating statements about material things into
observation-statements, and thereby furnish what could
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be regarded as a definition of a material thing.
But, in fact, this is impossible; for, as I have
already remarked, no finite set of observation
statements is ever equivalent to a statement about
a material thing. What one can do, however, is to
construct a schema which shows what sort of rela
tions must obtain between sense-contents for it to
be true, in any given case, that a material thing
exists; and while this process cannot, -properly
speaking, be said to yield a definition, it does
have the effect of showing how the one type of
statement is related to the other.
(Ayer, 1952,
p. 2b)
The kind of schema recommended by Ayer will be
examined more carefully in the discussion of the behavioristpositivist model in Chapter

IV.

Collins (1967) has developed a schema which is aimed
at demonstrating the logical independence of knowledge and
perceptual claims.

Though an exposition of this schema is

too technical for the present context, the following points
are made to demonstrate this his schema depends entirely upon
language analysis and says nothing of perceptual abilities.
Essentially Collins attempts to show that perception verbs
are used with propositional statements, but this does not
indicate that the verbs mean both perceptual and knowledge
claims in the same context.

In the claim, "he sees Mount

Monadnock", we have essentially a perceptual claim since it
is possible to make the claim about someone who has never
heard about Mount Monadnock and therefore is not making a
judgment "that that is Mount Monadnock".

There appears to be

a combined perceptual and knowledge claim in the following
construction, "he sees that that is Mount Monadnock".
argues that these can be separated.
36

Collins

There is a knowledge

claim which can be logically separated from the perceptual
claim by pointing out that it could not be attributed to any
one who did not know about Mt. Monadnock, even if it could be
shown that that person is perceiving Mt. Monadnock.

Insight

into the essence of his argument comes from understanding
his claim that the proposition that "Seeing is believing" is
not analogous to "swimming is exercising".

Doing a little

seeing is not doing a little believing, as doing a little
swimming is doing a little exercising.

Collins concludes

from this that even though perception influences knowledge,
and knowledge influences perception, and that those influences
can be demonstrated experimentally, this is no basis for
asserting the inseparability of the two.

The distinctions

made by Collins and Ayer are not necessary conclusions from
an analytic approach to the problem of semantics.

They have

embedded in them more than the analytic method as a presup
position.

They follow in the tradition of Wittgenstein in

assuming a representative theory of signs.

Wittgenstein

believed that the modern alphabet is essentially the same
kind of sign system as was hieroglyphics.

There is another

analytic philosopher who presents us with a contrasting view
to the notion that signs are representative.
Hanson distinguishes between symbols and signs,
arguing that signs stand for referents while symbols char
acterize them.

The atomic, protocol, or observation state

ments in science are not, as Wittgenstein (1922) maintains,
maps or signs of the phenomena, but are more complex symbolic
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characterizations.

It is not possible in Hanson's view to

separate the knowledge claim from the perception claim, since
the basic statements of knowledge give rise to alternative
perceptions.
We shall see later that this is a debate between those
who hold logical constructs to be fictional conveniences, as
does Ayer, and those, as Hanson, who holds constructs to be
"vrhole" principles of organization.
With the exception of Hanson, the large majority of
analytic philosophers have disassociated the problem of
observation from the problem of perception.

They see no need

for an integration between their methods and the evidence
collected by experimental psychologists.

In addition, the

sharp distinction which these philosophers make between
analytic and synthetic propositions reveals an explicit be
lief in that "principle of separation" which in turn reveals
an implicit belief in the capacity of science to make objec
tive observations by which to produce synthetic knowledge.
We have seen that one of the oldest and most persis
tent aspects of scientific thought can be understood in terms
of two principles.

The "principle of separation" which

maintains that only certain aspects of experience can be
trusted and the "principle of verification" which maintains
that scientific method is the only way available for discrim
inating those aspects of experience which can be trusted and
those which cannot.

The "principle of separation" preceded
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the formation of our contemporary academic specialities;
therefore, we developed a discipline with methods and inter
ests for each of the two kinds of experiences that the seperation created.

The philosophy of science would answer the

most important question in philosophical epistemology which
was, how does man establish an indubitable unit of knowledge,
while the psychology of perception would give us a descrip
tion of man's ordinary subjective experience.

Even with each

of these separate disciplines of epistemology there were other
dichotomies which once again paralleled the "principle of
separation," so that psychology divided into behaviorism and
phenomenology and philosophy of science divided into analytic
and empirical approaches.
Wot all the developments in these fields militated
against joining scientific epistemology and the psychology
of perception.

We noted above, for example, the work of a

few philosophers of science who brought psychological factors
to our understanding of the logic of discovery.

There is

also some evidence that many analytic philosophers are
realizing that a combination of analytic and empirical tech
niques must be used to give an account of epistemology.

A

good example of this is available to us in the work of Harris.
There is, unfortunately, no counter balancing evidence that
psychologists are becoming more aware that certain analytic
and normative processes, such as language, must be incorpor
ated into their study of perception.
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There is no doubt that

psychologists have for a long time recognized the influence
of language on perception.

They have not learned from analy

tic philosophers to analyze language as a set of publicly
available prescriptions governed by normative regulations.
We have seen that these two disciplines have, as
Hirst (1959? p. 2*0 puts it, dealt with these questions "in
haughty isolation from each other", and we have tried to
argue that there is more than just interest and method which
has kept the two disciplines apart.
is the assumption of objectivity.

That "something more"
What, therefore, can we

learn about the conceptual requirements of a method to be
used to inquire into the assumption of objectivity?

The

first thing to be learned is that there are immediate meth
odological benefits which can result from merely holding the
assumption in abeyance.

We can see this by examining what

happens to the two major objections which have kept psychology
and scientific epistemology apart, once the assumption of
objectivity is held in abeyance.
From the discussion so far, it can be seen that the
relationship between epistemology and perception is logically
and historically ambiguous and controversial.

Since this

study intends to show that perception is episteraologically
relevant in science, at least two philosophical distinctions
between perception and epistemology must be dealt with.

The

first of these is that raised by Hamlyn (1961) in which he
says that the purposes of epistemology and the science of
perception are divergent.

Epistemological philosophy is
l+O

prescriptive and aims at justifying claims to knowledge.
Psychology of perception is descriptive and aims at under
standing the conditions which give rise to certain experiences.
This distinction is one which most psychologists would readily
accept and is one of the reasons which has kept perceptual
scientists out of the business of developing sign theories
for the epistemology of science.

It seems, however, that the

distinction must ultimately fail since it is precisely in the
activity of perception that the normative and the experiential
become fused.

This is true in the ideographic sense that an

individual in the activity of perception labels his exper
iences according to linguistic categories, and thereby shapes
the experiential by way of norms.

The normative and exper

iential also come together in the nomenthetic or public sense
that language becomes fused to phenomena in science.

The

original intention of perceptual science to describe has lead
to a description which involves necessarily normative epis
temic considerations.

In other words, some of the most

important conditions to give rise to certain experiences or
percepts are linguistic, and therefore normative.
Besides the distinction between prescription and
description there is the claim made by

Ayer (1952) and

Collins (1967) that perception is a metaphysical problem,
and therefore by definition falls into the realm of nonsense,
or at least has nothing to do with the claim to knowledge.
As was implied in a previous section, proponents of this view
already are relying on a form of perceptual atomism which is
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by no means universally accepted.

When Ayer claims that

those who propose the perceptual problem are being deluded
by language into thinking that the subject of propositions is
a real substratum giving rise to its predicated qualities, he
reveals his phenomenalism, which after all is a theory of
perception.

It is by no means clear from studying experi

mental psychology of perception that the primitives of exper
iences, or the givens are what Ayer calls "sense content".
Nor is it clear that man has the capacity to simply and
directly "represent" these sense contents in atomic sentences.
It is preferable not to prescribe any limitations on what
description will ultimately reveal, or to elevate a particu
lar epistemological commitment to an epistemological
prescription.
The method we choose will have to- overcome the
analytic/synthetic distinction:

that is, it must somehow

combine normative information with experimental information
without assigning one to the realm of ideas and the other
to the realm of facts.

CHAPTER III
THE METHOD OF ANOMALIES
At this point, a method which Is neither analytic nor
experimental is required.

It has been demonstrated that the

currently existing methodologies for dealing with questions of
epistemology tend to be either analytic or empirical.

We have

already seen that the almost universal acceptance of this dis
tinction militates against an inquiry into the question of
objectivity.

It does so by virtue of the fact that current

methods have imbedded in them a commitment to the assumption
of objectivity.

The method which will be used makes no inher

ent distinction between analytic or synthetic, subjectivity or
objectivity, veridical or illusory.

In the context of the

inquiry, perhaps the best name for this method would be the
method of anomalies.

This name suggests a new method, but in

fact it is a method which is modeled after a scientific method
which goes back to Galileo.
experiments."

This is the method of "thought

(Myers, 1968)

The method of anomalies requires

a considerably detailed explanation but it will be helpful to
begin by expressing some broad outlines and the major thrust
of the method.
The method of anomalies provides a systematic way of
producing counterevidence to an assumption which is the sub
ject of an inquiry.

Broadly speaking, there are five steps

which must be accomplished.

In the first place, an assumption

of some significance in the current structure of knowledge
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must be identified.
tion explicit.

The next step requires making this assump

This involves reviewing the role the assumption

plays in the various theories relevant to the domain in which
the assumption is made.

Having made the assumption explicit

makes it possible to hold that assumption in abeyance and there
by collect anomalies to the assumption.
lenge the credulity of the assumption.

These anomalies chal
The next step involves

seeking an alternative to the assumption which will hopefully
conclude the inquiry by making possible the last step in which
the difficulty raised by the anomalies is resolved.
In order to examine the question as to whether or not
the subjectivity/objectivity distinction is valid, we must set
it aside in the method we use for examining the question.

No

matter how peculiar the method suggested appears to be, its
peculiarity is a necessity, for to get rid of it would nec
essitate accepting a method which would assume in advance an
answer to the question being asked.

A natural question which

will be asked of anyone who claims not to be working in either
the analytic or synthetic realm, is:
working in?

What realm are you

Kant had an answer to this question; he would

have pointed to the realm of the a priori synthetic.

Though

Kant's a priori synthetic is an appropriate answer to this
question, it is not one which this author had in mind when he
chose this method.

But if one thinks of Einstein's thought

experiments in which he proposed physically impossible events,
such as physicists riding elevators through empty space in order

to get at conceptual consequences about the real world, one
can easily see that this work is important despite the fact
that it is neither analytic nor synthetic.
Perhaps the best known example of a thought experiment
was the one given by Einstein1 in which an elevator containing
experimental physicists is first dropped in free fall in a
gravitational field and then pulled at a constantly accelerated
speed by a supernatural force in an inertial field.

Einstein

demonstrated that the physicists inside would confuse a grav
itational field for an inertial field and vice versa.

It

should be noted that Einstein came to this conclusion by the
method which analytic philosophers claim can only be arrived
at through linguistic analysis.

(Ayer, 1952)

In other words,

he proved that the distinction between inertia and gravity is
analytic, not synthetic.

He demonstrated that phenomenally

you cannot distinguish between the two kinds of forces.

This

important conceptual clarification was done by pushing the
meaning of the concepts inertia and gravity to the limit of
their implications.
The method of thought experiments differs from the
analytic method in that it depends upon propositional conse
quences.

In other words, thought experiments aim to make

conclusions which are relevant to the real world.

They depend

upon an "if-then" series of propositions rather than a defin
itional analysis.
-

This idealized experiment is described in detail in
Einstein and Infeld (1938) pp. 21*4-222.

...thought experiments are similar to empirical
experiments in that the results of both must be
interpreted by means of propositions having either
theoretical or factual status. Just as the "facts"
supposedly revealed by a physicist's experiment are
established by the experiment only if the notions of
electricity, optics, heat, and so on governing the
construction and use of the experimental apparatus
are correct, so the philosopher's interpretation of
the results of his thought experiments is acceptable
only if the propositions he employs in his inter
pretation are acceptable.
(Myers, 1968, p. 191? 192)
The discussion of Einstein's work at this point is
presented only as an example of the fact that not all good
scientific inquiry can be easily classified as analytic or
experimental.

Particularly in the context of discovery it is

becoming more clearly recognized that fanciful imagination
is an important part of scientific fruitfulness.
The reason so much stress has been placed on the nonanalytic and non-experimental aspect of this method is that
the specific assumption which we wish to examine in the
inquiry is one which is generally used to justify the distinc
tion between analysis and experimentation.

Having made this

point clear we must examine the various steps in the method
to see first how they work in general, and secondly how they
apply to this particular problem.

The first step in the

method of anomolies involves identifying an assumption.

To

understand this step we must begin with an examination of the
role that assumptions play in knowledge in general.
Webster's tells us that an assumption is anything
taken for granted, a presupposition.

All knowledge systems,

be they empirical or formal, make use of assumptions as a

necessary beginning place.

The important point to be noticed

is that they are not subject to empirical test, but are used
as a background for testing propositions of lower order of
generality.

Myers states this proposition very clearly when

he says,
It is evident that while science is self-correcting in
respect to the system of belief it produces, it is not
self-correcting, in respect to those beliefs such as
that in the existence of reals which the doing of science
presupposes. If, contrary, to the fact, these pre
supposed beliefs were wrong, then the practice of science
would not correct them. Hence science does not provide
an example of how someone working within a framework
of material and methodological assumptions can critically
examine the framework without standing outside it.
(Myers, 1968, p. 18*+)
It is because assumptions are not subject to empirical tests
that other methods are necessary for conducting inquiry into
knowledge which already exists.
According to T.S. Kuhn (1962) it is characteristic of
normal science that a certain cluster of achievements based
on common assumptions form a defining network.

This network,

which he calls a paradigm, is accepted by most scientists as
the source of questions to be worked on.

Within such a para

digm there is no means of questioning the basic assumptions
which are the starting place that came prior to the achievement
of facts.

Kuhn includes in his definition of paradigms, theories,

laws, instrumentation and application which grouped together
create a coherent research tradition.

This tradition is what

must be learned to become initiated into the science as one of
its practitioners.
characteristics.

The viability of the system rests on two
The first is that the paradigm as initiated

is unprecedented enough to attract followers.

Secondly, it

is open ended enough to leave some problems unresolved.

The

course of normal science is characterized by Kuhn as one in
which the unresolved problems of the paradigm are worked on in
a"puzzle solving" fashion, but during which there is no ques
tioning of the fundamentals of the paradigm.

(Kuhn, 1962)

A paradigm is defined as a pattern, example or model
and it is this broad sense of the term which is important in
the present context.

Most historians of science would con

sent to the existence of paradigms as just defined, even
though they might disagree with the definition and interpret
ation by Kuhn.
It should be noted that historians do not agree that
the notion of paradigm is applicable to all sciences.

Watson

(1967) notes that psychology is an example of science in which
one can find lacking many of the characteristics of a paradig
matic science.

There is no basic agreement among psychologists

about theories or methods.

Besides this ideological provin

cialism, Watson points to significant national differences in
psychology as evidence of the fact that the first paradigmatic
revolution has not yet arrived in psychology.
For the purpose of this discussion, however, Watson's
objections are not critical, since he substitutes for paradigms
the notion of prescriptions.

In doing so he differentiates for

us between those aspects of the Kuhnian definition and the
broader definition referred to above, making it clear that some
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form of assumptive structure is needed in a science as a set
of guiding principles.

Watson says of his prescriptions,

The overall function of these themes is orientative
or attitudinals they tell us how the psychologistscientist must or should behave. In short they have
a directive function. They help to direct the
psychologist-scientist in the way he selects a prob
lem, formulates it, and the way in which he carries
it out."
(Watson, 1967» p. ^35)
For the purpose at hand, which is to demonstrate what
the role of assumptions in science is, the differences between
prescriptions and paradigms are not significant.

It can be

seen that in either case a form of a guiding principle

which

is obtained as part of a scientist's training, and can

be

traced through a period of time in history, is being taken
for granted by the individual scientist in his research.
It is clear that there is agreement on the proposition
that all sciences have imbedded in them certain assumptions
and that those assumptions are not subject to the self-correcting
influence of inquiry.

They are above those influences and

therefore one must stand outside the science in order to
question them.

The full

and complete impact that such assump

tions have on the knowledge which is generated under them is
simply not known to us.

But there are two important insights

about the influence of assumptions which have been identified.
The first of these two insights is that assumptions play a
very significant role in defining the problems and selecting
the issues which shall be investigated within a discipline*
The second insight into the influence of assumptions is less

definite but probably more important:

it appears to be

desirable to eliminate as many assumptions as possible.

There

is some evidence that suggests that some great scientific
breakthroughs have occured as a result of removing old assump
tions, rather than by adding new information.
Let us now turn to an examination of the roles which
assumptions play in defining the problems within a domain of
knowledge.
It is in the realm of presupposition and assumption
that we find the source of problem definition.

For this reason

science must have methods for looking within itself.
Real progress in any science comes not merely by "adding
to" existing knowledge, but by becoming aware of our
assumptive worlds, conscious of their inadequacy, des
troying and disintegrating them, and then rebuilding
them in the constant search for more adequate formu
lations.
(Cantril, 19^9? p* 375)
In this connection the transactionalists have attempted
to develop a systematic method by which one can come up with
new questions in science.

This is done in the belief that

problem definition is as significant, if not more significant,
than problem solution.

Heisenberg agrees that this is a prob

lem in the physical as well as the social sciences.

He main

tains that we have developed experimental methods to generate
and evaluate solutions but that we have inherited from the
Greeks a propensity for an intuitional approach for generating
and evaluating the validity of questions.

Many contemporary

writers, (Bridgman, 19^9; Stevens, 19^7; Ayer, 1952) have
taken the position that the principles of operationalism
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constitute one set of criteria for discriminating meaningful
from nonsense questions, while the meaning of operationalism
is intimately related to our notions of objectivity.

The

discussion of operationalism as a method for evaluating ques
tions will be postponed.

It is our view that operationalism

offers no systematic method for generating questions.
The method of challenging assumptions by the means of
anomalies, which is roughly

modeled after the thought exper

iment, is a method which will yield significant new questions.
An example which we have already discussed at length is the
set of new questions which become evident from the reintegra
tion of the epistemology of science and psychology of perception.
Questions about problems which these two questions have in
common are not evident as long as one assumes a difference
between objective observation and subjective perception.

For

example, it is for the most part not recognized that the data
language problem in philosophy of science and the behavioral
indicator problem in the psychology of perception are essen
tially the same problem.

In experimental perception there is

probably no greater difficulty than the fact that the exper
imenter must rely on some kind of verbal or behavioral
indicator to evaluate the phenomenological.

No definitive

solution to this problem, is yet available, which can assure
an experimenter that two subjects responding to the same
words or other behavioral indicators are experiencing the
same phenomenological qualities.

This problem, which is as fam

iliar to psychologists, has an exact counterpart in the
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philosophy of science.

In this context, the problem has to

do with the relationship of language to phenomena.

The

philosopher of science must study the language of scientists
and assume that the language is an adequate indicator of the
phenomena which the scientists study.

Notice the similarity in

the quotation below to the familiar problem in perceptual
psychology.
There is no disagreement on the phenomena to be
studied, but when one comes to tell what these
phenomena are, or how they are to be categorized,
then the strife begins.
(Kattsoff, 1957 9 P» 27)

The belief that there is agreement on the phenomena under study
but no consensus as to how to tell what the phenomena are about
or how to categorize the phenomena, is parallel to saying that

certain perceptual experiences are taking place without responses
from which they can be inferred.

If all the evidence one has to

go by is in fact public knowledge, then it must consist of the
telling and categorizing of the phenomena by the scientific
community; otherwise, we are forced to maintain that we cannot
express what we are in fact agreed upon.
In addition to suggesting new and important questions,
there may well be a more direct benefit from challenging exist
ing assumptions.

In recent years some writers have emphasized

that many of the significant changes which have taken place in
science came about, not from adding new knowledge to what was
already known, but from destroying something which had been
taken for granted within science.
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Agnes Arber (196*0 is one such writer who acknowledges
that basic assumptions are necessary and inevitable.

She be*

lieves that we have opened new areas for actual investigation
by reducing these assumptions to the smallest possible number.
As a single example, from biology, of something which
was long held, without adequate reason, to come into
the category of the given; and to be thus immune from
inquiry, we may recall the affirmation that the leaf
is a basic unit of the plant body in the angiospersms.
So long as this was assumed, any effort to understand
the morphology of the leaf was forbidden; the leaf
was a concept which one could not, as it were, get
behind. 'When, however, the ban was lifted, and the
leaf lost, the privileged position accorded to it as
an organ sui generis, the way was opened towards
interpreting it.
(Arber, 196*f, p. 81)
More evidence that it is desirable to eliminate as
many assumptions as possible comes to us from Polanyi (1967)*
He has investigated the logic of negation and he holds that
many important scientific breakthroughs are cases in which
problems arising from a certain assumption are eliminated by
negating the validity of the assumption rather than by solving
the problem.

Among these are the Principle of Inertia, the

Second and Third Laws of Thermodynamics, the Theory of
Chemical Elements, the Principles of both special and general
Relativity, the Principle of Indeterminacy, and the Pauli
Principle.

Taking only one of these as an example, certain

ideal conditions which were assumed in mechanics led scientists
for many years to believe in, and in fact work on, the con
struction of perpetual motion machines.

The fact that no one

is presently engaged in solving this problem does not mean that
the problem has been solved.
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It means that the impossibility

of the problem has been raised Into a universal principle in
the form of the Second Law.
If Polanyi and Arber are correct in assuming that by
reducing the number of existing assumptions we are making
scientific progress, then it means that challenging assumptions
is desirable and that we should try to develop systematic
methods which allow us to challenge assumptions.
Having gained an understanding of the significance of
assumptions in knowledge we may now turn our attention to the
next step in the method.

That next step involves making as

explicit as possible the assumption which is the subject of
inquiry.
After having said -this much on the significance of
underlying assumptions, it is disappointing to say that very
little has been written and presumably this means little is
known about how one identifies such an assumption.

As these

assumptions are related to science they tend to be propositionalj that is, they tend to be assumptions about the nature
. t'

of things.

•

Classic examples of such assumptions, so blatantly

identifiable post hoc, are the assumptions of absolute time
and space.

A further example is that described by Arber con

cerning the status of the leaf.

Not all assumptions related

to science are of this form however.

At least one set of

assumptions in science is concerned with the abilities of
scientists, rather than the subject matter which they study.
Among these are the assumptions scientists make about their
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power of observation.

It has already been mentioned on

several occasions that these fall within the domain of the
psychology of science.
No matter what the assumptions•are about, the fact
that they are so difficult to identify can be understood when
we consider that they have an implicit and an explicit aspect.
The explicit assumptions in a science are always available
for challenge.

A good indication of this is the fact that

Hume (1952) and Berkeley (1952) as well as Newton himself (Michelmore, 1 9 6 2 ) challenged the assumption of absolute time and
space.

They were not successful because their challenge was

explicit and they did not carry the challenge through all of
its implications.

Einstein, on the other hand, not only

challenged this assumption, but showed us what difference it
made.

Hopefully, this dissertation will succeed in justifying

the belief that explicit assumptions are available in the
formal structure, and that we can understand their meaning by
carrying them out to their logical conclusions.
Implicit assumptions make their influence felt in the
perceptual, rather than in the logical, realm.

Changes in

explicit assumptions can be made without a change in implicit
assumptions.

The consequence of doing so is to produce oddity.

It has often been said that only a few men truly can understand
Einstein's theory of relativity.

This claim rests upon a

belief that only a few men can treat physical propositions on
an exclusively logical level.

Having mastered the mathematics

allows one to calculate consequences which are logically
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independent of absolute time and space.

When we convert the

mathematics to description, we involve a language which is
based on the implicit assumption of absolute time and space.
The consequences must necessarily seem to us impossible be
cause we cannot imagine them.
The seeming impossibility of some of the relativistic
conclusions is due to the fact that at the level of "common
sense", and therefore perceptually, we are Newtonians.

The

same kind of discrepancy applies to theories of perception
and philosophies of science.

As professional scientists,

psychologists may conclude various things about perception
which lead us to think that everyday perception is not
veridical.

Nevertheless in his everyday experience the psych

ologist operates on the assumption of perceptual realism.
Likewise scientists and philosophers of science may take pos
itivist and other positions which deny any metaphysical claims
on reality, but in their everyday lives as well as in the
laboratory they operate as realists.

The assertion that

assumptions can influence perception is made on the basis of
much perceptual research.

The most direct evidence for this

point is provided by Ames and his colleages.

Some of this

research will be examined in detail in Chapters IV and V.
At this point, Ames' words are sufficient to communicate the
relationship between implicit assumptions and perception.
That it is our perceptual world and not our abstracted
world that is most basic and is directly related to our
purposes is disclosed by the fact that in a concrete

56

situation it is our perceptual response (sensations)
and not our abstracted concepts that determine our
actions (distorted ROOM). (Ames, 1960, p. 1*f)
In the case of the distorted room, the assumption that
"this is a room" does not have to be made explicitly by the
subject, it is immediate in his perception.

Furthermore,

changing the implicit perceptual assumption requires more than
merely telling the subject that it is a distorted room.

One

must tell the subject how the room is distorted; that is, one
must carry it out to its experiential consequences.

Identifying

an underlying assumption means more than pointing to its ex
plicit name, such as the subject/object split or absolute
time and space.

It means getting a feel for the experiential

consequences of making such an assumption.
At this point, it is of crucial importance to consider
the use of anomalies in challenging assumptions.

To do this

we must clarify the meaning of the term anomaly and the term
challenge.
Webster's defines an anomaly as anything which deviates
from the general rule, while Kuhn, to whom we are indebted for
the idea of anomalies, sees them as facts which are contrary
to the existing paradigm.

Kuhn himself is unhappy with being

forced by linguistic convention into calling anomalies facts
as opposed to theories.
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e.,
with the recognition that nature has somehow violated
the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal
science. It then continues with a more or less extended
exploration of the area of anomaly.
And it closes only
when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the
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anomalous has become the expected.
Assimilating a new
sort of fact demands a more than additive adjustment of
theory, and until that adjustment is completed, until
the scientist has learned to see nature in a different
way - the new fact is not quite a scientific fact at
all.
(Kuhn, 1962, pp. 52-53)
The first question which we must consider is one of
factuality.

Are anomalies simply experimental facts which

cannot be accounted for by existing theory?

Most observers

will agree that not all experimental results which cannot be
accounted for by existing theory are to be considered anomalous
in Kuhn1s sense of the word.

The majority are attributable to

error and most are ignored.^
Three contemporary philosophers of science who have
pondered the problem of scientific discovery are important in
understanding the factuality of anomalies.
Kuhn and Feyerabend.

They are Popper,

These men hold complex and often con

flicting views concerning the evolution of scientific ideas,
yet each is identified with a particular tenet which is relevant
to this question.
Popper1s views with respect to the problems of induc
tion are of special importance in an analysis of the role of
perception in science, but this will be taken up in a later
section.

The part of Popper's philosophy which is relevant

to this question is his emphasis on the deductive logical
consistency of scientific knowledge systems.

He briefly states

his position as follows:

1A great deal of relevant literature concerning the
disposition of counterevidence is available on this point.
Notably the work of Polanyi, Duhem, Popper and Feyerabend.
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My point of view is, briefly, that our ordinary
language is full of theories; that observation is
always observation in the light of theories; and
that it is only the inductivist prejudice which
leads people to think that there could be a phen
omenal language, free of theories, and distinguishable
from a "theoretical language"; and lastly that the
theorist is interested in explanation as such, that
is to say, in testable explanatory theories:
appli
cations and predictions interest him only for theor
etical reasons— because they may be used as tests of
theories.
(Popper, 1959, P» 59)
That facts do not stand up by themselves is important
in understanding anomalies.

Kuhn has indicated his belief

that crisis in the evolution of science results from the
experience by certain scientists of anomalies to the tradi
tional paradigm.

We must keep Popper's perspective in mind

when using the word anomalies, for it would make no more
sense to believe that bits of information against a theory
can exist independently, than to believe that they can exist
independently to support the theory.
Kuhn himself is not clear on this point.

He says on

the one hand that the discovery of oxygen by Lavoisier was
anomalous to the existing chemical paradigm.

He goes on to

recite that if the criterion of discovery is the isolation of
the gas, then it predates both Priestly and Lavoisier.

If,

on the other hand, the criterion be the understanding of the
chemical qualities of a gas then Lavoisier's attribution of
acidic and atomic characteristics to the gas means that he
fails to discover it.

He goes on to show that no experiment

in any specific time or place can be isolated in which oxygen
was discovered.

The term discovery is in part to blame be

cause it leads us to believe that oxygen was experienced the
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first time

through some exclusively inductive process.

As

Kuhn (1962) points out there is evidence to suggest that
Lavoisier was dissatisfied with the entire existing paradigm
and that this dissatisfaction was essential to his discovery.
If anomalies are not ontological contradictions
bumped into by scientists engaged in the evolution of normal
science, then we must seek an alternative set of dynamics to
account for the crises that occur in the evolution of science.
It is Feyerabend (1961) who provides such an alternative by
suggesting that scientific progress takes place during crisis
periods while an abnormal pluralism is flourishing.

Normal

science to Feyerabend is monistic and dogmatic and if it is
not challenged for a sufficient period of time then it will
become metaphysical.

With Feyerabend, the role of anomalies

is considerably diminished.

The view held here falls some

where between Kuhn and Feyerabend.

Anomalies are neither

ontological stumbling blocks to an otherwise monistic theoretic
bliss, nor mere fallout of theoretical debate.

We must con

clude, therefore, that at the present time there is no clear
cut answer as to whether or not anomalies are simple exper
imental facts.
There is another question which arises out of the way.
From reading Kuhn one is lead to believe that anomalies arise
at a time just before revolution to a new paradigm.

It is

the present writer's view that old facts explained by the
existing paradigm can become anomalous if offered in the right
context.

"The principle of inertia, the law of conservation
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of energy were gained only by new and virginal thoughts about
well-known experiments and phenomena."

(Einstein, Infeld,

1938, p. 96)

With these considerations in mind, let us consider a
definition of what is intended here by the word anomaly.

An

anomaly consists of phenomena viewed in a context which sug
gests that our expectations with respect to the behavior of
the phenomena are in error.
thought experiment.

As an example, consider Einstein's

None of the facts concerning the behav

ior of the physicist's experiments in the elevators is new
facts; none of the facts is in themselves surprising or
anomalous, but the total effect of seeing these facts under
conditions where we expected other facts, gives rise to our
suspicion that something is awry.
If one has been successful in identifying an underlying
assumption and understanding its implications, it should be pos
sible to produce anomalies merely by asking for counterevidence
to the assumption.

Challenging the assumption means looking

at the anomalies as they fit under the conditions prescribed
by any paradigm or model which makes use of the assumption.

In

this way we can make comparisons between various models' ability
to deal with the phenomena.
erators of facts.
have produced.

Scientific models are positive gen

We tend to see the models with the facts they

In this situation, we try to make them deal with

the facts which are relevant to their domain, but not necessar
ily produced by them.

Here we can look again at Einstein's

thought experiments as an example of this technique.
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He often

used facts produced by terrestrial physics in contexts, ideal
or real, which were not part of the conditions Newton assumed
in his model.
at

The famous example in which clocks travelling

different speeds are found to keep a different time relies

on the fact that the original context which was assumed by
Newton has been changed .1

This produces a fact about these

two different time pieces which Newton should be able to ac
count for, since his model purports to have general laws
about time.

Hopefully it can be demonstrated that in the

field of perception, various models have generated facts which
appear to fall within the same domain but, in fact, these
models are very often generating anomalies for other models
of perception.

By challenging, we mean that we are making

demands on the model which we would expect it to be able to
fulfill if it were an adequate model to account for the do
main of which it is a m o d e l .
Once the assumption of objectivity as it exists in the
various models of perception has been challenged, we should be
able to detect the conceptual requirements of an adequate al
ternative to the assumption of objectivity.

Such alternatives

could involve different kinds of solutions.

An alternative

assumption to that of objectivity might be made which does not
have the problems which are revealed by the challenge to
objectivity.

Adjustments might be made in other aspects of

the models so that they no longer depend on an assumption in

This idealized experiment is described in detail
in Einstein and Infeld (1938), pp. 21^-222.
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this area.

This is the same as saying that we might find that

the assumption did not play an important role.

Finally, we

might conclude that the assumption of objectivity is justified
under certain conditions and not under others.

Whatever the

case might be, the alternative will have to be explored in
terms of its consequences for the resolution of problems
raised by the challenge.
In summary, it will be beneficial to review the five
essential steps in the method of anomalies.
The method of challenging assumptions by means of
anomalies does not fit into the usual classifications of
analytic or synthetic.

This is so because the usual division

presumes objectivity which is the subject of the inquiry.
This method resembles the thought experiment in that it makes
use of already known facts to explore the implications of com
bining these facts with assumed conditions.
Challenging assumptions is important because assump
tions are taken for granted by the usual methods of inquiry.
Paradigms or prescriptions are examples of sets of guiding
assumptions in science.

They generate the questions scien

tists ask and the problems for which they seek solutions by
means of empirical methods.

The reduction of the number of

assumptions seems to be another good reason for challenging
assumptions since there is evidence that some scientific
progress came directly from the negation of assumptions.
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Identifying an underlying assumption means more than
being able to call its name or to isolate it within the formal
system.

It offers an opportunity to trace its logical and

experiential consequences.

Identifying the assumption

explicitly is an analytical problem.

Identifying the assump

tion implicitly means demonstrating the concrete differences
the assumption makes in any given system.
Demonstrating the concrete differences that an assump
tion can make means dealing with phenomena as well as with
theories.

In this method the phenomena which are used are

called anomalies.

An anomaly consists of phenomena viewed in

a context which suggests that our expectations with respect to
the behavior of the phenomena are in error.

Challenging

assumptions in this context means making demands on the
assumption, forcing it to deal with material which is contra
dictory to it, but relevant to its domain.
The result of challenging the assumption is an assess
ment of the adequacy of the assumption

and the development

of conceptual requirements for an alternative which would be
more adequate than the assumption being challenged.
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CHAPTER IV
MAKING THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY EXPLICIT
The purpose of this Chapter Is to examine the assump
tion of objectivity as it fits into various theories of per
ception and observation.
models require exposition.

To accomplish this, five different
These models are complexes of

philosophical and psychological theories of empiricism.

It

is obvious that not all aspects of these models can be dealt
with in this context.

Our primary goal is to see how each

defines objectivity.
Two kinds of perceptual theory must be reviewed in
order to get a proper understanding of the prevalent models
of perception which are available.

They are philosophical

prescriptive theories and psychological descriptive theories.
The two kinds of theories combine to form a model of percep
tion.
two.

The prescriptive theory is the more general of the
It supplies us with rules or minimal requirements which

any of the descriptive theories must meet.

For example, the

prescriptive realist sets up requirements which must be met
by any description but he will permit any description that
meets the standards.

Five such models will be developed:

they are the realist, the positivist, the configurationist,
the neorealist and the transactionalist.
It will become obvious that not all of these five
models addresses itself directly to the assumption of objec
tivity.

Furthermore, to the extent that they do so, their
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formal definitions differ, as do their emphases on certain
aspects of these definitions.

If we are to maintain the

criteria of synonamous definitions, we will undoubtedly find
that all of these five models make different assumptions about
objectivity.
Webster's defines objectivity as "an objective state
or quality, or objective reality," objective is further defined
as "1.

of or having to do with a known or perceived object,

not a mental image or idea.

2.

independent of the mind; real 3»

being, or regarded as being,
concerned with the actual

characteristics of the thing dealt with rather than with the
thoughts, feelings, etc."
worth emphasis.

Two aspects of this definition are

The first is the feature of independence,1

objective knowledge is independent of the knower.

The second

feature is implicit in all the definitions, but is not stated.
This is the feature of certainty.

When something is objective,

we are sure of its truth and meaning.

We hold the classical

definition of objectivity to imply independence and certainty.
Each of the five models which follows will be examined in
order to answer these questions:

Does the model allow for

the classical definition of objectivity?

In what ways does it

differ from the classical definition of objectivity?

How is

the objectivity that it does allow, achieved?
-

The feature of independence is discussed in more
detail on pages 1^ 8 - 150 .
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A realist is one who believes that there is an exis
tential world which is independent of us and external to us
and that this world can be known by us.

Early naive forms of

realism held that objects conveyed images directly to our
minds through some ethereal medium.

Though this picture is

still consistent with much of our daily experience, it is
seldom taken seriously by philosophers or scientists.

One of

the earliest forms of realism to be taken seriously was the
dualistic position described in Chapter II as the doctrine
of primary and secondary qualities.
Locke's (1967) theory of perception is an example of
an indirect realism since it holds that only part of what we
perceive can be attributed to the object independently of our
perceiving it.

Certain qualities, such as color, are only in

us and are dependent on the senses.

Other qualities can be

apprehended by several senses and, therefore, they are held
to be in the object.
recent times.

This view was widely held until very

(Montague, 1965)

One of the major reasons for

believing it was that it paralleled the qualitative/quanti
tative distinction in science.
From the belief that the nonquantitative qualities
of objects are ineffective and useless, it is but a
short and tempting step to the belief that they are
not really objective attributes at all, but merely
subjective effects which are produced upon the mind
of the observer, and which exist only therein.
The
dualistic theory makes this step possible, for,
according to that theory, the objects presented in
direct perception have their locus with the perci
pient, and are in no sense numerically identical
with their extra-organic causes.
Then, too, if the
secondary or nonquantitative qualities have ceased to
be welcome in the realm of physical causes, they have
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to be, out of mere decency, as it were, provided for
in an asylum, and what more natural than to regard
the mind itself as that refuge? Since the secondary
qualities are restricted in their effects to the
perceiver's own processes, it seems appropriate to
think of them as essentially and exclusively mental
in the nature, and hence as of interest to psychology
rather than to physics.
(Montague, 196?, p. 197)
The primary/secondary position has a complex descrip
tion of the perceptual process which holds that the qualities
which we experience are only partially representative.

The

perception of color, for example, has some aspects which are
primary; that is, they are a function of a feature of the
incoming light stimulus.

Such qualities can be expressed

quantitatively in terms of duration and intensity.

Other

aspects of color perception are due to the effects of light
on the sensory system.
is hue.

An example of such a secondary quality

We have already quotedLocke to the effect that he

was in doubt that we could ever discover and describe the
systematic relationships between primary and secondary qualities.
One theory which attempts a description of the relation
••

between external and internal qualities is Johannes Muller's
theory of specific nerve energy.

(Allport, 19555 Boring, 19^2)

It holds that the qualities one is aware of are due to the
nerve which has been stimulated, not the object that stimulated
the nerve,

duller himself held that a nerve could be stim

ulated by any kind of stimulus and still give rise to the same
conscious quality.

His followers, however, modified the theory

in such a way that nerves were also specific as to the kind of
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stimulus which would activate them.

Helmholtz 1 theory of

hearing which holds that each discriminable tone has its own
specific nerve, and Herring's theory of color-vlsion which
postulates a similar recepter specificity, are still generating
experimental research.

(Allport, 1955j Boring, 19^2)

Let us now turn to our questions concerning the status
of objectivity which implies the certain knowledge of qualities
independent of the knower.

According to this dualistic posi

tion, objectivity is achieved by making a sharp distinction
between scientific observation and daily perception.

Scien

tific methods allow us to distinguish the quantifiable quali
ties from the subjective ones.

In normal perception there is

a confounding of the objective and subjective qualities.
Scientific observation must develop special techniques for
reducing knowledge to quantitative variables or qualities.
Those aspects of experience which are due to primary objec
tive qualities demonstrate their independence and certainty
by virtue of the fact that they are amenable to quantification.
The objective world which we come to know through the use of
scientific observation is therefore different from the world
of daily experience.^
-

Other forms of realism will be treated in subsequent
sections. Russell's critical realism is better understood
within the context of phenomenalism, while perspective realists
such as McGilvary and Gibson are treated later as neo-realists
because of historical and philosophical differences.
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Currently, logical positivism is by far the most
influential philosophy of science among scientists and phil
osophers alike.
philosophy.

In fact, for many, it encompasses all of

Logical positivists are in agreement on two

fundamental tenets.

The first is that there are only two

kinds of knowledge, synthetic and analytic.

Synthetic know

ledge consists of facts acquired through observation, and
their validity is determined empirically.

Analytic knowledge

consists of logical operators by means of which facts can be
related to one another.

The proper use of analytic knowledge

is determined by analytic methods.

Analytic knowledge is

tautological since all analytic propositions are ultimately
reducible to the form A is A.

Even though all their implica

tions are not intuitively obvious, —

for example, all the

mathematical derivations of a set of axioms are not intuitively
obvious —

they are necessarily deducible from such axioms.

The second fundamental tenet to which all logical
positivists are committed is that the meaning of a proposition
is the method of its verification.

A proposition can only be

meaningful if it is verifiable in principle.
always defined in terms of observations.

Verifiability is

It is over the pre

cise meaning of observation that logical positivists are
divided into phenomenalists and physicalists.

Phenomenalists

believe that the referents of observation are sense data,
while physicalists believe that the referents of observations
are physical objects.

The phenomenalist position is the older
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form of radical empiricism dating back to Berkeley.
its most notable advocates were:

Among

Schllck, early Carnap, Moore,

Ayer, Bergmann, Godel, Waismann, Feigl, Price and early
Russell.

Physicalism was developed somewhat later and in part

as a reaction to the ambiguity of verification principles as
seen by the phenomenalists.

Physicalism ultimately became the

basis for the unity-of-science hypothesis accepted by most
members of the Vienna Circle.

Among its most important

representatives are late Carnap, Feigl, Frank, Reichenbach,
Hempel, and Sellars.
The phenomenalist is one who believes in Berkeley's
maxim "to be is to be perceived."

The phenomenalist believes

that there is only one thing we can be sure of, only one
indubitable:

the existence of sense data.

All knowledge

must be based on sense

data if itis to be viewed as

ical knowledge.

often said that phenomenalism is a

It is

theoretically neutral position.

empir

It is probably better to say

that phenomenalism asserts nothing about metaphysics and very
little about epistemology.
no means neutral.

That very little, however, is by

How little phenomenalism implies is made

explicit by H.H. Price:
It may be worthwhile to mention explicitly a number
of things which we are not committed to.
1. We are not committed to the view that sense-data
persist through the interval when they are not being
sensed. We have only to admit that they exist at the
times when they are being sensed.
2. We are not committed to the view that several minds
can be acquainted with the same sense-datum. We have
only to admit that evety mind is acquainted with some
sense data from time to time.
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3. We are not committed to any view about what is
called "the status" of sense-data in the universe,
either as regards their relations with other types
of existent entities. They may he events, or sub
stances, or states of substances. They may be phys
ical; i.e. they may be parts of, or events in,
material objects such as chairs and tables or (in
another theory) brains.
They may be mental as
Berkeley and many others have held.
They may be
neither mental nor physical.
*f. We are not committed to any view about their or
igin. They may originate as a result of processes
in material objects, or of mental processes, or of
both. Or again, it may be that the boot is on the
other legs it may be that they are ultimate con
stituents of the universe, and material things
(perhaps minds as well) may be just collections of
thems in which case they "just are", and have ho
origin and no explanation, since every thing else
is explained by reference to them.
(Price, 1959>
pp. 1 1 3 - 1 1 1*)
This statement certainly represents the minimal state
ment of the phenomenal position.

But even at this minimal

commitment, it is necessary to disagree with those, such as
Ayer and Price, who maintain that all perception theories are
phenomenal.

The most notable exception to the "sense datum is

primitive" notion are the gestalt psychologists and the neo
realists, such as J.J. Gibson.

These two groups assume that

perception is primitive and do not agree with the phenomenalist
presumption that perception is a more complexly organized
meaningful awareness which is problematically related to a
more primitive sense data.

Despite these exceptions, however,

phenomenalism does allow a very wide range of positions, both
philosophical and psychological, concerning the problem of
perception.

It is precisely because seemingly imcompatible

positions, such as realism and idealism, can agree on the
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phenomenal test of reducing all things to impression, that a
phenomenalist

like Ayer can maintain that the difference

between these two positions are nothing more than linguistic
preferences.
In order to understand the role of objectivity in
these various models, it is not necessary to compare contrast
ing phenomenal positions.

Whether or not the realist or

idealist is correct metaphysically will not make any differ
ence if he is at the same time a phenomenalist.

The test of

propositions for the phenomenalist involves reducing propos
itions to denotable sense data.
proposition its meaning.

It is this which gives a

Whether sense data are signs of

external objects or internal ideas is a separate question not
itself subject to the principle of verification, and according
to some, it is therefore an erroneous question.

The search

for the meaning of objectivity in this model will require
that we examine carefully all of the available formulations
of phenomenal verification principles.

This will give us the

prescriptive or philosophical theory of perception.

We will

also find that each of these can be elaborated descriptively.
Berkeley rejected the notion that any qualities could
be said to be primary, by which he meant existent in matter.
The same arguments which proponents of the primary/secondary
view used to dismiss secondary qualities, like heat, are also
applicable to primary qualities, like figure and extension.
As Berkeley puts it, the same "eyes from different stations",
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or "eyes of different texture" will apprehend figure and
extension differently.

(Berkeley, 1952, p. ^15)

For this

reason the substantive material qualities have no greater
claim to an independent existence than do the secondary
qualities.

This does not preclude a belief in a science

based on observation,

"...by a diligent observation of the

phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws
of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena..."
(Berkeley, 1952, p. ^3^)

According to Hume, the test for any complex idea
involves examining its definition and determining the simple
ideas of which it is composed.

If there is still ambiguity

concerning any of the simple ideas we merely have to bring them
to the final test, which is to revive the impressions of which
the idea is a faint copy.

"The most lively thought is still

inferior to the dullest sensation."

(Hume, 1952, p. **55)

In Berkeley there is an implied distinction between
sensation and perception.

When we say we hear a coach we are

really inferring that the sound we hear is made by a coach.
The sound in this example is the specie of given which con
temporary phenomenalists accept as sense data.
an interpretation of the sense data.
to today as cognitions.

The coach is

These would be referred

Within his notion of impressions there

is no clear distinction between perception and sensation.
In most of his applications of the test of reduction
there are at least the seeds of distinction between sensation
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and perception.

When Hume treats "power" as he did "cause",

he says that each man is "conscious" of the power by his will
to move his limbs.
A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm,
or who had newly lost those members, frequently
endeavors at first to move them, and employ them in
their usual offices. He is as much conscious of power
to command such limbs, as a man in perfect health
is conscious of power to actuate to any member which
remains in its natural state and condition. But
consciousness never declines. Consequently, neither
in the one case nor in the other, are we ever con
scious of any power. (Hume, 1952, p. V 7 2 )
In the question we can see that Hume uses two senses
of the word conscious.

Certainly in the case of a palsied

man there are some immediate impressions which he experiences
as the loss of power.

It requires a close, diligent analysis

to realize that the experience of power is but the influence
of past experience on present impressions.

It is consistent

with Hume's position to say that the sense data or impressions
combine with past experience or ideas to result in a percept
of power.
The conception that perception is an interpretation
of sensation is the fundamental phenomenalist model.

It has

persisted since Berkeley in various forms of psychological
theories and until recently as a tenet of positivism.
One of the earliest psychological theories to be
elaborated experimentally, which fits under the rubric of
phenomenalism, was Wundt and Titchener's structuralism.

In

particular, Titchener's core-context theory had many features
in common with contemporary phenomenal definitions of meaning.
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Titchener's core was pure sensation, and this was defined by
the structuralist in terms of elements.

It was experimentally

described in terms which were similar to those used by philos
ophers of science, such as E.

Mach, F.E. Moore, Ayer and Russell,

in describing "patches of colors".
particular shapes and extensity.

They were "here, now", having
Psychologists will recognize

in G.E. Moore's description below reminiscences of the intro
spective subjects' diligent attempts to avoid the stimulus error.
I hold up this envelope, then: I look at it, and put
it down again. Now what has happened? We should
certainly say (if you looked at it) that we all saw
that envelope, the same envelope; I saw it, and you
all saw it. And by the it, which we all saw, we mean
an object,...But now, what happened to each of us
when we saw that envelope? I will begin by describing
part of what happened to me. I saw a patch of a
particular whitish colour, having a certain size, and
a certain shape, a shape with rather sharp angles or
corners bounded by fairly straight lines.
These things;
this patch of a whitish colour, and its size and shape
I did actually see. And I propose to call these things,
the colour and size and shape, sense-data, things given
or presented by the senses - given, in this case, by
my sense of sight.
(Moore, 1965? P* 98)
The description given by Moore dates back to approx
imately 1910 when he introduced the notion of sense data into
the mainstream of British philosophical thinking.

The criter

ia of sense data had already been applied in a thorough re
examination of Newtonian physics by Ernst Mach.

At the same

time that the structuralist psychologists were trying to develop
an experimental description of sensory elements, Mach was in
sisting that all scientific concepts be reducible to sensory ele
ments.

In addition, it is clear that Mach was in agreement with the
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structuralists that a trained individual was required to
distinguish between sense data and everyday perception.
(Hill, 1961)
This new form of radical empiricism anticipated much
of what was later to be called operationism.

It represented

a no nonsense application of a verification principle that
Mach applied to rid physics of metaphysical speculation.

Such

speculation made its way into science in the form of forces
and substances for which there was no sensory basis.

Many

writers have since paid tribute to Mach for a conceptual
clean-up job without which an Einstein would not have been
possible.

(Capek, 1961; Frank, 1957; Einstein and Infeld, 1938)

At this point, a curious involution takes place in
the development of the status of the perceived object.

In

the philosophy of science the physical object is distinguished
from the material object while in psychology the object of
perception is distinguished from the stimulus.

Russell and

Wittgenstein developed their theories of description which
involve logical maps of the external world.

The elements in

these maps have varying degrees of certitude beginning with
the only true empirical knowledge in the form of atomic facts,
which though they cover a small range of generality, they are
the only things of which we can be certain.
facts can be reduced to sense data.

Such atomic

They can be represented

in the form of sense data statements which are denotable in
form; for example "Black patch passes red patch now," can be
contrasted with the less empirical descriptive form which would
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be a pointer reading.

Less reliable but useful logical forms

such as constructs, e.g. time and space, are reliable to the
extent that they can be supported by atomic facts.
however remain hypothetical.

They must

Physical objects such as tables

and chairs are descriptions; their status is logical, not
ontological.

The existence of material objects (tables and

chairs) are hypothetical.

At the same time, a similar devel

opment took place in the psychology of perception.

A percept

finds its meaning in the context of associations to which it
gives rise, not in its external context.

Titchener was will

ing to relinquish the problem of meaning to the logician.
The stimulus gives rise to sensory elements, not to a picture
of itself.
The early phenomenalists as well as the structuralists
in psychology, made a clear and firm distinction between ob
jects and sense data.

Objects were the products of perception,

and perception was a process of interpretation of sense data.
By means of careful analysis or introspection, the perceived
object could be reduced to the sensations of which they were
interpretations.

For the analyst philosopher of science this

meant developing a sense data language which would be closer
to the truth than the object language.

It would be closer to

the truth because credibility is a function of how close a
statement is to the epistemic root, which is sensation.

It

is curious to find that phenomenalist philosophers debate
the question, "is a sense-datum language possible"late into
the early 19*+0's, (G. Bergmann, 1951*; Ayer, 1959) without
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ever considering the fact that the structural psychologists had
made an experimental attempt at just this question.

The phen

omenalist philosophers write with a great deal of confidence
that the development of such a language is in fact possible.
But an examination of the structuralists1 work suggests that
the problem with phenomenalism
coming but a perceptual one.

is not a linguistic short

Most critics of phenomenalism

argue that the phenomenal languages seem artificial.

The his

tory of psychology suggests that a more fundamental criticism
is that the phenomenal account of experience is artifactual.
Late forms of phenomenalism, such as represented in the
writing of Ayer and Bergmann, use softened forms of verification
principles in which it is recognized that propositional state
ments are verifiable in principle if some kind of experience
is pertinent to determining their credibility.

Such state

ments tend to be circular and the meaning of the term experi
ience becomes more ambiguous. It is perhaps because of some
of these logical problems that more recent positivists have
abandoned phenomenalist verification principles as a criterion
of meaning.
Let us see how the phenomenalist construction deals
with the problem of objectivity.

The word objectivity is

inappropriate to the entire way of thinking involved in phen
omenalism; in fact, the word object has a different referent
for the phenomenalist than it does in its classical definition.
As we have seen, an object to a phenomenalist is an inter
pretation, the product of a language which is already one
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step removed from the indubitable, that is experience.

Objec

tivity in the classical sense, we have defined as assuring
certainty and to the phenomenalist that is the function of
sense data, not the function of objects.

Despite this pec

uliar semantic involution, the meaning of the classical term
objectivity is important to the phenomenalists.
Phenomenalists are not in agreement concerning the
question of independence.

Russell, (1965) for example, insists

that sense data are independent of the observer, but Price (1965)
argues that this is a metaphysical position.

What the phen

omenalists are in agreement on is that sense data have intersubjective reliability.

What the sense datum language allows

one to do is to make actual the potential experiences which it
describes for any particular observer.

This is very close to

a pre-behaviorism description of physicalism.

It describes

in any particular situation what to look for in order to
verify.

Later forms of physicalism get rid of the phenomen

ological language, and describe what to do in order to verify.
Just as phenomenalism is associated with experience, the
later form of positivism which is usually called physicalism,
is associated with behavior.

We will return to this theme

after we obtain a clear picture of the phenomenalists' rela
tionship to objectivity.
So far we have seen that objectivity for the phen
omenalist differs from the classical definition in that it
substitutes intersubjective reliability for independence.

The

other important characteristic of objectivity is the notion of
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certainty.

The fundamental motivation for the phenomenalist

movement was in the promulgation of this notion more than any
other derived from the empirical tradition.

G.E. Moore (1965)

^demonstrated his commitment to certainty by describing sense
data as the one thing about which we cannot possibly be mis
taken.

This also seems to be the reason Mach chose this

form of radical empiricism with which to eliminate many con
cepts in physics.

It is also the dedication to verifiability,

as the definition of meaning, which continues the logical
empiricist tradition even though it abandoned phenomenalism.
For the most part, logical positivists abandoned the
attempt to reduce protocol statements to sense data statements.
The impossibility of building a sense data language as well
as the likelihood that most scientists would not use it if it
did succeed, made phenomenalism the one aspect of early
logical empiricism that has almost disappeared.

It was

replaced by the thesis of physicalism.
Meaning was for the physicalists, as for the phen
omenalists, defined in terms of verifiability.

The essential

difference between phenomenalists and physicalists is in the
nature of data language and phenomena or what we have pre
viously called factual reference or empirical significance.
Physicalists insist that data language be the language of
physical objects in the Newtonian sense of object, and that the
referent of this data language be physical objects.

Physical

objects here refer to macro-objects and different physicalists
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use different terms to designate thems

Carnap calls them

"observables", Reichenbach calls them "concreta".

We should

be careful to distinguish between the meaning of the word
physical in this context, and the meaning of physics as a
subject matters

for example, in microphysics the phenomena

under study must be translated into the physical language
which is composed of physical objects capable of entering
into our experience.

Most physicalists argue that this

object language is the natural language of observation.

The

physicalists come a great deal closer to the classical def
inition of objectivity than did their predecessors, the
phenomenalists.

They replace the intersubjectivity criteria

of the phenomenalists with the publicity criteria.

Since

for the phenomenalist the primitives were sense data, intersubjective reliability was the best that could be hoped for.
By making the object the referent to which all other things
must be reduced, the physicalist is able to re-establish the
independence of observation.
The obvious psychological parallel to this development
is behaviorism.

Boring (19^2) says of the union of behaviorism

and positivism that "they could have sensation and eat it too."
The method of verification in science, as in perception in
psychology, can be completely externalized and given an indep
endent referent.

The discriminated response and the physical

definition are attempts to banish the subjective in the two
domains of perception and observation.
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There can be and usually is a substantial difference
between the way things appear and the way things are:

there

fore, there must be a difference in the way in which each of
these is verified.

The process of perception can itself be ac

tually described by relying on people's behavior measured
physicalistically as an index of their abilities with respect
to the stimuli.

From such a description, it is learned that

the discrepancy between the stimulus object and the object of
perception is due to perceptual constancies which tend to
reduce the amount of heterogeneity in the perceived object
when it is viewed from all its perspectives.
There is in this an element which remains consistent
with the interpretation thesis of the phenomenalists.

In the

behaviorist account of perception we find reference to terms
such as signs, cues or clues, which give rise to a percept
which is more like the thing being perceived than the sensa
tions giving rise to the perception.

Thus, looking at a dime

from a few feet away one's perception of its size is more
consistent with its actual size than with the retinal image
of its size.

The retinal image in this description serves as

a cue to the distal object.

These kinds of considerations do

not apply to objective observation, that is to physicalistic
description, because they are public and repeatable.
In a later chapter we will consider the interpretation
problem that is to be found, even within physicalistic des
cription.

It will suffice to say at this point that in a

physicalistic description there are analytic conventions whose
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relationship to fact is not clear, and there are physical
objects which are amenable to more than one physicalistic
description.
We can see that the classical meaning of objectivity
is essentially restored by the physicalists.
our descriptions is independent objects.

The referent of

Certainty of our

descriptions rests on the criteria of denotability, publicity,
and repeatability.
Though the large majority of logical positivists, among
scientists and philosophers alike, can be placed into either
the phenomenalist or physicalist camp, there is at least one
philosopher who is closer to logical positivism than to any
other recognizable philosophy of science:

Carl Popper (1959)

who disagrees with both phenomenalists and physicalists.

He

is an empiricist in that he believes that our knowledge must
be rooted in observation, but he believes that verification
or any form of induction necessarily gets bogged down in
psychologisms.

Logical rigor requires that we avoid the psych

ological, and this requires a deductive empiricism.

According

to this view, science operates by making bold general asser
tions which can only be evaluated in terms of their ability to
generate "falsifiable" propositions.

Freud's theory is a poor

one, not because it cannot be verified, since it offers evid
ence at every turn, but because it cannot produce propositions
which can be falsified.

Compare to this the concrete prop

ositions generated by Einstein's relativity which could easily
have gone wrong.

8^

Popper has concluded that we cannot rely on objective
perception to confirm hypotheses.

At first glance, it would

appear that Popper has abandoned the assumption of objectivity;
in fact, he continues to maintain that we can rely on observa
tions in instances of disconfirmation but not in instances of
confirmation.

There are psychological reasons why this sol

ution to the problem of perception is not satisfactory and
these will be dealt with later,

(see pages 199-200)

We have seen that one of the elements which united
physicalists and phenomenonsts was their belief in the
principle of verification.

Meaning for both of these groups

was obtained by discovering the way in which a term could be
verified.

They differed in their belief concerning the ul

timate reduction that would result from verification.

The phen

omenalists argued that the primitive indubitable was in the
private experience of sense data, the physicalist arguing that
verification would reduce to publicly observable physical
objects.

The group we are about to consider is in agreement

with the phenomenalists insofar a$ they believe that the
primitive elements of knowledge are in the private experience
of the individual.

For this reason the group is usually

referred to as the phenomenologists.

The phenomenologists,

however, do not fall into the logical empirical tradition
since they do not accept the division of all knowledge into
analytic and synthetic; rather, they are the descendants of
Kant in maintaining that certain principles of mental organ
ization are innate, Just as Kant maintained that Euclidean
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geometry and space and time were a priori synthetic.

The

phenomenologists did not hold meaning to be dependent on ver
ification.

Certain objects are held to have meaning without

even the possibility of verification.

For example, we are

able to imagine golden mountains and bucolic unicorns, and
they have meaning for us in that they are capable of entering
our phenomenological experience through imagination.

Such

objects are said to subsist, rather than to exist, and subsistent objects are meaningful even though they are not subject
to verification.

(Spiegelberg, 1960)

It has been said that phenomenology is inherently antiscientific in that it has traditionally been associated with
existentialism and philosophers such as Nietszche and
Kierkegaard.

This negative association is not a fundamental

problem for our own position.

Most of these early existential

ists were not systematic writers and they did not object to
science because of any belief that science was fundamentally
in error; rather, they held that science was ethically unde
sirable.

In addition, the phenomenologists who were interested

in the problem of factual reference were scientists.
not, however, empiricists.

They were

All empiricists wish to reduce

meaning to a specific set of sensations.

Husserl objected to

this because of his belief that meaning can only be grasped
lntuitlonally.

Take, for example, the meaning of a verbal

statement; it cannot be said to be discoverable in the utter
ance since no two utterances can ever be the same.

The meaning

of a statement can be uttered in many different ways.
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Husserl

argued that to try to reduce meaning either to objects or to
a specific sense experience is like maintaining that the
meaning of a sentence is in its utterance.

(Spiegelberg, 1960)

The phenomenologist philosophy of science is different
from all we have thus far covered in that it attributes dis
covery to insight.

Though this is not an empiricist position,

it is not necessarily anti-scientific since it does maintain
that in the context of Justification some empirical testing
is used.
Let us now consider that aspect of phenomenology which
is most central to the subject of inquiry.

The phenomenologists

believe that the primitives are whole perceptions which cannot
be reduced to a more elementary form; therefore, configurations
are to phenomenologists what sense data are to phenomenalists
and physical protocols are to physicalists.

Though the

psychological description of such perceptual configurations be
gan with Ehrenfels and was continued by the gestalt psychol
ogists, the idea that the primitives of experience involved
complexly organized patterns was present among philosophers
who antedated gestalt psychology.
Leibnitz's theory of monads held that mental criterion
and worldly entities matched one another as a pair.

Each such

monad was a complex whole, therefore an object in the real
world gave rise in experience to its mental counterpart in
what is at least a superficial anticipation of the gestalt
principle of isomorphism.
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William James thought that the greatest error in
empiricist philosophy was that it based all of knowledge on
little bits of experience which he pointed out are never
actually found in consciousness.

Consciousness flows, it is

remarkably unified, and there is nothing in it like the dis
jointed bits which the empiricists are appealing to.

(James,

1890)
Perhaps the most important historical figure in configurationism is Brentano.

Brentano was not a self-avowed

phenomenologist, but his thesis of intentionality was a
starting point for his students, among whom were Meinong and
Husserl.

The thesis of intentionality maintains that in every

awareness there are two elements, the presentation and the
object.

The presentation is a mental act such as sensing,

feeling, thinking and perceiving.

The object is physical and

independent of the act as an external object, but in awareness
it is necessarily bound to the act of awareness.

The thesis

maintains that no object can make its way into awareness
without an accompanying object.

Brentano with his thesis of

intentionality has established the nature of what is to be
considered primitive in knowledge for the phenomenologists,
and these primitives are neither elementary awareness (sense
data) nor independent objects of awareness (physical objects),
but perceived objects.

Perception is impossible without an

object, and objects are unknown unless accompanied by
perceptual acts.

(Spiegelberg, 1960)
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Edmund Husserl, referred to as the father of phen
omenology, developed the method which would lead to a true
intuitive science.

According to Husserl, empirical science

could only lead to relative truth because it distorted the
perceptual primitives by ignoring their individuality and
classifying them on the basis of group characteristics.

His

method

of bracketing resembles Descarte'smethod of doubt,

but it

is intended to apply to experience rather than to

reason.

To come to the essence of a perceived object, one

must remove from the mind all categories, classes and general
descriptions.

On viewing the work before me, for example,

I must restrain from descriptions based on categories such
as desk, table, and furniture, and accept the perceptual
object as it is.

This alone can yield an "objective" and

"essential" knowing of the thing.

Such a program of scien

tific description, though many have deemed it desirable, is
obviously impossible since the essential objective descrip
tions cannot be linguistic.

Because our very language assumes

categories and classes, it is an obstructing device.

It

should be obvious that the gestalt psychologists who inherited
the phenomenological tradition did not accept this radical
point of view on science, but they did accept perceptual in
sight as the essential mechanism of learning and discovery.
The gestalt psychologist made by far the most impor
tant contribution to the configuration!st point of view.
Their contribution falls into this category because they
accepted the criteria of primitive configurations; that is,
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they accepted primitive perceived objects and sought as their
goal a description of the perception of such perceived objects.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the gestalt
psychologists was not in their writing but rather in their
collection of perceptual demonstrations which serve them as
doubled-edged.pedagogical instruments.

They both demonstrated

the influence of organizational principles on what is perceived,
and at the same time, served as an example of the significance
of intuitive discovery.

Whenever one wants to explain the

meaning of pragnanz, proximity, closure or any other of the
whole-part determinisms, it is best to turn to specific examples of each case rather than use verbal description.

The

student will respond with an immediate understanding of the
principles and an increasing understanding of the meaning of
insight.
The gestalt tradition followed Brentano in asserting
that the perceived object differs from the object.

This

difference results from the influence of the perceptual process.
Much of gestalt work was an attempt to describe the precise
nature of such influences.

The gestalt principles of organ

ization are just such descriptions.

"The whole determines

the perception of the parts," is probably the most famous of
such principles, and Ehrenfel's example of the melody is
probably the most famous demonstration of that principle.
How is it, Ehrenfels asks, that we can hear the same melody
-

A more detailed and illustrated example of wholepart determinism is discussed on pages 150-156.
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played in two different keys, if we attribute the perception
of such melody to the physical dimensions of sound.

It is

not the individual note that shapes the melody, but the melody
that gives perceptual meaning to each note.

Thus it is that

these organizational principles are characteristic of the
perceptual fields such that there is always a discrepancy
between perceptual experience and stimulus geometry.

(Kohler,

1967)
The discrepancy between stimulus and perception is not,
as the behaviorist describes it, a learned mechanism of effi
ciency (constancy hypothesis), but it is an innate character
istic of the organism which is the basis of intuitive learning.
The gestalt psychologists point to several experiments in
which lower forms of life such as chicks and infant monkeys,
as well as near neonate humans, demonstrate that they also
perceive as though they are subject to the principles of
organization.
Having said that the gestalt psychologists subscribed
to a description of perception that elevates illusion to a
universal principle, and subscribed to a thesis of intention
ality that makes perception its object $ it

will seem curious

to conclude by saying that the gestalt psychologists were
realists and believed in a form of verifiability.

It is

precisely on this point that Merleau-Ponty (1963) is critical
of the gestalt psychologists.

According to Ponty's account,

they discovered form but then made the mistake of putting
form in nature.

The gestalten were elevated to ontological
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patterns of organization and Kohler, for example, sought
examples of physical gestalten.
elements in the environment —

These patterns became
i.e., stimuli essentially no

different in their causal effects on consciousness than the
behaviorists' stimuli.
We do not think that the notion of Gestalt is pursued
to its most important consequences either in those
materialist conclusions or in the mentalist inter
pretation which we indicated at first. Instead of
wondering what sort of being can belong to form and,
since it has appeared in scientific research itself,
what critique it can demand of the realist postulates
of psychology, it is placed among the number of events
of nature: it is used like a cause or a real thing;
and to this very extent one is no longer thinking
according to ’’form." As long as one sees the physical
world as a being which embraces all things and as
long as one tries to integrate behavior into it, one
will be driven from mentalism, which maintains the
originality of biological and mental structures only
by opposing substance to substance, to a materialism,
which maintains the coherence of the physical order
only by reducing the two others to it. In reality,
matter, life and mind must be understood as three
orders of significations. But it is not with the help
of an external criterion that we will judge the alleged
philosophy of form. On the contrary, we would like
to return to the notion of form, to seek out in what
sense forms can be said to exist "in" the physical
world and "in" the living body, and to ask of form
itself the solution to the antimony of which it is
the occasion, the synthesis of matter and idea.
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963* pp. 136-137)
This form of realism differentiates between the sig
nificance of scientific truths and argues that pattern
discoveries are more significant than that filling in of
detail which is the confirmatory end of the scientific bus
iness.
Two noted philosophers of science, Hanson and Polanyi,
have applied gestalt psychology to the problem of scientific
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observations.

Both of these men emphasize the creative aspect

of scientific discoveries and spend much time in rebutting the
idea that discoveries take place inductively.

In the following

quotation we can see the strong gestalt influence, both in
giving a whole-part deterministic description of perception
and an intuitional account of discovery.
Perceiving the pattern in phenomena is central to
their being "explicable as a matter of course".
Thus the significance of any blob or line in
earlier diagrams eludes one until the organization
of the whole is grasped; then this spot, or that
patch, becomes understood as a matter of course.
Why does Mars appear to accelerate at 90 and
270°?— (P) Because its orbit is elliptical— (H).
Grasping this plot makes the details explicable,
just as the impact of a weight striking clay becomes
intelligible against the laws of falling bodies.
This is what philosophers and natural philosophers
were groping for when they spoke of discerning the
nature of a phenomenon, its essence;*1 this will
always be the trigger of physical inquiry.
The
struggle for intelligibility (pattern, organization)
in natural philosophy has never been portrayed in
inductive or H-D accounts."
(Hanson, 1958, p. 8 7 )
In strong opposition to the logical empiricists,
these configurationist philosophers of science place a great
deal of value on the logical constructs.

It will be recalled

that, in their disdain for metaphysical speculation, the
majority of logical empiricists strove for a language, the
elements of which were either synthetic or analytic.

All

synthetic elements were to have phenomenal or physical refer
ents:

otherwise; they were to be dismissed as nonsense.

One

set of elementary terms was especially problematical to this
program and that was the set which makes up the subjects of
propositional sentences; for example, the subject "pencil"
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in:

"The pencil is yellow, pointed and cone shaped." or the

subject "body" in:
of ___ ."

"The body had a mass of ___ and a velocity

To the logical empiricist, be he phenomenalist or

physicalist, the status of these subject terms is ambiguous.
For the phenomenalist it is a construct referring to the
interpretation of the sense data.

To the physicalist it is

a construct which combines or interprets the measures of the
object.

For neither is it an underlying essence.

For the

logical positivists, these terms are incomplete description,
less essential “to synthetic truth than the predicate
statements.

As we have seen above, Ayer believes that we are

forced to use such subject terms merely because of an acci
dent of our language.
In sharp contrast, the configuration!st sees such
subject terms or constructs as the very essence of science.
Constructs are not primarily an underlying substrata which
gives rise to secondary qualities which are the predicate
statements, but instead they are an organization principle
discovered through insight, thereby giving meaning to the
predicates.

Without these constructs past results could not

be interpreted and future research could not be organized.
What Polanyi says below about the subject term organ applies'
to all such subject terms, not simply to teleological ones.
The philosophy of behaviorism does not contest the
duality of body and mind, but it assumes that all
mental performances can be fully specified without
referring to afiy mental motives.
Could this be true?
Consider an analogy. All textbooks of physiology
refer to organs and the function or organs, and in
spite of frequent solemn declaractions that such

9^

teleological conceptions are unnecessary and indeed
objectionable, no one has yet published a textbook
of physiology that does not speak of organs and their
functions. For the biological functions or organs
can be known only as coherent wholes.
This also
applies, of course, to the motions forming a skillful
performance, or an act of intelligence: these can be
identified only as parts of their meaningful coordin
ation. To describe, as behaviorists claim to do,
workings of the mind without relying on the guidance
of mental motives is as impossible as it is to
describe physiological events occuring in an organ
without being guided by the observation of its
J hysiological functions."
(Polanyi, 1968,
The emphasis that the configurationist philosophies
of science place on the role of scientific constructs marks
an important transition in our account of scientific discovery.

1

The positivist tradition viewed constructs with disdain since
they seem to mark the point at which metaphysics made its way
into science.

More recent configurationists, such as Polanyi,

Hanson, and Kuhn, attribute most of the progress in science
to the discovery or creation of such constructs.

According

to these writers, these constructs are simple units discovered
through insight which change the course of science.

They

point to Kepler's ellipse, Galileo's pendulum, and Newton's
gravity as the kind of constructs which, despite their
relative simplicity, change the course of physics in an
irreversible manner.
All of the configurationists are subject to Merleau-Ponty's
criticism.

Like the gestalt psychologists, Hanson and Polanyi

1
We have already discussed some of the background to
this transition on pages 37- 38*
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diverge significantly from the traditional scientific epistemology.

They do so in that they give a non-inductive

account of discovery and hold that pattern discoveries are
more significant than detail discoveries.

In addition to

this they wish to apply a coherence criterion to the meaningfulness of scientific propositions.

Kohler believed that

truths are hierarchically arranged,

and that those at the

top are more meaningful.

A similar position is held by the

configurationist philosophers of science.

We can see in the

quotation that follows a faith in the future of science that
dramatically differs from the logical empiricists point of
view.
Once the recognition of anticipatory powers in science
establishes a conception of reality transcending tan
gible things, we might be able generally to acknowledge
higher entities, intangible and yet real— as real as
matter and yet meaningful. We shall recognize thus
a cosmic hierarchy in which man has once more his own
place."
(Polanyi, 1967-68, p. 196)
Despite these many deviations from the epistemological
paradigm, Ponty's criticism is appropriate.

The configur

ationists have redefined the nuggets of experience, as well
as the account of their meaning, but as to their validity
the empirical test of correspondence remains the traditional
mark of science.

Once more we quote Polanyi to demonstrate

the faith configurationists place in correspondence.
What we mean is that the thing will not dissolve like
a dream, but that, in some ways it will yet manifest
its existence, inexhaustibly, in the future. For it
is there, whether we believe it or not, independently
of us, and hence never fully predictable in its con
sequences.
(Polanyi, 1967-68, p. 191)
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In contrast to the logical positivists, truth and
meaning are separate issues for the configurationists.

While

the truth and meaning of a proposition are the method of its
verification for the positivists, the configurationists
maintain that while truth depends on verifiability,
depends on context.

meaning

A proposition gets its significance by

finding its place in the larger whole.
The meaning of objectivity for the configuration!st
is very close to the classical meaning.

As is evident in

the quotation above, he believes in independence of external
real objects.

In addition, he believes that verification

makes a thing certain, but that it does not make it meaning
ful.

Therefore without essentially redefining objectivity

the configurationists deprive it of much of its significance.
Thus far we have described epistemological "isms"
which are familiar by virtue of a long tradition.

What will

presently be referred to as "neo-realism" does not have as
clear and unified a traditional position.

Several important

philosophical strains arising out of a reaction to positivism
in the philosophy of science, and relativism in the theories
of perception, have resulted in a group of thinkers who share
several common characteristics without necessarily paying
tribute to a common label.

Among the earliest such movements

in philosophy was the American and British new realism, as
well as certain forms of critical realism.

In the psychology

of perception cybernetic and information theorists were
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reacting to the subjectivity implied in much of the relativistic theories which had been prompted by the gestalt psych
ologists.
The most important characteristic of neo-realism with
respect to the assumption of objectivity are its externalization of the object of perception and its active view of the
perceptual process.

We will discuss both of these.

There are,

however, other characteristics that the neo-realists have in
common

which are not so central to this thesis.

The most

striking of these is their acceptance of common sense, ordinary
language and daily experience as a standard form of knowledge,
against which to evaluate science and philosophy.

Consistent

with this, and in sharp contrast to the positivists and behaviorists they show no disdain for metaphysical concepts.
make free use of terms such as reality and nature.

They

They have

an affinity for the language of information and communications,
and spend little or no time clarifying the meaning of the con
cepts couched in this language.

Among the early philosophical

leaders of this group are M.R. Cohen, T. Nunn and E. McGilvary.
The most outstanding psychological contributors to this point
of view are Gibson and Attneave.

Within the philosophy of science,

Duhem's work is very important, but current writers such as
Harris and Hawkins have more of the superficial characteristics
of neo-realism.
The positivists' relegation of metaphysics to the realm
of nonsense and the behaviorists1 relegation of consciousness
to the status of epiphenomena can be viewed as a process
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of internalization.

Simply by telling us that belief in reality

is metaphysical, the positivists did not rid us of our "psych
ological" need to speculate, which was a hindrance to progress.
By the same token when behaviorial psychologists chose to ig
nore the world of private eaqjerience they did not rid the
individual of his awareness of it, but justified their choice
by claiming that nothing that happened there could make any
difference.
Positivists treated metaphysics and consciousness in
a very similar manner, applying their principle of verification
as the only criterion of meaning.

They found that both meta

physics and phenomenological awareness were meaningless.

This

means that the language of the ordinary man, as well as the
ordinary language of philosophers and scientists, is largely
nonsense.

In addition, since it accepted the verifiable

scientific description as the true and meaningful picture of
the world it means that most of human experience falls into
the world of illusion.

In the realm of individual experience

a parallel disdain of phenomenology means that the world of
perception is largely the product of internal and subjective
manipulation of unknowable proximal stimuli.

The objects of

awareness can be viewed as internal perceptions.

These

perceptions can be considered the products of internal mech
anisms, either learned constancies or Innate principles of
organization, as much as they are the products of stimulation.
Historically, the trend in positivism and behaviorism
had been to view the world as much simpler than it was
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experienced in consciousness.

The secondary qualities with

which former realists enriched subjective awareness had
disappeared:

but other mechanisms such as constancies, also

had been introduced which organized and enriched proximal
stimuli.

The real world was made up of energies and bodies,

as described by physicists.

The textures, colors and complex

configurations of awareness were enrichments upon the energies
arriving at the receptors.

The neo-realists are united in

reversing this situation.
real world.

The objects of awareness are in the

The process of perception has them as objects.

Whatever modifications perception makes upon its objects, it
is in the direction of impoverishment, not in the direction of
enrichment.
One of the men who

was

most influential in reversing

this trend was T.P. Nunn, who held that all aspects or qualities
of an object were entirely independent of our perceiving them.
In his view, experience is more veridical than our ideas.

The

different shades of yellow one can see in a buttercup are
properties of the flower, just as we experience them.

Accord

ing to this view, ideas are poor oversimplifications of the
experience they represent.

(Passmore, 1968)

We can refer to this trend as a process of externalization.

Ever since the beginning of the study of perception

there had been a continually increasing tendency to attribute
the qualities of experience to internal (inside the perceiver)
mechanisms.

A good early example of the process of external-

ization can be found in McGilvary's (1965) work on perspective

100

realism.

MeGilvary argues that contrary to earlier phil

osophies, relationships are reals

a geometrical object, for

example, has many perceptual faces depending on the perspec
tive from which it is viewed.

Traditionally it was thought

that perspective was an inherently subjective notion.
MeGilvary makes use of projective geometry to calculate
various perspectives of a cube, and argues that none of these
perspectives is dependent on a viewer; therefore, they are
as much a feature or property of the cube as its Euclidean
dimensions.
••

If perspective is real, why not texture, pragnanz
or all the constancies which make up the behavlorists’ appar
ent world.

This is precisely the thesis that Gibson offers

as the only hope for a true stimulus-response psychology.
The first would be a psychophysical theory of the
correspondence between variables of stimulation and
qualities or dimensions of experience. Its chief
novelty would be the explicit postulate that for
every quality of experience there is a discoverable
variable of stimulation.
This means not only that
the sensory qualities, so called, have stimuli, but
that all the qualities of surfaces, edges, slopes,
and shapes have stimuli, and that all the qualities
of motion, action, and causality have stimuli, and
that all the qualities of persons, groups, insti
tutions, words, and symbols have stimuli. Its method
would be the psychophysical experiment with optimal
conditions for discrimination.
Admittedly, the
isolation and control of the stimulus variables for
most of the latter qualities would be fantastically
difficult. In this sense, the theory might never be
fully verified. It is, however, simply the extension
of the accepted theory of sensory experience to spa
tial and social experience and it provides a straight
forward program of experiments.
(Gibson, 1951> PP«

10»f-105)
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We can see the same process of extemalization in
Hawkins' reasonings
My criticism of the way of thought that is common to
Kant and the relativist is that it arises from a
broken-down analogy. Perception is not perception
of a received-mental-object, problematically related
to a real object that we do not perceive.
The proper
counterpart to the received message in communication
is not the object of perception, but the perception
itself, the psychological act - whole object is.
precisely, the physical object of perception.
(Hawkins,
196M-, p. 5 0
The extemalization of the object of perception as it
is advocated by the neo-realists is not without its difficulties.
The most important of these difficulties is understanding the
ambiguous residual of the internal object, what Gibson calls
"stimulus information" or "invariances in experience" and what
Hawkins terms it "message".

In order to understand this we

must look at their description of the perceptual process.
The neo-realists are united in viewing perception as
an active process leading to an achievement.

The originator

of this view of perception was Gilbert Hyle.

Hyle, however,

did not agree with Gibson, Attneave and Hawkins, these men
having devoted more time to the psychology of the problem than
to the philosophy of the problem.

Ryle did not agree that

seeing or touching referred to any mental or physiological
capacities of the organism.

For Ryle these were merely

achievements in the same sense as is implied by the terms
"winning" or "catching" as in the phrases "winning a race" or
"catching a ball".

To the psychologist Gibson, achievements

implied activity leading to the achievement, and in his The
Senses Viewed as Perceptual Systems, the subject matter under
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study were composed of the activities of listening, seeing
and touching, and not the senses of touch, audition and vision.
Only in sensation do the five senses operate as separate pas
sive receptors.

These are merely the energy receiving systems

which bring stimulus energy into contact with the nervous
system.

In perception the entire body works as a single

system in processing stimulus information, the order embedded
in stimulus energy.

Stimulus information can go through sev

eral transformations without losing its significance and it
makes use of stimulus energy only as a carrier in the same
way that the telephone uses currents of electricity.

Con

tained in the message is information which comes from the ob
ject of perception, not from the energy which carries the
message from the object.

In this way, all the riddles of

constancy and other discrepancies between proximal and distal
stimuli are resolved.
The retinal image of a coin held at a slant a short
distance from the eye is for sensation an ellipse, but for
perception it is circular.

Prior theories have tried to

explain this by introducing some form of mediator between
sensation and perception.

Gibson (1966) merely held that the

information of circularity is present in the retinal image.
It is a higher order invariant and it is invariant with
respect to all the rest of the stimulus information entering
into perception at that time.

For it must be remembered that

perception involves not just the eye, but other information
available to the perceptual system about the perspective of
103

of the eye with respect to the coin.

Such information is

given by certain invariant ratios existing in optical array.
In the case of the coin, the invariance which serves
as information for the perception of circularity is, according
to Gibson, "ratios and other invariances in the optic array"
(Gibson, 1966, p. 306).

It is safe to assume that Gibson

means by ratios, relationships such as the mathematical rela
tionship between radius and circumference.
not be conscious.

These ratios need

Assuming that Gibson's notion of invariance

in the optic array is an adequate substitution for the constancy
hypothesis, there still remains a difficulty with the example
of the coin.

It just so happens that slanted coins seen from

a distance are like railroad tracks seen from a distance; that
is, they are cases of incomplete constancy.

According to both

the constancy hypothesis and Gibson's invariance hypothesis,
the tracks should not appear to converge at all and the coins
should appear completely circular.

In fact, experiments dem

onstrate that perception falls somewhere between complete
constancy and an exact reading of the optical or retinal image.
Gibson attributes the incompleteness of the constancy to a
special case of sensation intruding on perception due to the
learning of perspective.
Some sorts of visual sensation, especially linear
perspective, are very obtrusive, the more so when
attention has been educated to it by having learned
to draw pictures.
The result may be the illusory
appearance of foreshortened surfaces and decreasing
size with distance.
VJhen this attitude is adopted,
the information for the slant of the coin becomes a
sensation of elliptical shape and the information for
the recession of distance becomes a sensation of
10lf

angular convergence to a vanishing point. I do not
know of any good evidence to show that animals or
young children are subject to these illusions of
perspective.
(Gibson, 1966, p. 307)
Unlike the behaviorists and the gestaltists the con
stancy or invariance of perception is not problematically
related to sensation.

It is immediately present in the stim

ulus information and has its ontological existence in the
message which is the ordering of stimulus energy.

Unlike the

behaviorists1 constancies such invariances do not have to be
learned by the associating of sensations, although they must
be discriminated.

1

Gibson agrees with the gestalt psychol

ogists that the ability to detect such invariances is present
in young children and animals.

(Gibson, 1966)

When the senses are used as a perceptual system, the
perceptual activity involves the processing of information
which is brought to the senses.

In the ordering of stimulus

energy, the perceptual process decodes this message and refers
to its object which is external to the body.

This reference

to the object is best understood if one thinks of the telephone
analogy in which the message is what is understood even
though it is attributed to the sender.

This view of perception

emphasizes veridicality and is in marked opposition to most
of the work that was being done in perception when Gibson
promulgated it.

Most of the neo-realists take it as a

matter of course that our ordinary experience is correct in

^Most learning theorists would not accept the dis
tinction that Gibson makes here between discriminating and
learning by association. Nevertheless it is presented here
since this is an attempt to express his theory as he sees it.
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assuming that we perceive things as they are.

To put it in

Hawkins words, "The sensory channels are too well matched to
the normal message source to allow any consistent decoding of
message sequences that violate the basic customs of nature."
(Hawkins, 196M-, p. 5 0

Hawkins goes on to argue that there

are two convincing reasons for believing that nature’s encoding
is well matched to our decoding.
The first fact is that the set of possible messages
from nature is much larger than the set that nature
actually uses. This is demonstrated by the ease with
which, in artificial laboratory situations, perceptions
can be disoriented and judgment misguided.
(Hawkins,
196k, p. lf9)
While this first argument is most often used to support
the opposing point of view, Hawkins seems not only to have
assumed a veridical decoder but also a cooperative encoder.
Further, Hawkins argues that our decoders are not tuned to all
possible sorts of messages, but only to those nature is in the
habit of providing.
Finally we arrive at the question of scientific obser
vation.

How, if at all, does scientific observation differ

from ordinary perception?
does not.

In any of its essential aspects it

According to the neo-realists, veridical perception

is always a capacity that man can employ.

All of the percep

tual research which has accrued in demonstrating the influences
of motivation, purposes and selective attention does not dem
onstrate that perception cannot be veridical.

For example,

Gibson distinguishes between literal and schematic perception.
Literal perception is veridical in that it depends on the
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stimulus which is independent of the subject.

Schematic

perception demonstrates that attention and poor perceptual
conditions such as are used by most researchers in social
perception, can and do distort the stimulus.

Gibson does not

address himself to the question of scientific observation, but
it is clear that the objective observation, as classically
defined, is possible under what Gibson calls "literal per
ception".

(Gibson, 1 9 5 0

Knowing that the perceptual process is capable of
both literal and schematic productions we merely have to
enhance those conditions which produce literal perception and
minimize schematic perception.
process of measurement.

This is what we do in the

"Every measurement involves a part

icular finding or set of findings, certified by perception
and independent

of wish or

At first glance

it

bias."

(Hawkins, 1961*, p.86)

would appear that the meaning of

objectivity for these neo-realists has been fully restored,
but upon closer analysis their concept of objective percep
tion deviates from the classical concept of objectivity in
several important ways.

The first deviation from the trad

itional concept of objectivity in the neo-realist epistemology is related to the extemalization of the object of
perception.

Early neo-realists, such as T.P. Nunn, repeat

edly emphasized that reality is more diversified in its
properties and perspectives than is our perception of it.
The neo-realist

account of

scientific observation hasim

bedded in it an

element of

this problem.
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The early

new realists would criticize it because it inherently glosses
over many of the potentially discriminate properties in the
perceived object.

This is in essence Husserl's criticism.

He held that in scientific description the use of data lang
uage to represent observations —
(Spiegelberg, 1960)

impoverishes reality.

Nowhere among the more recent writers

included above as neo-realists can we find a clear discussion
of this issue.

In fact, there are only hints that the per

ceptual oversimplifies the actual, and never is there dis
cussion of the implications of this kind of misrepresentation
in scientific epistemology.
We can see the residue of this problem in those few
places in which writers like Gibson and Attneave fall back
on the principle of economy, rather than the principle of
correspondence, as a criterion of truth.

Gibson is clear in

maintaining that his is a theory of strict psychophysical
correspondence.
The test is simple: does a specific variation in the
observer's experience (or behavior) correspond to a
variation of the physical stimulus? Although this
experiment has seldom been applied to what are trad
itionally called perceptions, it can and should be
performed.
(Gibson, 1950, p. 62)
But, on the other hand, when Gibson is forced to explain how
perception yields a message more closely identifiable with the
distal than the proximal stimulus, he falls back on the con
cept of invariance.

All the incoming information is processed

to produce the most invariant percept possible.

This is sim

ilar to Attneave's argument that perception reduces uncertainty
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by producing the most "economical’1 picture of the stimulus based
on the available information.

Economy and correspondence seem

to be quite different criteria.

Whether they can be compatably

mixed in the fashion suggested here is not a question with which
these writers deal.

It would seem clear, however, that the

criterion of economy is one which deviates from the strict cor
respondence implied in the independence feature of the classical
definition of objectivity.
In passing, it is instructive to repeat an interesting
reversal in perceptual theories that is related to this prob
lem.

It was pointed out earlier that, before the neo-realists,

the tendency within the field of perception was to accept the
physicist’s description of the stimulus and to view the process
of perception as one which takes advantage of past experience
in order to bring to consciousness a very complex and highly
enriched representation of the stimulus.

It would appear that,

by externalizing the object of perception, the neo-realists have
inherited the mirror image of the problems that are inherent in
the constancy hypothesis.

They began with an extremely complex

stimulus situation containing so much variation that the process
of perception must reduce its complexity in order to bring to
consciousness a rather constant picture of the world.

Neither

of these pictures seems to render the use of correspondence crit
eria possible in the philosophy of science.
The second important difference between the neo-realists view
point and the classical definition of objectivity is in their belief
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in a hierarchy of factuality.

In this we can see their con

nection to the ordinary language analysts with whom they share
an affinity for common sense.

For Gibson anything that can

be measured is a fact, which can be measured.

Higher order

variables, such as the dimensions of a human smile may some
day be measurable, but whether we can successfully incorporate
this meaning of factuality with what is usually connoted by
the facts of physics seems doubtful.

Gibson himself says

that there are facts at all levels of "sensibility".

That

this is true as a common sense proposition few will question,
but the fact that the level of their existence depends on
human sensibilities would ban many such facts from the realm
of science.

Most scientists would agree that the range of

observables to which man has been able to bring his senses
has and will continue to expand, but the range of sensibilities
which man may bring to scientific observation is prescriptively
limited.
YJhat is here called transactionalism has even less of
an explicit tradition than the neo-realists who were discussed
in the previous section.

Philosophically this position has

been called pragmatism or instrumentalism, but the two most
important contributors to what is called transactionalism pay
no homage to this tradition and are more scientific than
philosophical.

In particular this refers to Werner Heisenberg

and Adlebert Ames, whose work in quite different sciences led
them to very similar conclusions with respect to the problem
of observation and perception.
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There is a very significant and important link between
philosophical pragmatism and psychological transactionalism.
Pragmatic transactionalism is the one school of philosophical
psychology which received both its initial philosophical
expression and its later psychological amplification in the
United States.

Pierce was the first to develop it as a phil

osophy, and James as a psychology.

Later Bentley and Dewey

refined the philosophy and Ames, and Cantril made the psych
ology more concrete.
Transactional!sts are united in agreeing that the
primitive of knowledge is a relationship between instrument
and the given;Instruments include such things as physical
apparatus, overt and covert operations, and constructs and
assumptions; the givens can only be known in the way they
relate to any of these instruments.

The primitive element of

knowledge is a transaction in which one becomes aware of the
consequences of his actions under this set of initial condi
tions.

The percept or the observation is the relationship

between what the perceiver or observer brings to the situation
and what is given by the situation.

This relationship,

although it is not a clearly defined unit, is to transaction
alism what object protocols are to physicalism, sense data is
to phenomenalism, gestalten are to configuration!sm, and
information to the neo-realist.
William James offers the following pragmatic edict:
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...to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of
object...we need only to consider what effects of
a conceivably practical kind the object may involve what sensations we are to expect from it, and what
reactions we must prepare.
(James, 1969) P« *+11)
This is the pragmatist's counterpart to the positivist's
verification principle.
or phenomenal!sts wish

The positivists, whether physicalists
to use sense data or protocol objec

tivity to establish that the idea was valid because of exis
tential independence.

Pragmatists not only doubt the

possibility of establishing correspondence, they also assert
the undesirability or at least irrelevance of doing so.

In

that they hold concepts to have meaning independent of their
existential representativeness, they are similar to the
configurationists.

The concept guides experience and there

fore influences consequences.

We can demonstrate the irrel

evance of the correspondence by using James' famous argument
for the belief in God.

Justification for the belief in God

does not come as an answer to the question, "Does God exist?"
but rather to the question "What difference does the belief
in God make to the human experience?"

If today were the last

day of human existence then the belief in God would truly be
meaningless, since concepts have no retrospective significance.
But since it is not man's last day, a continued belief in the
existence of God makes a significant difference in the per
spective which molds future experience.

No doubt James would

have used this argument as in fact some of his philosophical
descendents have against the positivist disdain for meta
physics.
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In his analysis of perception, James also came very
close to the position of the contemporary transactionalists
in psychology.

Concepts are useful abstractions which have

their influence on perceptions by selection, organization,
and anticipation.

In certain contexts he refers to these as

"supposals" which have a self-fulfilling influence upon
perception and which can only be evaluated in actual instances
of carrying out a purpose.
F.C. Scheller, is one of the best known pragmatists,
and was in fundamental agreement with James' view.

Scheller

and Alfred Sidgewick developed a pragmatic logic, which in
sharp contrast to that of logical empiricists involved consid
erations such as cognitive satisfaction and task completion.
Most logicians would consider these factors to be psych
ological.

Scheller1s concept of reality is strikingly sim

ilar to that of contemporary transactionalism because it is
both subjective and evolutionary.

Reality, as well as logic

and methodology are by no means defined for all time, but are
subject to change with man's condition.

All of these usually

static terms are seen as variables dependent upon man's pur
pose.

(Scheller, 1912)
An evolutionary and psychological view of the analytic

aspects of knowledge is one of the hallmarks of pragmatism.
Mathematics, logic and conceptual requiredness are empirical
in origin in the broadest sense of that term.
on this point than Dewey.

None is clearer

All such analytic considerations

are based on prior successes.
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One of the best examples of

the evolutionary nature of analytic knowledge comes to us
from Bentley and Dewey's analysis of the evolution of what is
to be considered a satisfactory scientific theory.

Not only

does the content of our explanations progress with scientific
success, but also there is a change in the very nature of
what we consider to be a satisfactory explanation.
Bentley and Dewey (19*+9) review the nature of explan
ations in the history of physics and abstract three types of
explanations which have evolved.

They are given here in

historical order, which represented not just change but
improvement in their view.

Taken together, they provide one

of the broadest philosophical definitions of transaction and
do

so in a contrasting context.

In addition, they demon

strate that these functionalists would never be satisfied
with any static definition of logical necessity, so typical of
the positivists.

The three kinds of explanations are:

SELF-ACTION: where things are viewed as acting under
their own powers.
INTER-ACTION: where thing is balanced against thing
in causal Interconnection.
TRANSACTION: where systems of descriptions and naming
are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action,
without final attribution to "elements" or other pre
sumptively detachable or independent "entities."
"essences," or "realities," and without isolation of
presumptively detachable "relations" from such
detachable "elements".
(Bentley and Dewey, 19^9> p. 108)
In the transactional point of view, the repeated
emphasis upon the "non-detachability" of any of the elements
of knowledge is one of the factors which distinguishes trans
actionalism from the previous four theories of knowledge that
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we have examined.

In each of the others, the indubitable was

characterized by what Dewey calls detachability and what we
have called independence.

The search for an element of know

ledge which we could attribute to nature, rather than to
ourselves, was abandoned by the pragmatists.

This represents

the important transition in the perspective on knowledge.
Despite all the differences which exist between the other
theories of knowledge that we discussed previously, the fact
that they all have proposed an indubitable means that the
fundamental task of the creators of knowledge is to read the
book of nature.

When the pragmatists abandoned the hope of

isolating a detachable element, they established a completely
new perspective on knowledge.

The creators of knowledge,

according to the pragmatist point of view, are not reading
the book of nature; instead, they are charting a course of
human achievement.

One of the most important characteristics

of the transactional position held in common with the neorealists, is an active view of perception.

But, in the context

of transactionalism, the activity is an essential aspect of the
relativity of perception.

Bentley and Dewey have stressed the

significance of this point within the framework of scientific
experimentation.

Dewey urges that we substitute the word

"taken" for the word "given" when referring to the observables
of an experiment, emphasizing that man is not a passive
recipient of information but an active resolver of problems.
Man is in no position, nor should he want to be, of ever
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apprehending the pre-cognized givens.

The objects of inquiry

are the products of previous inquiries both in the private and
the public sense.
In accordance with the new perspective mentioned above,
inquiry is conducted into problems of knowledge, not problems
of nature.

The need for inquiry is the result of noting

inadequacies in what we already know.

As Dewey puts it, it

is work to be done "usually at the edge of knowledge."
(Bentley and Dewey, 19^9)

We are conducting our inquiries

into anomalies that exist in the present state of knowledge.
Therefore even the problems we work on are molded by past
knowledge.

The methods or instruments we will use for working

with the problem were once the object of inquiry for someone
else.

Dewey includes among instruments, concepts, meanings,

overt and covert operations, and apparatus.

The results of

an inquiry are "taken" by all of these instruments, not given
by nature.

Our knowledge is to be evaluated, not according

to its ability to represent nature, but according to its
reliability in achieving human purposes.
The development of a descriptive psychology of percep
tion based on the pragmatic philosophies presented above was
undertaken by Adlebert Ames and his followers, Cantril and
Ittelson.

Following in the gestalt tradition they rested

their case primarily upon a set of experimental demonstrations,
which it was Ames' genius to construct.

For purposes of

discussion here we will refer to the distorted room experiment.1

d e t a i l e d description for the construction of distorted
rooms as well as descriptions of typical observations made in
the room are given in Ames. pp. 182-196)
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Such demonstrations carry the same amount of conviction as do
the gestalt displays, but they are more elaborate and the
principles of their construction are more explicit.
The distorted rooms are built on the principle that
several different actual configurations can give rise to the
same retinal image.

The walls in the trapezoidal room appear

rectangular because one assumes walls to be rectangular.

If

this is the case than any piece of furniture placed in the
trapezoidal room will appear distorted.

This creates a sit

uation in which a distorted room appears normal, while making
its normal contents appear distorted.

Here we have in essence

the first important principle of transactional perception, which
is that assumptions influence what is perceived.
principle has to do with the role of action.

The second

The way to come

to see the room trapezoidally is by acting with respect to it.
If a subject tries to catch a ball which he has bounced off
the various surfaces of the distorted room, he will at first
fail to catch the ball.

With practice his catching will im

prove, and his perception of the room will gradually shift.
Take the same subject immediately to a room which was con
structed rectangularly and he will perceive it trapezoidally.
Only with additional practice of action will his perception
return to that of a rectangular room.

The second principle

is, therefore, that assumptions and purposes are intrinsically
related to one another.

The assumptions one initially made

concerning room did not come from the correct perception of
all rooms in prior experience, but from the set of purposes
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one has had with respect to similarly constructed rooms.

That

our present assumptions with respect to rooms are dependent on
purpose, and not the similarity of room constructions, can be
demonstrated by considering the fact that Ames1 distorted rooms
would have entirely different consequences for a blind person
or for an acoustical engineer.
We are never afforded the opportunity of perceiving
the world without any assumptions.

This is probably why Husserl's

new science did not flourish.
The fact that the world can be apprehended in accord
with various schemata implies that there exists one
world which does not depend for its existence on how
it is differentiated and that schematization creates
some, but not all, of the differences in the world.
However, nothing follows concerning the possibility
of apprehending the world in a pre-schematic, or
pre-linguistic way.
(MacKinnon, 1968-69, p. 126)
The transactional description of perception corresponds
to Bohr and Heisenberg's description of observations in quantum
physics.

This correspondence is of the utmost significance and

creates the basis for a new epistemology.

Ames' description of

perception is that of an individual bringing a set of assumptions
to a set of givens; what he experiences is the relationship be
tween the assumptions and the givens.

The individual is never

afforded a view of the givens independent of any assumptions.
He can obtain alternative views by bringing to the same givens
alternative assumptions.

Bohr and Heisenberg's descriptions of

a measurement procedure in quantum physics, are cases in which
the measurement obtained is not attributed to the phenomena,
but to the relationship between the phenomena and the apparatus.

118

Just as Ames says that what you see is a function of how you
look, Bohr and Heisenberg say that what you obtain is a func
tion of how you measure.

This is not a solipsistic position:

it merely denies the possibility of direct apprehension.
Both Instances are analogous to one of the favorite
transactional analogies, in which it is said that the world is
only viewed through transformation lenses.

The transformations

of the lenses can never be separated from that which is appre
hended with them, and what is apprehended can never be known
independent of the transformations.

In the case of the per

ceptual demonstrations, the rooms perceived are as much a
function of the assumptions made about what is perceived as
they are a function of the visual display.

In the case of

the quantum measurement, the numbers obtained do not refer to
the phenomena, but to the relationship between the phenomena
and the apparatus.

Heisenberg's apparatus and Ames' assump

tions have their analogy in the transformation lenses.

We

can see the parallels between Ames' view of sensation, and
Bohr and Heisenberg's view of measurement, in their own words,
We can no longer speak of the behavior of the particle
independently of the process of observation.
As a final
consequence, the natural laws formulated mathematically
in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary
particles themselves but with our knowledge of them.
Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not
these particles exist in space and time objectively,
since the only processes we can refer to as taking
place are those which represent the interplay of
particles with some other physical system, e.g. a
measuring instrument.
Thus, the objective reality of the elementary particles
has been strangely dispersed, not into the fog of some
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new ill-defined or still unexplained conception of
reality, but into the transparent clarity of a math
ematics that no longer describes the behavior of the
elementary particles but only our knowledge of this
behavior.
(Heisenberg, 1958, p. 15)
We conceive that we cannot directly know external
events; that our senses and sensations and ideas
give us, at most, a prognosis of their significance.
What is known can never exactly correspond to the
immediate occasion. At best their relationship can
only be a similarity or analogy.
The degree of this
similarity may vary, but we can never know the inher
ent nature of objects and their relationships as such.
The fact that WE CAN NEVER KNOW what we commonly con
sider as facts and truth is rather appalling. It is
as if nature had set about to create a super hoax
with humans, like donkeys chasing the "feed bag."
But we are in that situation as long as we insist
on believing that knowledge of the constitution of
things as such and their relationships, is the
final goal.
(Ames, 1960, p.
The status of objectivity from the point of view of
transactional!sm is curiously muddled.

This is so particularly

if one relies exclusively upon Ames and Heisenberg as spokesmen.
For example, Ames, who persistently maintains that we can never
know the essence of things independent of our purposes and
assumptions, nevertheless distinguishes between subjectivity
and objectivity.
Both the subjective and the objective worlds are
essentially humanistic in their essence. The differ
ence between these two worlds is not that one is
subjective and humanistic and that the other is
objective and nonhumanistic, but that one is uniquely
personal to the individual experiencing it, disclosing
those aspects of nature that can be experienced by him
and by him alone; while the other discloses the hum
anistic aspects of nature that can be the common
experience of all men. These aspects must be imper
sonal, that is, exclusive of individualistic signif
icances (cf. modern science)."
(Ames, 1960, p. 8)
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This position is similar in some respects to the
publicity criterion of physicalists.

It separates private

significances from public significance.

One further compli

cation with respect to the transactional position has to do
with what Ames may mean in the quotation above when he refers
to ’’all men".

This is puzzling since Cantril, his closest

colleague, through whom all of Ames1 work is known, explicitly
promotes the notion of cultural relativity in which assump
tions, purposes and language define reality differently for
different groups.
Heisenberg's view of objectivity is no more clear
than is Ames'.

On the one hand he says,

While political ideas may gain a convincing influence
among great masses of people just because they corres
pond or seem to correspond to the prevailing interests
of the people, scientific ideas will spread only be
cause they are true. There are objective and final
criteria assuring the correctness of a scientific
statement.
(Heisenberg, 1958, p. 19*0
On the other hand he does not identify scientific propositions
with reality,
Furthermore, one of the most important features of the
development and the analysis of modern physics is the
experience that the concepts of natural language,
vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable
in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms
of scientific language, derived as an idealization from
only limited groups of phenomena.
(Heisenberg, p. 185)
An assessment of objectivity from this perspective
reveals that, at least with respect to the feature of indep
endence, objectivity in the classical sense is not acceptable.
Precision and accuracy can be achieved and through these we
can be certain of reliable results.
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But reliable results in

this context have a different meaning since they do not refer
to the phenomena independently of the conditions under which
the results were obtained.

There is still an "if-then"

quality to the knowledge, but the "if" refers to something
one can do in order to obtain certain results and never allows
one to know essences.
Objectivity is also different with respect to the
criterion of certainty; in both the quantum situation and
with respect to any of the perceptual demonstrations, what is
known or perceived is in principle expandable on the basis of
ways of knowing.

We have always recognized that as our

instruments of observation improve, knowledge expands; but
this was seen as due to the limitations of our senses.

The

transactional position maintains that there is no one descrip
tion which is correct, proper or complete with respect to a
set of givens.

The limits of what is to be perceived are not

inherently bound in the stimulus, so that with respect to
certainty we can assign only a probability to a particular
percept arising from a combination of assumptions and givens.
Similarly, in the quantum mechanical experiment, descriptions
are not of phenomena, but of the relationship between phen
omena and other physical systems; therefore, the limits of
description are not inherent within the phenomena, but depend
on man's ingenuity in devising means of actualizing the
phenomena's potential.

All we can hope to do is assign a

probability to a given outcome given a particular set of
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initial conditions.

Transactionalists, therefore, do not accept

the finality that is implicit in the goal of description.
Since any particular description involves assumptions and goals,
as well as givens, no description is ever considered to he the
correct description.

Instead, descriptions can he given a

probability of occuring, given a set of initial conditions and
a purpose.

Since any of these factors may change with the hu

man condition, finality is impossible.
In this form of transactionalism, there is an important
change with respect to the notion of certainty.

The change can

be best understood in terms of a change of interpretation of
the meaning of probability.

Prior to the development of quan

tum physics and the principle of indeterminacy, probabilistic
prediction systems were used in classical physics but in a very
different way than they came to be used in quantum physics.
Probability theory was employed as the appropriate mathematical
system to make predictions about physical systems in which there
were technical limitations preventing the accurate measurement
of that physical system.

For obvious technical reasons, an

analysis of the kinetic motion of gas particles cannot rely on
the direct measurement of individual molecules in the gas.
Therefore, probability theory was used to estimate the parame
ters of interest on the basis of the behavior of large groups
of gas molecules.

This application of statistical inference

is used to overcome instances of human ignorance due to tech
nical limitations.

The principle of indeterminacy changes
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the interpretation of the role of probability theory by chang
ing the status of the measurement problem from that of a tech
nical problem to that of a logical problem.

In the quantum

physical experiment, the impossibility of measuring the traj
ectory of an individual particle is not a technical problem
but a logical and physical impossibility.

Therefore, the use

of probability inference techniques is an inherent aspect of
"knowing" in this domain.
eventually to be replaced.

It is not a temporary substitute,
We can either interpret this

ontologically or epistemologically.

That is, we can say that

there is either an inherent element of chance in nature or an
inherent element of ignorance in knowledge, but we can no
longer interpret it as a matter of technical error, which, at
least in principle, could be overcome.
Thus we see that both of the fundamental features of
the classical definition of objectivity have been replaced in
the transactional account of knowledge.

The search for the

independent in the form of the indubitable given of knowledge
was abandoned, making knowledge relative to man's purposes.
The feature of certainty was also abandoned by elevating in
determinacy from.the technical realm to the logical realm.
For this reason, it is correct to say that the transactional
theory of knowledge does not accept the assumption of objec
tivity.

It is because of this that many of the methods and

experimental demonstrations developed by the transactional
ists have been incorporated into this inquiry.
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CHAPTER V
THREE ANOMALIES TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
We have already explained what is meant by an anomaly
in our section on method.

In the following material, the

anomalies are constructed with a definite plan in mind.

As

indicated previously, one of the fundamental reasons for sep
arating perception and observation was based on the assumption
that observation is objective and that perception is subjective.
To go along with this distinction would be to prejudge the
question of objectivity:

therefore, much care has been taken

in selecting anomalies which can be exemplified in what might
be clearly recognized as coming from each of these two domains.
This is why the first anomaly deals with geometry and illusions,
the second deals with reversible figures and a simple problem
in physical description taken from the history of physics,
and the third deals with the problem of equivalent configur
ations in perception and complementary description in quantum
physics.

The examples selected have been paired off in this

manner in the hope that parallel abstractions could come from
each half of the pair, thereby making the same point with
respect to the assumption of objectivity.
The anomalies result from two steps which have al
ready been discussed in some detail.

The first step involves

the bringing together of two currently separated fields of
epistemological research.

If, as argued previously, the

assumption of objectivity is what keeps philosophy of science
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and the psychology of perception separated, then the effect of
holding that assumption in abeyance is to allow us to see
their commonality of interests.

This is why each anomaly con

sists of information that has been collected from each discip
line and brought together to bear on one problem.

The second

step involves the selection of items which, in the combined
context of the two epistemological disciplines, appear to be
counterevidence to the assumption of objectivity.
Each of the three anomalies is designed to make a
different point about the objectivity of observations.

The

first anomaly is counterevidence to the assumption of objec
tivity in that it demonstrates that what is observed depends
in part on assumptions being made by the observer.

The second

anomaly attempts to demonstrate that the observed is influenced
by patterns of organization brought to it by the observer.
Finally, the third anomaly attempts to demonstrate that what
is observed is influenced by the goals of the observer.
In 1955? Floyd Allport thought it was necessary to
begin his textbook on perception by giving a clear and simple
demonstration of the difference between subjective and objec
tive reports.

He believed that we could abstract from this

simple situation some general principles for distinguishing
between these reports.

The principles were to be applied to

reports concerning more complex subjects such as are usually
studied in psychology, wherein the distinction between objec
tive and subjective is more difficult to make.
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Allport presented the simple geometrical illustrations
that are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

He held that we can dis

tinguish the objective from the subjective by observing the
methods the subject uses in arriving at his reports.
Allport
at Figure 1.

asks two questions of the subject, looking

The first question calls for a subjective answer.

It is, "How does Figure 1 look to you?".

The subject merely

glances at the figure and replies that Figure 1 appears to be
two straight horizontal parallel lines.

The second question

Allport asks of his subject is, "What are the facts about
Figure 1?"

This calls for an objective answer.

The subject

takes a ruler, which is a straight edge, and compares the
straight edge to both lines.

He then measures the distance

between the two lines at various points along the lines.

The

subject then replies that the facts about Figure 1 are that
it contains two straight lines, and that these lines are
parallel.

Though the subject gives the same reply to both

questions, it is clear that he has used a different method to
arrive at each answer.

The significance of the difference

between these methods becomes clear only when the two methods
are applied to Figure 2.
Here we see lines like those of Figure 1, but in a
different setting. If the reader will not repeat his
two observations exactly as before, the point can be
readily made; and in making it we shall come at last
to a true understanding of the problem of perception.
First we ask, as before, the phenomenological question:
"How do the lines appear?" The reply will probably be,
for both the upper and the lower figure, that they look
CURVED. For the upper figure the report will probably
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FIGURE 1
ALLPORT.'S NON-ILLUSION STIMULUS
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FIGURE 2
ALLPORT'S ILLUSION STIMULUS
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be that they look closest together at the extremes and
furthest apart at the center, while for the lower fig
ure they look closest together at the center and
divergent at the extremes. Now we ask for the obser
vation corresponding to the physicalistic question;
"What are the facts regarding the lines?" If the
reader will again use the straightedge or ruler for
testing both the upper and lower figures, thus again
bringing in denotation, he will probably, report that
the lines in both cases are STRAIGHT and PARALLEL.
Clearly then, phenomenological and physicalistic
procedures may differ not only methodologically BUT
IN THEIR REPORTED RESULTS. The two methods of observ
ing give answers that disagree. It cannot be alto
gether true that things look as they do because they
are what they are.
Moreover, if a large number of observers went through
the same two procedures for Figure 2 we would doubtless
find this same difference of outcome in all the obser
vations. Each type of description is in this case
general for a population of observers and follows its
own laws. It is evident that pursuing the objective
method and satisfying the criteria of denotation,
relative observer-freedom, and publicly performable
operations may lead to an experience content that is
different from that produced by the phenomenological
method with its failure to satisfy these criteria.
The question of whether objectivity-criteria are to
be used or not; therefore becomes significant.
One
of these methods cannot be substituted for the other
without running the risk not only of eliminating the
type of experience pertaining to first, but also of
changing the report. Phenomenological descriptions
must be used to state how the lines "look"; but if
we want to know the "facts" about them, we must place
our reliance upon the physicalistic account.
(Allport,
1955, PP. 38-^0)
It appears that this is one simple situation from which
we can abstract some clear cut principles for discriminating
between objective and subjective reports.

This is possible

only if we accept that the description the subject gives as
an answer to the question "What are the facts about Figure 1
and 2?", is in fact an objective description.
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By objective,

we assume Allport means that the description depends on the
stimuli and not on an arbitrary bias that the subject brings
to the stimuli.
We will demonstrate that in fact the description
"straight and parallel" in response to either Figures 1 or 2,
has imbedded in it arbitrary subjective biases brought to the
situation by the observer.

In addition, it will be shown that

another answer can be given to the question "What are the facts
about Figures 1 and 2?" besides the answer "straight and
parallel lines."

This alternative answer deviates as much

from "straight and parallel" as does the phenomenological reply,
but nevertheless satisfies all of Allport's criteria

for

objectivity.
The bias which we refer to is the assumption of an
Euclidean geometry along with certain conventions of measure
ment and certain other assumptions about physics.

There is

nothing inherent in the stimuli of Figures 1 and 2 to justify
any of the assumptions that are implicit in the Euclidean
description given by Allport.

We will demonstrate that

alternative assumptions about geometry, physics and conven
tions of measurement will give us a description of these same
figures, that is just as objective as the one given by Allport,
but is nevertheless different.

We will then be forced to face

the question, "How can there be more than one objective
description of these stimuli?"
Since the publication of Lobachevakii's New Elements
of Geometry (1955) it has been well known that Euclid's geometry
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is only one of many geometries or theories of relations.

Since

antiquity it had been assumed that Euclid1s was the only geom
etry and geometers have concentrated on problems within that
systematic body of knowledge.

In particular, proving the fifth

postulate, which is the axiom of parallels, is a problem which
had especially interested geometers.
Bolyai and Lobachevakii

It is said that Gauss,

concluded at about the same time

that a geometry was possible which did not assume the axiom of
the parallels was in fact possible.

For a long time, such

non-Euclidean geometries were considered logical curiosities,
of interest only to mathematicians and logicians.

It was not

until Einstein used it as the physical geometry appropriate
to the theory of Relativity that non-Euclidean geometries be
came widely accepted as candidates for physical descriptions.
It was at this time that the non-Euclidean descriptions were
recognized as possibly more "real” than Euclidean descriptions.
(Aleksandrov, 1963j Reichenbach, 1958)
To say that formal, purely mathematic geometry is a
convention simply means that its terms are arbitrary symbols
organized on the basis of logical consistency.
logically consistent systems can be constructed.

Several such
The elemen

tary definitions of a geometry are similar in many respects
to the dictionary definitions of languages:

therefore, it is

possible to construct an Euclidean, non-Euclidean dictionary
which gives the non-Euclidean definitions that most nearly
approximate their Euclidean counterparts.

(Table I is borrowed

from Poincare, and shows what such a dictionary would look
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SPACE:

portion of space situated above
the fundamental plane

PLANE:

sphere cutting the fundamental
plane orthogonally

STRAIGHT:

circle cutting the fundamental
plane orthogonally

SPHERE:

sphere

CIRCLE:

circle

ANGLE:

angle

DISTANCE
BETWEEN TWO
POINTS:

logarithm of the cross ratio of
these two points and the inter
sections of the fundamental
plane with a circle passing
through these two points and
cutting it orthogonally, etc.

TABLE I
ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF ELEMENTS IN
LOBACHEVAKII AND EUCLID*S GEOMETRIES

like.)

The use of such a dictionary allows us tp make logical

translations from one geometry to another,

only in principle.

In actuality, such translations require the complex mathematii

cal theorems of Riemannian geometry.
As long as non-Euclidean geometries were not involved
in describing the physical world, the possibility of such
geometries was not considered significant.

The philosophical

significance of the Theory of Relativity was in demonstrating
that not only were alternative geometries possible, but alter
native conventions of measurement were also possible.

This

meant that the non-Euclidean geometries could be applied to
the real world, including even those situations which could
be equally accurately described by Euclidean geometry.

Basic

measurement conventions were shown1to be definitions rather
than empirical truths.

Non-Euclidean descriptions of space

could only be applied to the real world if we constructed new
definitions of measurement which would allow us to make the
appropriate observations.

We suddenly discovered that, since

the geometry had made its way into the instrumentation of
measurement, many of the Euclidean verities were true only
by definition.

Three different sets of assumptions are in

volved at arriving at our conventions of measurement.

All of

these are arbitrary definitions for which it is possible to
construct logically consistent alternatives.

The first of

these which is most obviously relative is the conceptual
definition of units.

Basic units such as feet and meters are

arbitrary conventions and we can devise methods for translating
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from one such system to another.

The second of these involves

the physical coordination of the defined units.

This is a

matter of building instruments which are coordinated to the
scaling system devised.

Certain assumptions about physics

are involved when we define a foot rule on the basis of its
rigidity and the stability of its shape.
The third set of definitions has to do with the rule
for taking measurements.

For example, when measuring distance

in the ordinary Euclidean approach, we assume that the unit
of measurement remains the same when transported from one
plane to the next, and we therefore add equal values for each
adjacent application of the instrument.

It is possible to

devise other rules which are as logically acceptable as those
we are accustomed to using.

Such rules must be stated in

terms of a simple regulation which applies to each time and
place a measurement is made.

In the usual Euclidean approach

such a rule simply states that an equal unit is added, let
us say, one foot, each time the foot rule is placed exactly
adjacent to the previous measurement.

An alternative might

be a rule which calls for a reduction in the size of the unit
as a function of either the time or the place of the measure
ment.

This alternative would call "constant" in length a unit

ruler which from the point of view of Euclidean geometry would
be said to shrink in size.

In other rules the size of the

unit could vary as a function of the distance from a defined
point.

The important point is that the combination of the
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possible rules of measurement is practically infinite and the
selection of any particular rule is a matter of convenience.
It is precisely because these definitions are coordin
ated to physical objects like instruments of measurement that
we must be careful not to mistake the definitions for empirical
facts.

That a foot rule remains a foot long is not something

we can test, rather, it is something we have defined.

If two

foot rules have the same length at point A and then are
transported to point B, we must find that they are the same
length at point B or assume that
of them, are no longer foot rules.

one of them, or perhaps both
We do not reject the

definition for to do so would be to disrupt all previous
measurements; rather, we assume the deviant rule to be an
exception.
Thus we could arrange measuring rods, which in the
ordinary sense are called equal in length, and laying
them end to end, call the second rod half as long as
the first, the third one a third, etc. Such a defin
ition would complicate all measurements, but epistemologically it is equivalent to the ordinary definition,
which calls the rods equal in length. In this statement
we make use of the fact that
the definition of a unit
at only one space point does not render general measure
ments possible.
For the general case the definition of
the unit has to be given in advance as a function of
place (and also of the time). It is again a matter of
fact that our world admits of a simple definition of
congruency because of the factual relations holding for
the behavior of rigid rods: but this fact does not
deprive the simple definition of its definitional char
acter.
(Reichenbach, 1958, p. 1 7 )
A geometry, therefore, cannot be applied without first
developing conventions of measurements appropriate to it.
Riemannian geometry has provided the mathematical abstractions
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necessary to enable mathematicians to describe non-Euclidean
relations.

Most of us must accept the fact that such

non-Euclidean geometries and metrics are logically consistent
since we are unable to internalize the conventions of measure
ment and the logic of the geometry in the same way we have done
for Euclidean geometry.

Generally speaking, when we are faced

with a problem in geometry we test the correctness of the log
ical steps in the problem by visualizing or drawing the conse
quences.

Thus, for the axiom of the parallels we would draw

a straight line with a point next to it and "see" that only
one straight line can be drawn through that point which is
equidistant at all points with the one line.

Our ability to

do this rests upon our implicit knowledge of the definition
of the elements of Euclidean geometry such as lines, points,
planes and parallels; also, it rests on the implicit knowledge
of the conventions of measurement to be used to test the
straightness of lines and the distances of lengths.

For this

kind of implicit knowledge about Euclidean' definitions we
have no non-Euclidean counterparts.

Mathematicians who have

developed non-Euclidean counterparts for these definitions
through the use of Riemannian analytic geometry claim that
they gradually develop an intuitive grasp of such non-Euclidean
relationships.

For the sake of those of us who do not have

the mathematical facility, mathematicians have devised a
method of depicting non-Euclidean relationships in Euclidean
diagrams.

Perhaps the most famous of these diagrams is' given

in Figure 3»

It was first developed by Klein, who with
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FIGURE 3
KLEIN'S DEPICTION OF A NON-EUCLIDEAN SPACE

138

Poincare did much to amplify the significance of the develop
ment of non-Euclidean geometry to non-mathematicians.

(Hilbert,

1952; Poincari, 1953)
The circle forming the boundary
the boundaries of a Lobachevakii space.

of Figure 3 is

also

Since in Lobachevakii1s

geometry straight lines are geodesic, they do not travel infin
itely as in Euclidean geometry.

We may therefore represent

the entire non-Euclidean space within this circle.

If we

limit ourselves to the space within the circle it can be seen
that more than one straight line can be drawn through a point
which does not intersect another straight line some distance
from that point.

To understand how we can limit the space by

a circular boundary it must be understood that distance within
the space is measured by means of a non-Euclidean convention.
Mathematicians have worked out complex formulae which
describe in Euclidean terms the non-Euclidean metric for
measuring the distance between two points.

Mathematicians

tell us that the consequence of this metric is that the unit
of measure gets smaller and smaller as it approaches the
periphery of the space.

This simple statement of the effects

of the metric has been seized upon as a heuristic device for
the communication and depiction of non-Euclidean spaces.
Rather than explicating the complex mathematical
functions which represent the conventions of non-Euclidean
geometries, Poincar4 (1953) Klein and Reichenbach (1958) make
use of a universal force which affects the instruments of
measurement in the same way the mathematical functions affect
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the conventions of measurement.

In order to simplify the

situation, Poincar4 even reduces this force to something
as simple as heat.

Using this heuristic, we can explain how

the circular boundary of Figure 3 could never be reached by
anyone taking measurements from within the space.

Poincare

merely postulates a decreasing amount of heat emanating from
the center of the space.

This mysterious heat affects all

bodies, immediately placing them in thermal equilibrium.

As

we look upon it from outside the space we can see that the
observer from within the space who is making observations as
he moves toward the periphery of the space is gradually de
creasing in size.

His instruments also decrease in size as

do the steps he takes in walking toward the periphery.

It

becomes obvious that the observer within the space will never
reach the periphery.
Reichenbach has addressed himself directly to the
visualization or graphic representation of non-Euclidean
spaces.

In this he makes use of Poincare's technique of

projecting 3 dimensional curvilinear Euclidean spaces onto
planes which yield 2 dimensional non-Euclidean spaces.

Us

ing this technique we can describe Allport's stimuli as they
would appear in a non-Euclidean space.

Figure

depicts the

projection of a 3 dimensional Euclidean hemisphere into a 2
dimensional positively curved non-Euclidean space.
shows the 2 dimensional non-Euclidean surface.

Figure 5

We will

follow Poincare by describing the non-Euclidean convention

FIGURE If
THE STEREOGRAPHIC PROJECTION OF A
3 DIMENSIONAL CURVILINEAR SPACE ONTO
A 2 DIMENSIONAL NON-EUCLIDEAN SURFACE

FIGURE 5
2 DIMENSIONAL NON-EUCLIDEAN
SPACE OF POSITIVE CURVATURE
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of measurement appropriate to this surface in terms of a
universal force which influences instruments within this space.
The force expands all tangential lines and it increases in
strength as one approaches the periphery.
influence radial lines.

The force does not

This means that if a rigid rod were

held perpendicularly against the radial AB in order to draw
an equidistant CD, that the rod would increase in length in
moving from the midpoint towards A and B, since as it travels
from the midpoint towards either A or B it becomes increasing
ly tangential.

If we wish to connect the points CD in this

space, according to the Euclidean definition, the straightest
line between CD is the dotted line.

Since the dotted line

CD is farther removed from the midpoint it carries the rod
through that portion of space of maximal influence of the
universal force; therefore, the full length of the rod can
be laid down fewer times along dotted CD than it can along
solid CD.

Thus, we have a non-Euclidean description wherein

straight and parallel do not coincide, and it is in this sense
that the axiom of the parallels cannot be demonstrated in this
non-Euclidean space.

(Reichenbach, 1958, Hilbert, 1952)

The non-Euclidean description appropriate to Allport's
stimuli in figure 1 is obviously different from both the phen
omenological and the Euclidean description.

Despite this

difference, the non-Euclidean description satisfies all of
Allport's standards of objectivity, and therefore it stands
on an equal footing with his own physicalistic description.
He gives us three standards of objectivity, all of which
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are to be applied in evaluating the method that a particular
observer uses in achieving a description.

According to Allport,

if the three standards of objectivity are met, the object of
description can be said to have an existence apart from us and
belongs to the world of the natural sciences.
ards are:

The three stand

the degree of observer involvement, denotability and

operationism.

Of these three, the most difficult standard to

apply is the first one.
Is it not clear what Allport means by subjective involve
ment.

For example, in the problem of describing the stimuli in

Figure 1, is it more or less subject involvement when the obser
ver makes explicit the role that geometry and conventions of
measurement play in the description which he gives?

We are all

more willing to rely on a non-mathematical intuitional appli
cation of Euclidean geometry than on a non-Euclidean geometry.
It is therefore proper to say that a Euclidean description is
more subjective because it relies on psychological rather than
on logical analysis?

Despite this fundamental ambiguity in the

standard of observer involvement it seems clear that the diff
erences in observer involvement between the Euclidean and nonEuclidean descriptions are trivial ones that are due to cul
tural prejudice.
The standard of denotability means, according to
Allport, coming into physical contact with the object.

In

Jlgure 1, Allport means by denoting, placing a ruler in phys
ical contact with the figure.

It should be clear that accord

ing to this criterion the Euclidean and non-Euclidean do not
differ at all.

What differs with respect to rigid rulers is

the manner in which they are coordinatively defined and the
rules for their application, not their coming into physical
contact with the stimulus.
The third of Allport's standards of objectivity is
operationism which can be subdivided into the criteria of
publicity and repeatability.

By publicity is meant that the

process of observation must involve operations such as those
undergone with the ruler, which can be observed by anyone
present.

Repeatability means that such operations would yield

similar results when carried out at a future time.

With re

spect to the criterion of operationism it should be obvious
that the Euclidean and non-Euclidean descriptions of the stim
uli in Figure 1 are on equal footing.
We are forced to say that there is more than one
physicalistic description of the stimuli of Figure 1 which
meet the criteria of objectivity.

Allport would probably

retort that even though this is true we have only managed to
complicate the meaning of physicalistic description, and have
not understood his central thesis which is an attempt to
differentiate the phenomenological from the physicalistic.
He could at this point maintain that the Euclidean and nonEuclidean descriptions combine to define the objective methods
for the physicalistic description of the stimuli in Figure 2,
and that these physicalistic descriptions form a class still
essentially different from the phenomenological.

To make this

point, Allport would probably rely on the distinctions he
made with respect to Figure 2, which is, according to Allport,
a phenomenological illusion.

1^5

To refer to this stimulus

as an illusion means that the phenomenological deviates from
the physicalistic and is therefore a distortion of reality.
This is the case if one accepts the Euclidean description as
the only legitimate physicalistic description of either the
stimuli in Figures 1 and 2.

It can be seen that if we use

the non-Euclidean physicalistic description as our "true" or
"real" description of the stimuli, then the phenomenological
description of Figure 1 becomes an

illusion and in the relev

ant segment of Figure 2 the phenomenological and physicalistic
correspond.
To demonstrate this we have drawn dotted lines through
the stimuli in Figure 2 in such a way as to reduce Allport's
illusion to its fundamental elements.

From this demonstration,

it can be seen that the apparent curvature of the parallel
line is always in the same direction.

The ends of the straight

line appear to curve towards the point of origin of the
radiating lines.

Explaining this illusion requires an accurate

description of the segment A since the more complex illusion
is made up of various combinations of this simple segment.
We can superimpose segment A of Figure 2 onto a positively
curved non-Euclidean 2 dimensional surface such as the one
given in Figure 5.

If we assume that the line MN (Figure 2)

is a straight line, then it will curve as does the dotted
line CD (Figure 5).

Having done this we can see that the

physicalistic non-Euclidean description of the segment A
(Figure 2) corresponds to the phenomenological description.
All of the straight lines radiating from point 0 in Figure 2
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can be superimposed upon the non-Euclidean space without any
change in their apparent or physicalistic dimensions since
radials are not affected by the universal force in this nonEuclidean space.

It might be objected that the line MN

(Figure 2) is a parallel rather than a straight, but in order
to make this objection one must bring in Euclidean geometry,
since in non-Euclidean geometry straights and parallels never
coincide.

It would be possible to construct a non-Euclidean

surface of negative curvature in which solid CD (Figure 5)
would be the straightest, while dotted CD would be the equi
distant.

Constructing such a surface would merely require

reversing the position of the pole and the circumference of
the hemisphere being projected in Figure if.

In such a non-

Euclidean space, the universal force would reduce the size
of all tangential lines as a function of the distance from the
midpoint.
If we review each step that was taken we can see that
the word illusion makes sense only in a very narrow application.
I
Figure 2 demonstrates an illusion if our standard is Euclidean
geometry, and Figure 1 represents an illusion if our standard
is non-Euclidean geometry.

The error in Allport's analysis

is characteristic of most of the work done on illusions in
that it seeks to establish a hierarchy of description in which
the physicalistic narrowly construed is held to be the standard
against which all the descriptions are to be Judged.

Allport

claims his comparison is between the phenomenological and the
physicalistic.

Our demonstration shows that Allport is
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contrasting the phenomenological with the common sense view,
which is certainly different from the physicalistic.
The fact demonstrated above, that the phenomenological
can sometimes be Euclidean and sometimes be non-Euclidean,
suggests that a description of phenomenological geometry might
give us standards by which to evaluate other types of descrip
tion.

The beginnings of the kind of research which might lead

to a phenomenological geometry is indicated by Luneburg1s
(19*+8) work.

Luneburg and his associates have demonstrated

that the geometry of binocular vision can take on different
kinds of metrics and for certain circumstances non-Euclidean
metric is assumed.

Non-Euclidean metrics, are associated

with the perception of a large array of stimuli at a substantial
distance from the subject.

(Hardy, Rand, Rittler, Blank,

Brider, 1953)
The demonstration given above and Luneburg’s prelim
inary research seem to indicate that what we call illusions
are phenomenological experiences for which we have not yet
identified an appropriate geometry and metric.

Furthermore,

it suggests that the separation of phenomenological and
physicalistic descriptions into two qualitatively distinct
fields of experience is unjustified.
We have seen in our review of various perspectives
concerning objectivity that the notion of independence is one
of the basic standards by vdiich objectivity can be established.
The idea of independence can be expressed in both the jargon
appropriate to perception, and that appropriate to observation.
1.W

We assume a feature to be a part of the stimulus when all
subjects can discriminate it by means of verbal or other re
sponses.

By the same token we assume an observation to be

factual when repeated public operations yield similar obser
vations.

We have already seen that the manner in xirhich such

observations are made is a point upon which there is less
agreement than there is upon the belief that factual observa
tions can be made.
The most important feature of factuality is indep
endence.

When we assert something to be a fact we mean that

it in no way depends upon us.

Feyerabend (1965) refers to

the independence of facts as the "autonomy principle", which
he says is one of the most basic implicit assumptions of
contemporary science.

The autonomy principle does not insist

that the "discovery" or generation of facts is independent of
theory or of the observer's cognitions, but that once they
are established they remain facts forevermore and become
an essential unit of knowledge within the discipline.
T.S. Kuhn (1962) concurs with Feyerabend in holding
that the most important assumption of the traditional epistemological paradigm is the belief that facts have an indep
endent existence which, once established, makes them stable
elements of knowledge.

According to Kuhn, this leads to a

theory of history of science in which knowledge is considered
cumulative.

In this view theories merely serve to generate

the building blocks of knowledge which are the facts.

1^9

In this section, we wish to examine the phenomena of
patterning, or as the gestalt psychologists call it, form
perception.

In doing so we will look at an example of form

perception taken from the science of perception and one taken
from the history of physics.

It Is hoped that the reader will

see parallels between the two examples to be given.

The pur

pose in examining patterning is to demonstrate that perception
and observation are similar in that they select from the given
only certain features, and that these features are selected on
the basis of a pattern brought to the situation by the observer.
In the field of perception such patterns are usually referred
to as predetermining tendencies.

With respect to scientific

observation, these patterns are theoretical concepts.

The

implication which will have to be examined subsequent to the
discussion is that the line between logical and empirical or
theoretical and factual is difficult, if not impossible, to
draw.
Figure 6 is the stimulus of a reversible figure which
can be seen either as a goblet or as two profiles.

Literature

in perception is replete with examples of such reversible
figures, yet for all practical purposes they remain curios
ities.

"There is not much history to the reversible perspec

tive because the fact was obvious and no one has been successful
in offering a plausible explanation of it."

(Boring, 19*+2, p. 271)

In the example of the goblet, we can see the fundamental
argument of the configurationists:
perception of the parts.

the whole determines the

If one begins with the whole "goblet"
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FIGURE 6
REVERSIBLE FIGURE
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then one can see its stem, base and rim in Figure 6.

On the

other hand, if one begins with the whole "profiles" one can
see the noses, lips and brows.

In this example we find the

basis of the argument that facts are dependent on some kind
of pattern.

This becomes clearer if we consider the "whole"

as a hypothesis which can be tested.

If this is a goblet then

one should be able publicly to denote its rim, stem and base.
Is it possible to establish that this is in fact a goblet?

The

answer must be affirmative but by the same token it also must
be said that we can demonstrate by publicly denoting noses,
lips and brows, that it is in fact two profiles.
The most difficult question seems to be whether we
interpret the pattern or whole as something inherent in the
stimulus, or as a factor brought to the situation by the sub
ject.

The opposing points of view with respect to this ques

tion will be reviewed in a subsequent section.
In order to demonstrate that this example is not a
psychological problem pertinent only to perception, let us
look at another example from the history of mechanics.

This

example (Figure 7) is borrowed from Kuhn and it demonstrates
that two scientific descriptions of an object have no nec
essary overlap in the attributes they wish to measure.

IJhen

viewing a body in constrained fall, the Aristotelian measured
the weight of the stone, the vertical height to which it had
been raised, and the time required for it to achieve rest,
and he considered such measurements an adequate description
of the phenomena.

Galileo's description of the pendulum
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FIGURE 7
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF A
SWINGING BODY
ARISTOTLE
GALILEO
describes Figure 7 as
describes Figure 7 as
. a body in constrained
a pendulum
fall
He measures:
1. the weight of the
stone
2. the vertical height
to which it had
been raised
3. the time required
for it to achieve
rest
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He measures:
1. weight
2.. radius
3- angulardisplacement
*+. time per swing

required the measurement of w i g h t , radius, angular displace
ment and time per swing.

It is obvious that the dimensions

being considered by each observer with the single exception of
weight, are not interchangable.

If we consider the total sets

of measurements made in describing a phenomenon, then we are
forced to say that one is incorrect, or that they are different
phenomena, or finally that neither fully represents the phen
omenon.

(Koyre, 1939, 19^3)
The difficulty presented by both of these examples is

the identification of the independent element in observation
or perception.

Once we are operating from a particular theor

etical construct it is impossible to disprove it unless we
are provided with an alternative theoretical construct.

One

could have made a thousand observations on bodies in con
strained fall and never have concluded that they were in fact
pendulums.

The larger concept is a prerequisite to the

empirical test.

The questions one asks about the phenomena are

determined by these constructs.

It does not make sense, for

example, to ask "Where is the goblet's nose?"

Before one can

start looking for the noses, he must know that they are a pos
sibility, and such knowledge depends on the assumptions he is
making about the array or stimulus before him.
There are other ways in which the examples given above
can be interpreted.

It can be said that the individual measures

taken are the objective facts which remain stable over time
and that the pattern is an interpretation of these measures.
According to this account the measurements cannot be challenged.

This point of view is consistent with phenomenalism in which
the primitives of knowledge are individual sense data.

Though

this position can he defended with respect to many kinds of
descriptions, it is fallible with respect to the kinds of
situations in which more than one objective description is
available.

Given the parameters selected by Aristotle, one

could not arrive at an interpretation equal to Galileo's
pendulum anymore than one could make profiles out of bases,
stems, and rims.
The examples presented above are anomalous to the
idea of objectivity since it is impossible to separate the
elements which are independent of the observer from those that
the observer brings to the situation.

This is particularly

significant if one accepts the fact that the most important
steps forward in science are made through the creation of
such constructs such as that of a pendulum which gives us
insight or a new way of looking at something.
The idea that constructs guide us in the selection of
the significant parameters to be measured is not a new one.
We have expressed this in our discussion of the configurationist's view of science.

What is important to notice in this

context is that it occurs at the perceptual level.
entirely an intellectual matter.

It is not

Furthermore, there are

parallels between the anomaly and the one presented before it
concerning the appropriate geometry to be used in describing
the stimulus.

In each case, we are given seemingly contra
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dictory descriptions of a single stimulus or object, and yet
it is impossible to assign preference to one or the other of
these by using any of the criteria of objectivity.

Again we

are faced with the question, "How can there be more than one
objective description of a single thing?"
In this section we will look at examples in which the
qualities of perception and the properties of observation are
demonstrated to be the function of a relationship between the
observer and the observed.

It might be argued that this is

precisely what we have already examined in the cases of the
alternative geometries and reversible perspectives; however,
as we will see later the cases of the geometries and the
perspectives are subject to various interpretations, some of
which are not consistent with a relativistic point of view.
The three examples which we wish to examine are
subject to various interpretations.

also

We will present them

here as they were interpreted by the men who created them.
They are, a specific example of a transactional demonstration,
an examination of I. Kohler's prismatic lens experiment, and
an experimental exposition of indeterminacy relations in
quantum mechanics.

These will be presented from the points

of view of Adlebert Ames and his colleagues and Werner
Heisenberg and Bohr respectively.

In

discussing the exper-

ments we will be presenting nothing which is essentially new.
The benefit in doing so should derive from the context of
combining the perspectives of observation and perception and
from noting parallels between Ames' and Heisenberg's contri1 56
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butions.

Finally, it is important to remember that the purpose

in reviewing these phenomena is to see how they can be incor
porated into our assumptions concerning objectivity.
To understand the basis of all of Ames' demonstrations
requires understanding what Ames means by "equivalent config
urations."

In Figure 8 we have depicted a stimulus which has

equivalent configuration values as a trapezoid or as a rec
tangle viewed from a particular angular perspective.

In many

respects what we have here is a simple reversible figure.
This particular example of equivalent configuration is the
basis of several of the Ames' demonstrations, the most famous
of which is the rotating trapezoid.
In the rotating trapezoid demonstration we can see
how Ames employs the equivalent configuration principle to
demonstrate the role that assumptions play in perception.
When the trapezoidal shape is shaded to appear as a window
frame, the assumption that it is rectangular gains strength.
When this frame is rotated on its vertical axis and viewed
monocularly it appears to be an oscillating rectangular window
frame, rather than a rotating trapezoid.
The use of the phrase "appears to be" requires clar
ification.

Allport (1955) describes the rotating trapezoidal

window as a "dramatic masterpiece of ambiguous stimulation".
When we combine phrases such as "ambiguous stimulation" and
'hppearing to be" it might be supposed that the subject is in
doubt about what he sees, and that phenomenologically his
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experience is fuzzy, unstable or unclear.

But this is not at

all the case; if the subject assumes the rectangular shape
and he views the stimulus monocularly, his description will
remain stable and definite.

He will unambiguously perceive

an oscillating rectangular window frame.
The stability of this perception can be demonstrated
by attaching to the trapezoidal shape other objects which will
rotate syncronously with it.

If a rigid tube is attached to

the apparatus, as in Figure 8, the tube will appear to rotate
rather than oscillate.- The assumption of rectangular!ty will
persist in making the window oscillate.

At first, subjects

will assume the two to be pliable and under this condition
will report that the tube "bends" around the window in order
to accomplish its rotation.

The role of cognitive factors

can be further demonstrated by informing the subject that the
tube is rigid.

Given this information the subject will report

that the tube appears to be cutting through the -window frame
when the window and tube are seen to be moving in opposite
directions.

When a small cube is attached (Figure 8) to one

end of the frame we get an even more dramatic result.

The

subjects1 report that the cube moves in a rotary motion,
seeming to detach itself during part of its motion, and pro
ceeds to move with no apparent source of support for half of
its rotation.
It has been said of this stimulus that it is a master
piece of ambiguity.

Certainly, this observation cannot mean
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that the subject is in doubt or is unclear whether the window
is oscillating or rotating.

When this stimulus is viewed for

the first time from a perspective of equivalent configurations
by a subject raised in Western culture, he always reports,
immediately and without doubt, that the window oscillates.

We

must conclude that Allport means by "ambiguous" to refer, not
to the experience of this stimulus, but to his knowledge of
the experimental history.

In fact, Ames has demonstrated that

knowledge of the two perspectives or of the experimental his
tory of the stimulus will not in itself significantly influence
the probabilities of either experience.

This means that even

if a person knows that he is viewing the Ames' rotating trape
zoid when he views it from the perspective of equivalent
configurations, he will unambiguously perceive an oscillating
window frame.
The dramatic reports given as a result of attaching
the tube and cube are dependent on the weight or probability
valuation that the subject holds with respect to the assump
tion of rectangularity.

Similarly, how close one approaches

the optimum degree of equivalence configuration is a function
of the viewing conditions.

The optimum conditions specify a

monocular viewing of the rotating trapezoid from 20 feet away.
The subjects' weighting of the rectangularity assumption can
be influenced.

Ames has indicated that oscillatory motion can

be perceived when the rotating trapezoid is a simple cut-out
of uniform color and shading, but under these circumstances
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viewing conditions must be closer to the optimum, and even then
the oscillatory effect is more tenuous.

The addition of

mullions, panes and shading adds weight to the rectangularity
assumption by taking advantage of the familiarity of windows.
In his past experience the observer, in carrying out
his purposes, has on innumerable occasions had to
take into account and act with respect to rectangular
forms, e.g., going through doors, locating windows,
etc. On almost all such occasions, except in the rare
case when his line of sight was normal to the door or
window, the image of the rectangular configuration form
on his retina was trapezoidal. He learned to interpret
the particular characteristic retinal images that exist
when he looks at doors, windows, etc., as rectangular
forms. Moreover, he learned to interpret the partic
ular degree of trapezoidal distortion of his retinal
images in terms of the positioning of the rectangular
form to his particular viewing point. These inter
pretations do not occur at the conscious level, rather,
they are unconscious and may be characterized as
ASSUMPTIONS as to the probable significance of indi
cations received from the environment.
(Ames, 1951 1
P. 1*0
There is cross cultural evidence which supports Ames'
contention that such assumptions are culturally determined.
In an experiment conducted by Allport and Pettigrew (1957) it
was shown that the degree of susceptibility to the perception
of oscillatory motion of the rotating trapezoidal window was
a function of the individual's past experience with rectangular
forms, especially windows.

It was of course impossible to get

a population of subjects who had no experience with rectang
ularity, but at least two of the groups in this experiment
were young Zulu herdsmen with little formal education.

Zulu

culture is such that rectangular forms are not to be found
among their artifacts.

Zulu homes, windows, and doors are

all constructed with curved lines.
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These subjects were tested

with the trapezoidal window in a building of western construc
tion, and thereby assuring that they had had at least one
actual contact with rectangular windows.

Nevertheless, in

order for these subjects to report oscillatory motion, all
the conditions had to be optimal, and they reported oscillatory
motion

less frequently than did western acculturated Zulu boys

of their own age.

The difference between the western accul

turated and Zulu acculturated boys in the frequency of their
perception of the oscillatory motion in all but optimal cir
cumstances was statistically significant at the .001 level
of significance.
Two important points must be emphasized in order to
understand Ames clearly.

The first one is that all percep

tions are probabilistic, and therefore correspondence is
between experiences and not between experiences and reality.
Because the Ames demonstrations seem to be contrivances under
which the individual is not operating normally, there is a
tendency especially noticeable in secondary source accounts
of Ames' work to view one of the perceptions as an illusion
and the other as correct.

Ames (1960) himself is hostile to

this interpretation.
The second point to be emphasized is that the prob
abilistic nature of perception is not revealed in the percep
tion itself.

It is for this reason that the tendency referred

to in the last paragraph seems so natural to us.

Each per

ception has the same quality of certitude or the same degree
of "sureness" as any other in experience until such time as an
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alternative is available.

It is for this reason that the term

"ambiguous stimulus", to refer to the Ames' demonstrations, is
misleading.

The ambiguity is known only to those who are

familiar with the two views.

Ittelson (1960) can help us to

clarify this point.
How can anyone act in the fac e of the probability of
failure? Action implies certainty. If the percep
tions on which actions are based necessarily prove to
be to some extent imperfect, and if our actions will
inevitably be unsuccessful to this extent, we might
eventually reach a condition where we would hesitate
to act at all. The answer to the question is to be
found in the nature of the perceptual process— when the
predictive reliability of a perception becomes high
enough we act "as if" we were dealing with certainty.
Even if the predictive reliability is low, so that we
lack a sense of surety, when we finally do act we
must act with certainty if we are to have any chance
of being successful. One aspect of perceiving, then,
is the creation of certainty out of uncertainty or
probability. Every perception is an act of creation;
every action is an act of faith. Every action is
based on the belief that highly probable events are
certain events. It is an act of faith in the relia
bility of one's own assumptions, of faith in oneself.
Accordingly one product of perceiving is our creation
of a world of FUNCTIONAL absolutes. At any given moment,
these functional absolutes are treated as if they were
certain but, concurrently, are held open for modification.
(Ittleson, 1960, p. 38 )
The meaning of the term "interpretation" in our dis
cussion of Ames' work may be the source of some confusion.
Many secondary sources view Ames' demonstrations and his
functional analysis as a continuation of the Helmholtz
"unconscious inference tradition."

(Allport, 1955)

There

are aspects of this tradition which are inconsistent with
Ames'

(1960) own interpretation of his work.

Generally

speaking, unconscious inference implies that in sensation
there are the raw qualities of experience which are subject
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to the various interpretations by perceptual processes.

The

problem with this analysis is in identifying what qualities
are a function of sensation, and what modifications are
attributable to perception.

Though it is not explicitly

stated in many places there is the implication that the sen
sations, or that which is interpreted, contain the more fun
damental qualities, and that the modifications imposed on
these by perception are organizational and do not effect the
basic qualities.

This view of the matter is particularly

applicable to the notion of equivalent configurations.

When

we have equivalent configurations it seems that in the stimulus
the basic qualities such as color and size are given and that
the process of interpretation is one which influences their
organization.

Ames (1960) himself does not subscribe to the

distinction between sensation and perception, and holds that
all the qualities of perception are "interpretations" or
" prognostic directives".

It must be admitted, however, that

Ames' own demonstrations are not sufficient evidence for dis
missing the notion that basic qualities are given in sensation.
A review of the many perceptual demonstrations devel
oped by Ames and his colleagues at the Hanover Institute
reveals that the kinds of configurational equivalencies Ames
worked with were in the broadest sense geometrical.

That is,

the features of stimulus array, which he demonstrated could
be perceived in more than one way, tended to be holistic and
organizational.

It Is possible to interpret the Ames' dem

onstrations as instances of the perceptual reorganization of
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of more elementary sensory input.

For this reason it is

desirable to look for another source of experimental informa
tion which demonstrates that other than organizational char
acteristics are the function of perceptual interpretation.
Ivo Kohler 0 9 6 1*) conducted an experiment which re
lied on a principle that resembles Ames' equivalent config
uration; it demonstrated that at least one so-called "basic
quality" is not given in sensation, but is as much the func
tion of interpretation as are organizational qualities.

In

this experiment Kohler wore prismatic lenses for a long
period of time.
known.

The effect of wearing such lenses is well

When they are first put on, the lenses distort the

subject's perception in a direction consistent with the
optical transformations.

But with continued use under con

ditions in which the individual is involved in activity, the
visual perceptual processes compensate for the optical trans
formation and render the transformation "normal".

Upon

removing the transformation lenses, there is a prolonged per
iod of aftereffects which distorts the visual perception in
exactly the opposite direction from the optical transformation
of the lenses.

For example, if the lenses worn distorted

straight vertical lines so as to curve them to the left, then
the aftereffect of removing these lenses would be to perceive
straight vertical lines as curved to the right.

Presumably,

the reason for this opposite effect is that the optical input
is still being transformed or interpreted as though the person
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was wearing the lenses, and what was a compensating transforma
tion now becomes the source of distortion.
The specific kind of transformation which is of inter
est to us here is one which deals with color perception.

The

reason for our interest in color perception is that color is
usually considered one of the "basic qualities" which is given
us by sensation.

In this respect, color is sharply distinguished

from such qualities as curvature and texture, which seem to be
more subject to interpretation.

In this experiment Kohler’s

prismatic lenses diffracted light so as to produce small rain
bows of color.

Much to Kohler's own surprise, he discovered

that there was a complementary aftereffect which gave him the
experience of seeing the opposite end of the rainbow along the
contours of white objects whenever he removed his prismatic
lenses.
The diffracted color bands seen upon putting on the
lenses for the first time came as no surprise.
fully predictable from our knowledge of optics.

They were
The discovery

of the complementary color after-effect was absolutely unpre
dictable.

This kind of aftereffect simply would not be antic

ipated from our knowledge of color after-effects, and in fact
it is inconsistent with all existing theories of color percep
tion.

We quote directly from Kohler's (196*f) diary to capture

some of the excitement that he experienced in this serendipitous
discovery.

The account refers to Kohler's experience at the

time when he removed his lenses and gave them to someone else
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to look through.

The two men compared one another's perceptions

of the room, Kohler's companion gave a description commensurate
with what is known about the prismatic distortions which occur
prior to a period of adaptation while Kohler's description re
sults from having worn the lenses for a long period and there
fore are after-effects from adaptation.
Finally, he casually mentioned that the edges had
colored bands. He was referring to the vertical
beam, on the right side of the window, which was
illuminated by the light on the ceiling and stood
out in sharp contrast from the rest of the window,
which was dark. I asked him what the color was,
but before he told me I clearly noticed— without
spectacles— that it was a YELLOWISH-RED, belonging to
the longwave extreme of my spectrum, and that it ap
peared on the outermost edge of the white crossbars.
I was so struck by this observation that I seized
the spectacles and put them on myself.
Lo and be
hold, the edge glimmered in a beautiful, saturated
blue. I tried this experiment over and over again,
until late into the night, on all kinds of objects.
The result was always the same. Whenever I looked
at an edge without the spectacles, I saw a dim
yellowish-red or bluish-violet band: as soon as
I looked at it through the spectacles, the edge took
on a complementary hue.
(Kohler, 1964 -, pp. 60 - 6 9 )
These after-effect colors were complementary in sev
eral ways to the ones induced by the prismatic lenses*

The

first and most important of these complementarities was be
tween the ends of the spectrum seen as an after-effect and
with the lenses.

The color bands seen with the lenses were

at the short end, while those seen as an after-effect were
at the long end of the spectrum.

The optimum conditions for

seeing the color bands were also complementary opposites.
With the lenses, the color bands were most conspicuous under
bright sunlight illumination, while the after-effect bands
were seen most conspicuously at dusk or under artificial
illumination.
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Kohler was surprised to find that there were these
color after-effects because such an after-effect suggested
that the color perceptions were subjective.

Our notions con

cerning color perception rely on a correlation between bio
chemical activity in the retina, and the frequency of light
stimulation.

The reason Kohler's findings are anomalous is

that they could not be connected to the frequency of light
stimulation unless the transformation came between the source
of stimulation and the retina, as was the case with the pris
matic lenses.

Kohler then naturally hypothesized that the

adaptation effects were to "prismatize" the lens of the eye
in order to counterbalance the optical diffraction of the
prismatic lenses.

Such an effect on the lens of the eye would

account for all the phenomena observed.
experiment to test this hypothesis.

Kohler devised an

He merely put himself in

a room in which the only light source was incandescent sodium
which produces light which is homogeneous and cannot be
diffracted.
The results of this attempt were unequivocal:
even
in the homogeneous sodium light, I saw TOTH or WITHOUT
spectacles the SAME color bands which in normal day
light I could see only WITHOUT spectacles. This
evidence clearly indicated that the phenomenon in
question was a purely subjective one, that is, a
specific kind of afterimage.
(Kohler, 196*f, pp.
69-70)

The significance of these findings and their connec
tion to Ames' work rests in their similarity to Ames' prin
ciple of equivalent configuration.

What Kohler shows us is

that for a perceptual quality as basic as color there can
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more than one kind of stimulation; that the experience of
color depends as much upon what the individual brings to the
situation as upon the situation itself.

It also makes explicit

that assumptions may be viewed as unconscious mechanisms.

The

prismatic adaptation of the visual perceptual system is anal
ogous in Kohler's experiment to the assumption of rectangularity
with respect to trapezoidal retinal images of windows.

The

only difference is that it is easier for us to believe that we
can have perceptual assumptions about'geometry, than it is for
us to believe that we can have such assumptions about hue.
With each anomaly that we have discussed so far, we
have tried to develop parallels between material taken from
perception, or the psychological realm, and material taken
from other science, or the physical realm.
parallels is important to our central theme:

Finding such
perception and

observation are essentially the same kind of activities, and
one set of principles should be capable of encompassing them
both.

The physical parallel to Ames (1960) and Kohler (1961*)

is given to us by Heisenberg (1958A, 1958B) in his famous in
determinacy principle and by Bohr (1962) in his principle of
complementarity.

These two principles of quantum physics are

the essence of what is referred to as the Copenhagen inter
pretation.

The Copenhagen interpretation is an account of

quantum mechanics which, for the vast majority of physicists,
is at the present time the only acceptable account.

We will

accept the Copenhagen interpretation without delineating its
relationship to earlier more classical interpretation, such
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as Born's (1960), or what some would consider presently com
peting interpretations, such as DeBroglie's (1960) hidden
variable interpretation.

It will suffice to say that the

Copenhagen interpretation is the only available account which
does not require the addition of special constructs for each
case of quantum phenomena.

The hidden variable theories in

their present development have not been successful in present
ing one account for all the various phenomena, but must resort
to the use of unparsimonious special rules.

(Capek, 1961;

Jammer, 1966; Putnam, 1965)
Our concern with indeterminacy and complementarity
does not rest on an intrinsic curiosity about the physics for
which they were developed to deal.

Instead we are Interested

in these principles because they represent a fundamental
change in the epistemology of physics.

This fundamental change

is conceptually equivalent to the changes urged by the transactionalists in the field of perception.

Indeterminacy and

complementarity suggest the same kind of transition for our
notion of "property” in physics that the transactionalists
wish to bring about in our notion of "qualities" in perception.
It is necessary to begin at the level of phenomena in
order to understand how indeterminacy and complementarity com
bine to resolve the problems inherent in quantum mechanics and
also to change our epistemological account of properties.

As

a starting point, we will present two eaqaeriments which give
us seemingly anomolous information concerning the nature of
elementary particles.
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The first of these is Einstein's (1905) interpretation
of the photoelectric phenomenon. In a typical photoelectric
experiment a source of ultraviolet light which is mono-chromatic
is shown upon a metal surface.
are given off by the metal.

The result is that electrons

The older wave theory of light

could have predicted that the light energy would increase the
energy levels in the metal, and consequently that electrons
would be emitted.

The problem with the classical interpreta

tion was that the energy of light was held to be a function of
the light intensity; consequently, a classical prediction was
that as one increases the intensity of the light the emission
of electrons begins at an intensity threshold and proceeds to
increase in proportion to the light intensity increments.
Such a prediction does not square with experimental evidence
that no intensity of red light could produce the photoelectric
phenomenon, while very low intensities of ultra-violet light
would produce electron emission.

Einstein related the connec

tion between energy and frequency to a similar relationship that
Planck had noticed in black-body radiation.

He demonstrated

the accuracy of Planck's formula E = hv, wherein E is the
energy of the light, or photon, and v is the frequency of the
light wave, while h is Planck's constant.

In other words,

Einstein was saying that light was made up of particular
photons, each having an equal amount of energy, and that that
energy is a function of the frequency of the light, not its
intensity.

The intensity of the light governed only the

number of photons carried by a light wave.
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Given that the

photons were of sufficient energy to cause electron emission
in metal, then an increase in their number or in the intensity
of the light would increase the number of electron emissions.
However, below a certain frequency an increase in intensity
would not produce any photoelectric emission.
What is most important at this point is that in
Einstein's solution E = hv there is a curious mixture of par
ameters taken from classical mechanics and classical optics.
Energy (E) which is a parameter of particles in classical
mechanics, is said to be a function of frequency (v), which
is a parameter of waves in optics.

The photoelectric effect

clearly demonstrates that light comes in quanta, particles of
energy, but the value of such particles can be determined by
observing one of light's wave characteristics.
The seeming contradiction in E = hv is amplified when
we consider another phenomencnof quantum mechanics, which is
the interference of electrons.

Elementary units of matter

were classically considered to be particles, but in deBroglie's
(19^-^2) interpretation of the interference of electrons we
find that such elementary particles as electrons are asso
ciated with a wave characteristic which is frequency.
Interference was first demonstrated by Young. (Silva,
1969)

In this simple experiment Young pierced two small

holes in a screen and light shone through these two openings.
When one of the openings was covered up, the pattern of light
that was projected on the surface behind the screen was
homogeneous and circular.

When light was shown through both
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openings, the projected pattern which resulted contained
bright and shaded striped areas.

Young (Silva, 1969) inter

preted this to mean that light was a wave and that the projec
ted pattern resulted from the cancelling and amplification
which occur when waves interfere.

What deBroglie was interes

ted in explaining was that a similar interference pattern can
be obtained by projecting electrons through two slits onto a
surface which is capable of showing scintillation points
resulting from electron contacts.

His problem was exactly

reversed from that of Einstein1s in the photoelectric phen
omenon. Einstein (1905) started with the knowledge of a wave
characteristic of light and wished to account for its seeming
particle behavior; deBroglie (19l*0-2) began with the knowledge
of particular matter and wished to explain seeming wavelike
behavior.

deBroglie concluded that for an electron with the

mass M there would be associated a wave with the frequency
which can be determined by the formula hv = me2 .

From this

he was able to calculate the wave length of any given parti
cle.

We are faced with a situation in which parameters class

ically associated with waves can be used to calculate the
values of parameters usually associated with particles, or
vice versa.

It is this dilemma which the principles of indeter

minacy and complementarity clarify, and in so doing change the
epistemological status of properties.

How can it be that light

behaves like a shower of particles and elementary particles
behave like waves?

How can seemingly contradictory properties

such as wave length and energy both be descriptive of the same
thing?
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Heisenberg (1930) arrived at his principle of uncer
tainty by means of a thought experiment.

He realized that in

experiments such as those in which interference patterns were
obtained from a scattering of elementary particles there was
an inherent conceptual difficulty in which the classical
language of optics and mechanics was 'being mixed together in
a way simply not feasible in classical physics.

In his thought

experiment Heisenberg tried to trace the trajectory of an
elementary particle in the same way trajectories are traced
in classical mechanics.
We can extend his thought experiment to apply to the
interference experiment already described.

In describing the

trajectory of a particle, two parameters are necessary,
position and momentum.

We can calculate the position of a

particle from knowing the probabilities of its arrival at a
particular point on the scintillation screen.

deBroglie's

equations allow us to calculate precisely the probabilities
of such scintillations, and therefore through retrodiction
we can establish where a particle must have been if it went
through the slit and caused this particular scintillation.
But if we wish, at the same time, to know the parameter
momentum of that particle we must attach a device to the slit
which is attached to the framework by an elastic connection;
so that as particles go through the slit some of them will
collide with our measuring instrument and give us an estimate
of their velocity.

If we do this we will find that we have

destroyed the interference pattern on the scintillation
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screen.

The loss of that interference pattern, however, makes

the measure of position impossible.

It may appear that this

is unique to the situation, hut physicists have come to rea
lize that this is in fact an example of a principle which is
true for all complementary parameters in quantum mechanics.
The principle is simply that one can never obtain an accurate
measure of both position and momentum at the same time.
Stating the principle positively, we can say that the measur
ing of one of the pair to arbitrary accuracy necessarily
reduces the possibility of equally accurate measurement of
the other of the pair.

(Frank, 195^5 Silva, Lochak, 1969)

The reader must be warned against a very common mis
interpretation since we are all subject to what Putnam (1965)
calls the assumption of "no disturbance."

"The measurement

does not disturb the observable measured— i.e., the obser
vable has almost the same value at an instant before the
measurement as it does at the moment the measurement is taken."
(Putnam, 1965» P* 83)
In making the assumption of no disturbance we are led
to believe that before measuring either position or momentum,
a particle existed which had both position and momentum, but
that by virtue of taking one of the measurements we disrupted
the other.

This is a metaphysical position which by virtue

of the principle of indeterminacy could never be subjected to
an empirical test.

Heisenberg (1958B) makes very clear that

for an elementary particle to possess both position and mom
entum, at equal degrees of accuracy, is a mathematical as well as
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a physical impossibility.

The formalism of wave mechanics

does not allow for the description of a packed wave, which is
what high accuracy in both parameters would imply.
Bohr's (1962) principle of complementarity is an
extension of the logic of indeterminacy.

1

It maintains that

seemingly contradictory properties may be ascribed to the
same system because they are experimentally exclusive of one
another.

Wave and particle characteristics which are intui

tively contradictory are in fact complementary, since no ex
periment can be devised which allows you to measure a wave
characteristic accurately which does not, at the same time,
preclude the accurate measurement of a particle characteris
tic.

Jammer (1966) makes clear the relationship between this

notion of complementarity and Heisenberg's principle of indet
erminacy.
For the interaction between the object of observation
and the agency of observation— which interaction in
accordance with the quantum postulate cannot be
neglected as it could in classical physics— makes it

1
Jammer (1966) offers documentary evidence to counter
the popular notion that Bohr took directly from Heisenberg's
principle, merely extending his logic. Bohr did not have the
interest in formalism that Heisenberg had and the historical
evidence suggests that Bohr had considered complementarity as
a solution to the dual nature of light before he became fam
iliar with Heisenberg's indeterminacy. Nevertheless, it is
still legitimate to say that indeterminacy and complementarity
are logically the same principle.
Whether it is expressed by
saying that indeterminacy is a logical deduction from com
plementarity, or that complementarity was generalized from
indeterminacy is a moot point. We will see in the discussion
that Jammer promotes the idea that Bohr got his notion of
complementarity from William James.

impossible to separate sharply the behavior of the
atomic system from the effect on the measuring instru
ment whose behavior must be expressed in classical
terms. By combining the atomic system with different
classically descriptable devices one may measure
complementary variables, and by expressing the results
of these measurements in classical terms one may des
cribe an atomic system in terms of complementary
classical pictures.
(Jammer, 1966, p. 3^8)
It is important to note what happens to the notion of
physical property, according to Bohr and Heisenberg.

Which of

the two contradictory properties will be observed depends on
the instruments and the decisions of the observer as much as
on the system being observed.

There are similarities between

what we have said here about properties of experimentally ob
served physical systems and what we said before about the
qualities experienced in the perceptual experiments of Ames
and Kohler.

In all of these cases it is impossible to separate

factors in the observer from factors in the observed.

Another

interesting similarity between the aforementioned observations
is that they all seem to be cases of complementarity.

The

simplest example for intuitive appreciation is the case of the
reversible figure.

In each of these cases we are led by common

sense after experiencing the complementary properties; in the
case of the goblet and the profiles we ask, "But what is it
really?"

We must be careful not to confuse common sense with

scientific procedures, for as Putnam (1969) says about the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, experimental
evidence must be preferred to intuitive conviction.
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CHAPTER VI
THE EFFECTS OF THE ANOMALIES ON
THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
One way to evaluate the significance of the anomalies
presented in the previous chapter is to review the five models
presented in Chapter IV in order to assess how each deals with
the anomalies.

An alternative, and hopefully more economical

approach, is to deal with the notion of objectivity directly.
We have seen that there are two features of objectivity; these
are independence and certainty.

Chapter IV presented alterna

tive ways which have been proposed to establish independence
and certainty.

In this section we will take each of these

independently and see whether the anomalies give us any rea
son for preferring any of these over the others.
The most important method for establishing the indep
endence of knowledge has been to establish an epistemic root,
wherein certain elements of knowledge have been specified to
be independent.

These roots or independent elements are

usually called facts, and a fact is established by means of
objective observation.

Not all proponents of independent

knowledge wish to rely upon observed facts for establishing
credence.

There are some exceptions among philosophers of

science; most notable among these is Karl Popper,

(1959) who

has suggested an alternative to a reliance on objective per
ception for establishing independence.

Before we can deal

with such alternative suggestions we must review the several
methods of establishing factuality through observation.
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As

was Indicated in Chapter IV there is a great deal of agreement
concerning the proposition that there are facts, but not as
much agreement as to how it can be established that any partic
ular proposition is a fact.

There also is agreement concerning

the notion that facts are established through observation, but
the exact meaning of observation differs for each of the five
models presented in Chapter IV.

Each seeks to establish an

indubitable, a primitive of experience about whose indepen
dence there can be no doubt.
Lockean realism, which divides experience into primary
and secondary qualities, is not an epistemology which is taken
seriously by philosophers and psychologists today; but in an
alternative form it is still a viable epistemology for many
practicing scientists.

As was pointed out in Chapter IV, one

of the most appealing aspects of the primary/secondary dis
tinction, is that it parallels the often made distinction
between quantifiable and nonquantifiable variables.

According

to this distinction scientific progress is made by extending
quantitative techniques, since it is by quantifying variables
that we establish their independence from the observer.

In

other words, this form of realism maintains that we establish
the primitives of experience by their quantiflability.
Using quantifiability as a criterion of independence
is based on the common sense assumption that our number sys
tem is either neutral or empirical.

There is growing agree

ment that such number systems are in fact relative conventions.
It was demonstrated in Chapter V that the geometry one uses
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is neither neutral nor empirical and that the choice of a
geometry makes a difference in the description obtained.

Ad

vancements in our description are therefore not dependent on
improvements in the realm of observation alone.

Non-Euclidean

geometry gave Einstein (Polanyi, 1967-68) a new way of looking,
not a better look at the universe.

The differences in the

descriptions obtained, using Euclidean and non-Euclidean
geometries, cannot be ascribed to empirical progress alone.
The discussion of the role of patterning in Chapter V
suggests another difficulty in relying on quantiflability as
a criterion of independence.

The variables selected to be

quantified are not selected by standards which are inherent
in the system of quantification.

Even if it is agreed that

Aristotle’s and Galileo’s descriptions of a swinging body are
equally objective, because they are both quantifiable, it
would be impossible to maintain that the variables quantified
are independent of the observer's conceptual system.
As we have seen, logical positivists subscribe to two
fundamental tenets.

The first of these is that there are

only two kinds of knowledge, analytic and synthetic, or formal
and empirical.

This distinction is one which both phenomenal-

ists and physicalists agree to.

The second fundamental tenet

of logical positivism is the belief in a principle of verif
ication.

Phenomenalists and physicalists are not in agreement

on the exact nature of verification.

We shall, therefore,

deal with the first of the two fundamental tenets and leave
the discussion of verification for later.
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Each of the three

anomalies casts doubt on our ability to separate the formal
from the empirical aspects of knowledge.

Philosophical crit

icisms of the analytic-synthetic distinction based on logical
and linguistic analysis are available from Quine (1953) and
Putnam (1962).

Putnam (1962) tells us that among the most

convincing evidence for the logical empirical distinction is
the abundance of everyday examples.

Statements such as "Bach

elors are all unmarried males!' are clearcut instances of
analytic statements, which sharply contrast with statements
of the type "There is a book on the table."

Quine (1953) and

Putnam (1962) give linguistic and logical arguments why such
examples are not correct, despite their intuitive appeal.

The

three anomalies presented in Chapter V can be seen as counter
examples to the belief in the analytic/synthetic distinction.
In the first anomaly we demonstrated that the descrip
tion of a space depends as much on the geometry and coordinative measurement conventions as it does on observations.

The

two descriptions of a curvilinear 3 dimensional Euclidean space
and the 2 dimensional non-Euclidean space of positive curvature,
depicted in Figures

and 5 on pp. 1*t1 and 1^2 could be com

plementary descriptions of the same real space given that the
instrumentation of the non-Euclidean coordinative definition
of measurement were physically available.

The reason physicists

can choose between one or another geometry is because they
elect to keep coordinative definitions constant.

Such coordin

ative definitions are arbitrary; it is not possible to establish
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them empirically.

This means that the selection between geom

etries is a logical impossibility, not a technical impossibility.
There is an impossibility of making measurements which
is due to the limitation of our technical means; I
shall call it TECHNICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. In addition,
there is a LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY of measurement. Even
if we had a perfect experimental technique, we should
not be able to avoid this logical impossibility. It
is logically impossible to determine whether the stand
ard meter in Paris is really a meter. The highest
refinement of our geodetic instruments does''not teach
us anything about this problem, because the meter can
not be defined in absolute terms. This is the reason
why the measuring rod in Paris is called the definition
of a meter. It is arbitrarily defined as the unit, and
the question whether it really represents this unit has
lost its meaning. The same considerations hold for a
comparison of units at distant places. Here we are not
dealing with technical limitations, but with a logical
impossibility. The impossibility of a determination
of the shape of a surface, if universal forces are
admitted, is not due to a deficiency of our instru
ments, BUT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN UNPRECISE QUESTION.
The question concerning the shape of the surface has
not precise formulation, unless it is preceded by a
coordinative definition of congruence.
What is to
be understood by "the shape of a real surface"?
Whatever experiments and measurements I make, they
will never furnish a unique indication of the shape
of the surface. If universal forces are admitted, the
measurements may be interpreted in such a way that many
different shapes of surfaces are compatible with the
same observations. There is one definition which
closes the logical gap and tells us which interpreta
tions of our observations must be eliminated: this
task is preformed by the coordinative definition.
It gives a precise meaning to the question of the
shape of the real surface and makes a unique answer
possible, just as a question about length has a
unique meaning only when the unit of measurement is
given. It is not a technical failure that prevents
us from determining the shape of a surface without
a coordinative definition of congruence, but a
logical impossibility that has nothing to do with
the limitations of human abilities.
(Reichenbach,
1958, pp. 28-29)

It is often said that the differences between
Euclidean and non-Euclidean descriptions of the same space
are not significant differences, but are of the same order
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as the differences between meters and feet.

Within the science

of physics the debate over this question is still not resolved.
Those who maintain that geometries are mere conventions are
charged with the responsibility of making available translation
rules which will demonstrate that the differences between
geometries do not make a difference in physical geometry.

As

it is, in order to maintain a single set of coordinated defin
itions of measurement, it was necessary for Einstein (Reichen
bach, 1958) to use non-Euclidean geometry in his Relativity
description of gravity.

To extend the Euclidean geometry of

Newton's universe would have required a change in our defini
tions of measurement and this would have presented complica
tions far more disruptive than a change in geometry.
Leaving the problem of physical geometry for the
physicist to resolve, we are still faced with the epistemological consequences of the fact that Euclidean descriptions
are not unique.

The most important of these consequences is

that the Euclidean physicalistic can no longer be relied upon
as a standard for realistic description.

The fact that such

Euclidean descriptions are not unique physicalistic descrip
tions means that there is no justification for giving them
primacy over phenomenological descriptions since the latter
may come to encompass all of the former.
The anomaly of the pendulum versus the body in con
strained fall is also an example of our inability to draw the
line between facts and ideas.

If we maintain that Aristotle's

description of a body in constrained fall and Galileo's des
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cription of a pendulum are both factual, then we are forced to
admit that some factual descriptions are somehow better than
others, even though they both maintain the same degree of ob
jectivity.
If, on the other hand, we wish to draw the line between
facts and ideas at an even lower point we may choose to say
that the terms "pendulum" and "body in constrained fall" are
ideas which represent interpretations of the facts.

According

ly, the facts are viewed as the measurements taken.

The ob

vious difficulty with this account of the matter is that the
two ideas are not dealing with the same facts.
If we followed this logic to its natural conclusion
we will still have to conclude that "body in constrained fall"
is probably the best interpretation to refer jointly to the
parameters in which Aristotle was interested.

Consequently,

we still do not have a basis for preferring one description
over the other.
The anomaly of the pendulum not only demonstrates
the difficulty of drawing the line between analytic and synthe
tic, but it also violates the other basic tenet of positivism,
which is that factuality is established via a verification
principle.

According to the positivist's verification principle

the meaning of a proposition is discoverable in the method of
its verification.

The method of verification for either the

Galilean or Aristotelian descriptions involved taking certain
measurements, but it is not correct to say that these measure
ments alone define the meaning of "pendulum" or "body in
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contrained fall".

In order to take the right measurements in

the right order, one first must have the idea that selects the
relevant parameters.

When looking at a swinging body, no num

ber of observations of its weight, the height to which it had
been raised, and the time required for it to achieve rest, would
ever lead to the conclusion that what is being observed is a
pendulum.

The difficulty in reducing the verification or

perception to a set of physically observable operations, is
that the ideas which select and organize the operations are
not themselves inherent in those operations.

It follows that

verification principles can only be used to account for con
firmation, they cannot be used to account for discovery or
learning.

There are more difficulties with the verification

principles than the fact that they cannot account for the
context of discovery.

These other difficulties differ for

physicalists and phenomenal!sts, and, therefore, will be con
sidered later.

At this point we wish to limit our comments

in such a way that they apply to all positivists, whether they
be physicalists or phenomenalists.
Nowhere is the distinction between formal and empir
ical more clearly violated than in the case of microphysical
measurement.

The instrument or apparatus in an experiment is

a physical representation (a coordinative definition) of the
experimenter1s formalism, just as is a ruler in the simple
measurement situation.

The Copenhagen interpretation holds

that in principle there is always interaction between instru
ment and system in the quantum physical situation.
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Whether

one measures a wave or particle characteristic depends on the
instrument one uses.

Complementarity further indicates that

if you choose to actualize a wave characteristic you thereby
automatically eliminate the possibility of actualizing a parti
cle characteristic.

They are mutually exclusive, yet com

plementary descriptions.
The data in a quantum experiment is in principle
different from that which we usually think of as data.

Data

traditionally are attributable to the system under investi
gation.

In the quantum situation, the data refer to the re

lationship between the system and the instrument.

A change in

instruments means a change in the knowledge of the system.
This means that you cannot separate discussion of the phen
omena from discussion of the instruments by which they are
studied.

The phenomena have no specifiable characteristics

of their own, but can be viewed only as they relate to other
systems.
The three anomalies are also directly relevant to the
two prevalent points of view within positivism about the nature
of the primitives of observation and perception.

The phenomen-

alists are in agreement that an observer must be present so
that there can be sense data, but any normal observer with
the right training will be able to verify a scientific obser
vation.

This belief is obviously based on the idea that sen

sation, if not perception, is the same for all "normal" human
beings.

The first difficulty with this point of view rests

in the assumption that someplace in the complex perceptual
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apparatus of man there are some fundamental qualities which
stand in a one to one relation or perfect correspondence with
their source of stimulation.

The search for such elements of

consciousness has long been abandoned by psychology, but the
belief in their existence is still strong, particularly among
theorists who distinguish between sensation and perception.
The phenomena most anomalous to this point of view is that which
was given to us in Kohler's (196*+) experiment with prismatic
lenses.

Frequently, in the writings of phenomenalists, "patches

of color" are used as examples of sense data.

Kohler's (196*0

experiment demonstrates that color cannot be used as an example
of sense data, since the experience of it can arise from more
than one set of physical conditions.

It does not depend ex

clusively upon a perfect correspondence to the frequency of
light arriving at the eye.

Phenomenalists attempt to refute

the argument from hallucinations by holding that they are
ideographic peculiarities.

In Kohler's (196*f) experiment, as

in Ames' demonstrations, (1960) we are not dealing with the
perceptions of madmen, but clear cut demonstrations that
sensation is influenced by experiential and conceptual factors which
may be shared by all the Individuals in a culture, thereby
influencing what each of them experiences in the same way
without being attributable to a direct correspondence to the
source of stimulation.
The case of Euclidean geometry is a good example of a
culturally acquired set of descriptive biases, which is so
widespread in Western culture that many thinkers, such as
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Kant (1963), attributed them to man's native intelligence.

The

ability to visualize or in other ways rely on psychological
capacities in dealing with Euclidean geometry, means that
Euclidean assumptions are to most of us perceptual mechanisms,
operating at the same level as Kohler1s diffraction mechanism
in the prismatic lens experiment.
If we are prepared to admit that the experience of sense
data, such as color, can be influenced by past experience, then
how do we evaluate sense data with respect to the criterion of
independence?

In the first place, phenomenalists were never

committed to the notion that the sense data were independent
of the observer.

They were merely committed to the notion of

intersubjective reliability.

As was pointed out in the last

paragraph, this implies that similar stimuli give rise to
similar sensations, even though phenomenalists need not commit
themselves to this metaphysical position.
If this option is excluded and phenomenalism is defended
in terms of intersubjective agreement, then we have the diffi
culty of defining what is meant by "normal observer".

When

Kohler's (196*+), colleague, looking through the prismatic lenses,
saw the violet end of the spectrum everywhere Kohler (196*0 saw
the red end, do we say that one of these men is a normal ob
server, and the other not?

Or perhaps, we will maintain that

neither observer was normal.

Either of these possibilities

seem defensible, but each has the consequence of placing cul
tural limitations or sociological brackets around our scien
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tific propositions.

This seems to run counter to the initial

reasons for resorting to sense data as the indubitable.
In Chapter IV we pointed out that, for the most part,
logical empiricists abandoned sense data as the primitive of
knowledge in favor of physical objects.

The physicalists do

not avoid many of the problems of logical positivism by going
from sense data to physical objects.

In the first place,

physicalists tend to assume that there is no need to explain
what a physical object is; but the case of the swinging stone
demonstrates how the same physical object can be described
physicalistically, in more than one way, with very different
outcomes.

We have also shown that there is no sense in

appealing to the distinction between measurements and inter
pretations of measurements, since it is the interpretation
that governs which measurments will be taken.

Furthermore,

the same logic can be carried one step further to demonstrate
that each measurement is based on certain complexes of assump
tions and coordinative definitions, as was demonstrated in
our discussion of geometry.

The case of the pendulum is par

ticularly relevant to this point since it later became part
of a coordinative definition of time.

The interplay between

ideas and instruments is striking when we think of Galileo,
noting the regularity between his own pulse and time per
swing of the pendulum.

The evolution of the concept of time

was such that pendulum clocks would someday be used to
establish the regularity of the human pulse.
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We have seen that another suggested primitive was an
intuitive configuration.

Kant (1963), who was the father of

the intuitive configuratist's tradition, believed that the
basis for such intuition was a priori synthetic knowledge.
Among the elements of Kant's (1963) a priori synthetic know
ledge was Euclidean geometry.

By a priori Kant (1963) meant

that geometry, as well as other parts of the a priori synthetic
were not learned from experience, but were part of man's innate
abilities.

For Kant the a priori synthetic ordered and organ

ized sensation into perception; therefore, in order to identify
the a priori synthetic, experience was necessary, since its
influence could only be detected in experience.

By synthetic,

Kant meant that this intuitive innate capacity told us some
thing about the real world in much the same way that, geometri
cal axioms led to specific knowledge about real triangles in
the physical world.
The discovery and elaboration of non-Euclidean geom
etry is a serious setback to Kant's (1963) notion of the
a priori synthetic, particularly if it is not possible to
establish any logical or physical basis for preferring Euclid
ean geometries to non-Euclidean geometries.

Because many

neo-Kantians maintained that the intuitive visualizing of
Euclidean geometry demonstrated its claim to primacy,
Poincare (1953) and Reichenbach (1958) were very concerned
to demonstrate that non-Euclidean relationships could be
visualized by those who are familiar enough with the conse
quences of its axioms.
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Kant's a priori synthetic asserted that the origin of
geometry was not empirical, but that geometrical knowledge was
synthetic.

This assertion means that empirical techniques

would allow us to demonstrate that the geometry is in fact a
physical geometry.

There are in these relationships beliefs

which are similar to those held by the gestalt psychologists.
According to the gestalt psychologists, the principles of
organization were innate and immediate, but according to the
principle of isomorphism they were also a phenomenon influen
cing the natural environment.

For this reason, the same

principles of organization influenced the stimulus (physical
gestalten), the neurological processes (physiological gestalten), and perception (phenomenological gestalten).
As THINGS, phenomenal objects have definite proper
ties. Apart from their resistance to distortion we
have encountered their impenetrability, and their
inertia, according to which bigger objects move more
slowly than smaller ones. This correspondence be
tween phenomenal and real things is, according to our
theory, not primarily a matter of experience— although
we do not deny that experience may influence thing
properties— but the direct result of organization.
Psychophysically, the process distributions which
correspond to perceived things must in several re
spects be similar to physical things, and therefore
we must, on the basis of isomorphism, conclude that
behavioral things have autochthonously characteristics
similar to real things. Here, as in so many other
fields, a purely empiristic theory is bound to run in
a vicious circle. Our theory avoids not only this but
at the same time a Kantian apriorism.
(Koffka, 1935 j
P. 305)
The experiments of Ames (1960) and Kohler (196*+)
suggest that the principles of organization are not innate
or natural, but dependent upon experience.

The discovery of

perceptual learning, as exemplified in the adaptation phen
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omena in Kohler's (196M-) experiment, and the cultural depend
ence of assumptive worlds in Allport's (1957) experiment, have
effects on the gestalt principle of isomorphism that are sim
ilar to those that the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry
had on Kantian a priorism.

The belief in a priorism and

isomorphism were abandoned, but the belief in intuitive spatial
organization and perceptual insight remained.
Once the principle was established that the forms of
perception— and by extension the forms of belief—
were mind-dependent and not determined by the intrin
sic character of things perceived, it was only
necessary to add that these forms were themselves a
function of psycho- and socio-dynamic development, and
one went from Kantianism to all the verities of sub
jectivism, relativism, and cultural determinism that
have at once plagued and enriched modern philosophi
cal thought.
(Hawkins,
pp. ^ - ^ 9 )
Configuration!sm as a philosophy of science was
m
promulgated by Kohler (1967) as a method to achieve superior
knowledge, but Kohler (1967) explicitly accepted that physi
cal gestalten contained their own pattern of organization.
This pattern was not imposed upon the phenomena.

Using this

approach, Kohler (1967) would have a criterion for preferring
certain physical descriptions over others, since it was pos
sible to give' accurate descriptions that lacked insight into
the physical gestalt.

Such insightful descriptions could be

distinguished by virtue of their internal harmony and by
virtue of their consistency with the rest of acquired know
ledge.
More recent configuration!st philosophers of science,
such as Hanson (1958) and Polanyi, (1967-68, 1958) have aban
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doned the principle of isomorphism, viewing the patterning as
the influence of the conceptual on the observational.

These

patterns are seen as evidence of conceptual creativity.

As

we pointed out previously, Hanson (1958) and Polanyi (1967-68,
1958) both subscribe to the notion that only the details sub
sumed under the pattern are subject to empirical test.
Polanyi (1967-68, 1958) in particular maintains that patterns
in the history of science can only be evaluated on the basis
of consistency and coherence criteria.

Polanyi (1967 - 6 8 ,

1958) has collected examples of scientifically sound research
which have been ignored or denied by various disciplines be
cause their results do not fit in to the prevailing paradigm.1
The configurationist philosophers of science tend to
agree that the meaning of consistency and coherence is to be
defined by the standards by which an explanation is accepted.
If this is the case then there is a sense in which the Copen
hagen interpretation is an indication of a change in our
fundamental notions of consistency and coherence.

The prin

ciple of complementarity in fact elevates inconsistency to
the level of understanding.

Certainly in classical physics

the properties of objects must be stable in space and time,
and cannot be inconsistent with one another.

According to

complementarity, properties only exist when they are being
observed, and therefore need not be consistent with one
1
One example, familiar to psychologists, is the
experimental work on ESP by Rhine.
(Polanyi, 1958)
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another.

Polanyi (1958) and Hanson (1958) do not tell us how

such shifts in our notions of coherence and consistency can
take place.
The configurationists have forced the recognition of
the phenomena of patterning in both the realms of perception
and observation.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that

our knowledge contains these somehow irreducible units with
stable organization and impelling perceptibility.

It Is also

impossible to ignore that through his creative activity man
has been able to augment the number of such units.

Despite

this contribution, there are some very important omissions in
the configuration!st1s account of these irreducible units.

A

nativistic a priorism has lost its credibility, and because
of this loss the mechanism of intuition inevitably gets
replaced by sociological and psychological compulsions, which
run counter to Kantian rationalism and gestalt naturalism.
We have reviewed four candidates for the position of
independent indubitable:

primary qualities, sense data,

physical objects, and configurations.

We now turn to an

assessment of the neo-realist candidate— information.

Informa'

tion was defined in Chapter IV as an invariant set of rela
tionships existing among a set of measurements.
In Chapter IV we concluded our discussion of neorealism by remarking that there were conceptual differences
between the kind of objectivity implied by the independence
criteria and the kind of objectivity which is promoted by
Hawkins (196*0 and Gibson (1966).
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Despite Hawkins1 (196*0

claim that the message is entirely independent of the receiver,
and Gibson's (1966) claim that his is a theory of strict psych
ophysical correspondence, it was pointed out that both men re
sort to the criterionof economic description and to a hier
archical arrangement of factual!ty.

In their view, the use of

the criterion of economy in no way violates the independence
of the facts, since economy merely refers to the most reason
able arrangement of all the incoming information and it can
be defined in terms which are entirely measurable in that
information.

Even if we assume their own prediliction for

the jargon of information theory, such a view of the criterion
of economy is only justified if the set, to which the incom
ing information belongs, is known,

The most clearcut demon

stration of this set dependence is the contrasting descriptions
which result from using different geometries.

Within either

geometry, economy criteria can easily be shown to rest entirely
upon observable parameters; however, for this to be the case,
the geometry and the conventions of measurement must be known
in advance.
Neo-realist philosophers of science, such as Hawkins
(196*0, do not accept the relativity of geometry.

According

to their point of view, the apparent conventionalism, is due
only to the limitations of contemporary knowledge.
The view set forth here is that physical geometry is
neither a system of self-evident truths legislating
for the universe, as some philosophers may have thought,
nor an explication of mind-dependent forms of percep
tion, independent, as such, of any empirical tests.
It is, rather, a part of our empirically tested and
testable knowledge of nature; but it has, in the
description of nature, a special role and a special
195

kind of priority. Spatial properties are involved in
any demonstrative reference to physical realities, and
Kant was right in saying that we do not identify phen
omena as physical except in consequence of their
spatial ordering. We do not first identify things
as physical and only afterward find that they have
spatial location. But metric geometry cannot be
derived, as Kant supposed, from o u r 11A PRIORI forms of
intuition." Its theorems can be tested with high
precision under the given conventions of measurement,
and these conventions themselves rest upon judgments
that the growth of knowledge may confirm or cast into
doubt.
(Hawkins, 196*+, PP» 55-56)
Reichenbach (1958) and Hawkins (196V) disagree con
cerning the nature of the conventions of measurement.

Accord

ing to Reichenbach (1958), these are coordinative definitions;
therefore, it is logically impossible to confirm them empir
ically.

Hawkins (196V), on the other hand, maintains that

empirical knowledge can support or cast into doubt the con
ventions of measurement.

The analysis presented here assumes

that Reichenbach (1958) is correct, at least with respect to
physical geometry; but even if Hawkins (196V) is correct,
the points made with respect to the use of Euclidean physicalistic descriptions as criteria of reality in psychological
experiments are still valid.

Neo-realists are merely assert

ing that someday we may be able to confirm or disprove our
conventions of measurement.

Until that day comes to pass

the experimental psychologist has no criteria for preferring
one physicalistic description to another.
Gibson's (1966) analysis of illusory perception
nevertheless rests upon the tacit acceptance of Euclidean
assumptions.

With respect to simple geometrical illusions,

such as the one in Figure 2, Gibson (1966) maintains that
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the stimulus contains conflicting sets of information.

His

analysis of simple geometrical illusions is essentially the
same as that which he gives for reversible figures.

About the

goblet figure Gibson says,
In the absence of texture and parallax, the information
for edge-depth or superposition has been arranged to
specify two opposite directions of depth.
There are
two counterbalanced values of stimulus information in
the same "stimulus". The perception is equivocal be
cause what comes to the eye is equivocal.
(Gibson,
1966, p. 2k7)
Equivocation over whether this is a goblet or a pair
of profiles might be due to the fact that the stimulus is
equivocal.

This does not clarify how equivocal information

can be considered independent of the observer, since not all
reversible figures are spontaneous.

The case of the pendulum

is a good example of two sets of equivocal information which
do not reverse spontaneously.

Before Galileo, no one saw the

pendulum set of information values and, after Galileo, no one
accepted the older Aristotelian description.

In the case of

the geometrical illusions in figures 1 and 2, Gibson (1966)
would maintain that the phenomenological stimulus is at a
different level of sensitivity than the geometrical level.
The lines appear curved because the stimulus information pro
duced by the combination of lines is different than the
stimulus information produced by two lines alone.

According

to Gibson1s definition, however, every variation in eaqperience must be matched to a measureable variation in the
stimulus.

On this score the non-Euclidean description of

Figures 1 and 2, given in Chapter V, lends support to
Gibson's (1966) hypothesis.
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The Kohler (196^) and Ames (1960) experiments lend
support to Gibson’s (1966) notion that invariant relations
are what the individual perceives.

They contradict the idea

that these relationships exist in the stimulus independently
of the observer.

Ames' (1960) reliance on the principle of

equivalent configurations demonstrates very clearly how
certain invariances, for example between the trapezoid and
the rectangles viewed from certain perspectives, give rise to
certain invariant sensations.

The Allport (1957) cross cul

tural study suggests that the perception of these invariances
relies upon past experience.

Kohler's (196*+) experiment shows

that more than one set of information variables can give rise
to color perception, depending on the perceiver's set.

We

must conclude, therefore, that terms such as invariance and
information are only meaningful within a larger context.

That

larger context refers to the assumptions and axioms within
which the incoming bits of information are incorporated.

This

is why in Gibson's (1966) test we measure the variations in
experience first, and then see if we can find corresponding
measurements in the physical realm.
If we maintain the order of presentation used in
Chapter IV, we should next consider the transactional model.
The transactional model does not fit into the present scheme
since it does not promote a candidate for the position of
"indubitable".

We will, therefore, consider the transactional

model as one which suggests a method of evaluating knowledge
that is an alternative to those which rest upon indubitable
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observations or facts.

As was suggested earlier, Karl Popper

(1959 ) is a philosopher who wishes to avoid the psychologisms
of the type presented in Chapter V.

He therefore does not

wish to rely upon confirmatory observations to evaluate scien
tific hypotheses.

He is a logical positivist who wishes to

substitute a principle of falsification for the usual principle
of verification.

According to Popper, (1959) the only accept

able scientific propositions are those which are capable of
falsification.

We can trust our observational capacities when

it comes to disconfirmatory evidence.

In evaluating a prop

osition we select the hypothesis which has the greatest pos
sibility of falsification and believe in it in proportion to
our inability to disprove it.
This dissertation is based on the idea that psychol
ogisms are unavoidable in scientific verification.
therefore, accept the falsification solution?
a psychological one.

Why not,

The answer is

Essentially it is that scientific

propositions of the most fundamental type, which seem to be
at the crossroad of breakthroughs, are simple concepts which
channelize psychological processes in a positive manner such
that they tell you what to look for.

By simple concepts we

mean the creation of new entities, such as Galileo's pendu
lum and Kepler's ellipse.

There is nothing inherent in these

concepts to suggest the relevant falsifiers.

The discon

firmatory evidence comes only after an alternative concept
is available to generate this evidence.

Once more we turn

to the example of the goblet profiles; there is nothing in

199

either of these terms to suggest the alternative perspective.
If we follow the "if, then" logic, which is associated with
disconfirmation as well as confirmation, we can never go from
one of these terms to those parts of the other term that would
really give us good counterevidence.

For example, if Popper

(1959) is correct we should be able to say if this is not a
goblet then it will have a brow or nose.

In essence then we

agree that disconfirmatory evidence is less subject to the
psychologisms that Popper (1959) wishes to avoid, but that it
is these same psychological factors which make disconfirmatory
evidence so rare, unless there is a competing theory.
Finally, we examine the method which the transactional
model will use to cope with the difficulties presented by the
three anomalies.

As we said previously, transactional!sm does

not accept the idea of an observational indubitable.

Instead

it views both observation and perception as relativistic
processes.

Perceptions or observations are not evaluated in

terms of their correspondence to the real world, and theories
and ideas are not evaluated in terms of their correspondence
to known facts; rather, perceptions and assumptions are eval
uated in terms of their functional utility.

This criterion

implies that there must be a goal, an end which man wishes to
accomplish which can be used to evaluate percepts and ideas.
In all instances of descriptive complementarity, the descrip
tion preferred depends upon what we wish to accomplish.

In

addition to the tolerance for multiple descriptions, which is
built in to this approach, there is the implication that no
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description is ever complete.

This is so because perceptions

or descriptions arise out of the relationship between assump
tions and givens, and they are evaluated in terms of purposes.
The givens limit what will be perceived only insofar as certain
assumptions are disproved, but we can never anticipate from
this knowledge what future assumptions will be confirmed.
Only man's ability to come up with new goals and assumptions
can ever give us a measure of the limits.
The Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation of quantum mech
anics has many characteristics in common with Ames' view of
perception.

Both emphasize that what is observed is a function

of what the observer does as well as the system being observed.
Heisenberg (1958A, B) also concurs with Ames (1960) that a
future experiment may reveal other observations with the same
system, and that these new revelations will depend on the
goals the experimenter brings to the situation.
His final conclusion that the probability formulae of
quantum mechanics include a reference not only to the
kind of experiment which prepared the state, but also
to the kind of experiment which is ultimately envis
aged. By this he means that the development of the
wave function does not describe a process occurring
independently of observation, but that it represents
rather a set of incomplete potentialities which need
to be completed by a future action of measurement.
(Heelan, 1965, p. *+3)
The transactionalists differ from all the other pos
itions in one more important characteristic.
with the feature of certainty.

This has to do

Epistemological positions which

promote the notion of an indubitable admit the possibility of
error in description./ The probability of error increases
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with the complexity of the descriptive task.

In this sense,

the distinction between observation and perception is on a
continuum of probability.

Perception has a higher probability

of being in error than does observation.
In contrast to this point of view the transactionalist
indeterminacy position maintains that probability is inherent
in description and not a measure of technical proficiency.
The probabilities in the quantum mechanical situation are ir
reducible.

They express our knowledge in terms of the likeli

hood that a particle will appear at a given point under a
given set of initial conditions.

The similarity between this

view of probability and that expressed by Ittleson (1960) in
Chapter V is too striking to be accidental.

In neither case

does the acceptance of probability as an inherent feature of
our knowledge mean ambiguity.

If we say that the goblet and

the profile are descriptions of equal probability, given cer
tain initial conditions, it means that when one of the two is
being viewed it is an all-or-nothing perception.

Our know

ledge can only refer to a series of events, not to the abso
lute outcome of one event.

In classical terms this is an

indication that more work is needed, since probability is a
measure of ignorance, but in quantum mechanical terms, our
knowledge is basic even though it cannot make predictions
about the position and momentum of a particular particle.
Certainty and independence, therefore, are criteria of objec
tivity only in a model which insists on absolute indubitables.

202

We have repeatedly emphasized the significance of the
notion of indubitables in both fields of perception and scien
tific epistemologies.

It is therefore not sufficient to say

that transactionalists abandon

the notion of indubitables in

their account of perception and description.

In beginning our

examination of the transactional substitute, we mark an impor
tant transition in the course of the inquiry.

For just as it

is not sufficient to show counterevidence to the existence
of indubitables, it is not sufficient to collect counter
evidence to the assumption of objectivity.

What remains to

be done is the exposition of a viable alternative.

The first

task in arriving at this alternative involves getting an
understanding of what transactionalists substitute for the
notion of indubitables.
substitute as "devices".

We will refer to this transactional
It should be pointed out that those

whom we are calling transactionalists are not self-avowed
members of any school, and in the case of the towering figures—
Ames and Heisenberg— there was not even mutual recognition of
their epistemological similarities.

Nevertheless, the two men

have come to similar conclusions concerning the process by
which we acquire knowledge.

Let us now turn to an analysis of

the similarities in their understanding of observation and
perception that led us to coin the term "device".
It is interesting to note some of the similarities
among Ames' assumptions, Bohr and Heisenberg's instruments,
and Kohler's central aftereffects.

In the first place, each

is a device which the knower has come to use on the basis
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of prior successful experience.

Another expression which could

be substitued for device would be heuristic function.

The

choice of the word device is clearly appropriate to apply to
Bohr and Heisenberg's instrument.

It is obvious that apparatus

such as thermometers and interferometers are mechanical devices
which are not themselves the object of knowledge, but are
standards used to establish the existence of a property in the
object of inquiry.

Such devices play a unique role in connect

ing cognition to perception.

As we saw on pages 135-136, 181-182,

instruments of measurement are coordinative definitions and,
as such, contain a blend of analytic and synthetic elements.
It is in these instruments that the prescriptive elements of
knowledge, such as our numerical and logical systems, fuse
with the physical elements of our knowledge such as rigid
bodies used in the construction of rulers.
good example.

The ruler is a

The intervals represented by the numerical

markings on its surface are determined analytically, and on
the basis of the scale we wish to use.

The choice of a rigid,

stable material is not arbitrary but, based on our experience
with this material, we conclude that it will satisfy the
prescriptive rules of the numerical system.
Coordinative definitions, in many respects, represent
the state of human knowledge at any given point and can be
applied to make contemporary experience consistent with past
experience.

These instruments also have been called oper

ational definitions.

(Bridgman, 19^9).

It has become

recognized in recent years that operational definitions have
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both an analytic and a synthetic element, and that the inter
action of these two elements in a single measurement operation
means that we are bringing past knowledge to bear on present
experience.

The combined analytic and synthetic status of

these elements means that in some ways they act as prescrip
tive rules and in other ways as empirical facts.

With respect

to any particular experimental situation, the coordinately
defined instruments are prescriptive rules which are not
questioned.. In the long run, however, experimental evidence
may come to change the coordinative definition.
The idea that improvement in the realm of observation
is the mark of scientific progress tends to overshadow the
most important fact about how such improvements of observation
comes about.

There is the implicit assumption that the changes

in theory result from an improvement in the precision of our
observation.

Agassi (1968) has reviewed this question care

fully and concludes that the reverse is actually true.

As

long as we are working within a particular theory the oper
ational definitions define both the variables to be measured
and the level of precision which is desirable.

It is not

until a competing theory arises that changes in the operation
al definitions may require that scientists make even more
precise observations.
Thus, when an observer highly increases the degree of
accuracy of observation while referring only to one
current theory, his observation may be useless (sic)
if the fit is judged good enough, or useful if he
calls the fit into question— quite in accord with the
above observation of the relativity of degrees of
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accuracy.
For instance, when the atomic weight of
oxygen was deemed close enough to 16 there was
neither any point in increasing the accuracy of
the measurement of its deviation from 16 to fur
ther decimals nor even any point in isolating its
isotopes to find the more precise atomic weight of
the predominant isotope.
Things changed drastically,
of course, when 16 was not good enough any more be
cause nuclear physics should yeild the exact devia
tion from this weight (when the mass of a proton is
taken to be 1).
(Agassi, 1968, pp. 289-290)
If Agassi's analysis is correct, when viewed histor
ically an increase in precision really is a change in the
theoretical realm, not in the factual realm.

For example,

we could say that an increase in our precision of observation
of pendulum clocks allows us to decide in favor of Newton's

2

(a = const 1/r ) over Galileo's (a = g - const) .

This is so

because, according to Newton's formula, pendulum clocks at
various altitudes should, over long periods of time, become
discrepant with one another, while according to Galileo's
formula they should not.

To attribute the resolution of this

problem to the more precise observation of the behavior of
pendulum clocks is misleading because the competing operation
al definitions must come before the observations can be made.
Accordingly, Agassi (1968) argues that the increased precision
is a result of a change in the operational definitions, and
not an initiator of that change.

We do not change our notions

of acceleration because we observe the discrepancy between
the clocks; rather it is instead the other way around.

Once

a decision is made about which is the preferred operational
definition,

then it dominates the construction of measure

ment instrumentation with respect to future observations.
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The application of the term "device" to Ames' assump
tions and Kohler's central aftereffects may not seem as clear
as an application toBohr'sand Heisenberg's instruments.

Ames'

assumptions and Kohler's central aftereffects are a means of
bringing past experience to bear upon immediate perception.
But applying the notion of device to these particular situa
tions brings an additional insight which carries our under
standing beyond the traditional explanation of these perceptual
effects.

For the most part, learning theorists have tried to

subsume Ames' "assumptions" and Kohler's "central aftereffects"
under the concept of perceptual set.

A perceptual set pre

disposes the organism to have certain experiences.

The precise

nature of this predisposition is a function of past experience
with that particular set of stimuli.

Sets, therefore, are

exclusively empirical in origin.
If we substitute for this notion of perceptual set the
concept of device, as delineated above, we gain the additional
insight that there is an analytic or prescriptive aspect or,
in psychological jargon, a cognitive aspect, at work in pro
ducing these perceptual effects.

How else could we possibly

explain the functioning of these devices in situations in
which the perceiver has had no

experience, or in situations

where the bulk of his experience runs counter to the effect
of the device?

In the case of Ames' assumption of rectang-

ularlty, for example, the bulk of the subject's optical
experience runs counter to the effect of the assumption; and
yet the assumption persists in having its effect in all of
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its relevant situations.

If the device was based entirely

upon descriptive experience, then we should be set to see
trapezoidal windows, not rectangular ones.

The assumption of

rectangularity is not based on a large number of sensory ex
periences of rectangular windows, but on the cognition that
windows are rectangular.

If this device were based entirely

upon sensory learning, then it would work in exactly the
opposite direction.

That is, since the majority of optical

displays of windows have been trapezoidal, the device should
work in such a way as to convert non-trapezoidal optical
windows to trapezoidal ones.

Concretely, this would mean that

we should have no difficulty in seeing Ames1 rotating trapezoid as a rotating trapezoidj but a rotating rectangular
window frame would appear to us as an oscillating trapezoid.
This simply does not occur.

There is, therefore, a prescrip

tive element which modifies what we experience so as to be
consistent with what we know, regardless of the number of
experiences we may have had to the contrary.

To state this

in terms of operational definitions, we merely mean to say
that not all operational definitions are given equal weight
in our awareness.
It is not accurate to say that all publicly observ
able operations are of equal significance.

The usefulness of

an operation depends upon whether or not the operation can be
incorporated analytically, not synthetically.

Of all the

potential ways we might measure time, operationally we select
those which most closely approximate our logical schemes and
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ignore those for which we cannot create convenient prescriptive
rules.
We have seen that Ames' assumption of rectangular!ty
demonstrates that these heuristic devices cannot be based
entirely on sensory learning; this is so because the great bulk
of sensory experiences with windows give rise to a trapezoidal
optical display.

An examination of Kohler's device also sug

gests that sensory learning is an insufficient explanation.
Kohler's "central aftereffect" works in all situations in
which one would expect a diffraction pattern if there were a
physical basis for it.

It is not that the device works only

in those situations in which the perceiver has had sensory
experience with the diffracting lenses; rather, it applies to
all optical input.

Kohler himself refers to the central after

effect as a mnemonic which acts more as a "sorting" rule than
as a predisposition of the sensory apparatus.

(Kohler, 196^-)

We have seen, therefore, that perceptual devices have
an analytic aspect with respect to any one experience.
are definitional.

They

In addition to an analytic aspect, such

devices appear to have a range of convenience built into them.
The perceptual device of Ames and Kohler are experienced by
the subject as being "out there" in the stimulus precisely
because they only affect some of the stimuli, leaving other s
seemingly untouched.

The assumption of rectangular!ty affects

the windows in a room while not affecting the perception of
circular table tops.

The whole from which the perceiver is

working appears to determine whether or not a device will be
209

used.

This is most obvious in the case of experimental de

vices of measurement.

The instrument is only applicable to

a specific set of phenomena.

This is why no one thought to

build an interferometer for particles of matter until their
discreteness was in doubt.
The final and perhaps most important aspect which these
devices seem to share is their dependence on purposive
behavior.

Both Ames and Kohler emphasize that the building

up of their devices depends on successful action.

Ames re

peatedly demonstrates that the way to bring about modifications
in the perceptual assumptions a person is making is to make him
do something.

Activity which leads to counterevidence to the

assumption will eventually force changes in that assumption.
This can be seen simply in the case of the trapezoidal room.
As long as he is assuming a rectangular room, a subject attempt
ing to bounce a ball off the various surfaces in the room will
make inappropriate, and therefore unsuccessful movements in
tlying to catch the ball.

Kohler, as well as other perceptual

psychologists who make use of transformation lenses, has re
peatedly demonstrated that compensatory adaptation devices only
evolve if the subject uses the lenses while trying to success
fully mobilize in the environment.
It is not as easy to demonstrate the role of purposive
behavior in the development of scientific instrumentation;
however, the fact that we refer to the apparatus in scientific
experiments as instruments suggests that they are a means of
accomplishing a goal.
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These "devices" are as close as the transactionalist
comes to offering a conceptual unit to replace the traditional
indubitables of epistemologies based jipon the "principles of
separation and verification."

This inquiry leads us to be

lieve that the assumption of objectivity and, therefore, the
"principles of separation and verification", leave much to be
desired in the way they account for our scientific knowledge.
We will rely on transactional devices as one of the building
blocks for an alternative account to be considered in the
following Chapter.
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CHilPTER VII
SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE TO
THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY
The three anomalies demonstrate that descriptions and
perceptions are influenced by three aspects of knowledge which
the perceiver or describer brings to the situation to be per
ceived or described.
wholes and goals.

These three elements are:

assumptions,

Recognizing that this is the case consti

tutes a rejection of the assumption of objectivity.
To say that science is not objective calls for one of
two reactions from the reader.

The first reaction is that of

denial; an analysis which concludes that science is not ob
jective must be fundamentally in error since it runs counter
to the bulk of our experience and common sense.

The second

reaction, probably less likely, would be to assent but, at
the same time, to dismiss it.

The thinking behind this reac

tion would involve falling back on the obvious discrepancy
between science and other kinds of knowledge.

It is to say

that the analysis was successful in debunking but that this
is an empty victory since, as it turns out, objectivity never
did form the essential difference between science and non
science.
The first of these two reactions will undoubtedly find
some measures of support since there may well be technical
errors in the expositions of the anomalies in particular.
Technical errors are not likely to determine the fate of the
inquiry.

In fact, more work should allow us to determine the
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correctness of the conclusions.

That is to say, if this

method is valuable at all, the success or failure of the in
quiry should not depend on the examples of the anomalies in
Chapter V, but should be capable of generating others like
them.
The second reaction which would admit the conclusion
but not the relevance of the inquiry is more damaging as a
criticism of the inquiry.

For that reason, we shall devote

the remainder of this Chapter to understanding the implica
tions of the inquiry and try to state in positive ways the
consequences of accepting its conclusions.

Perhaps the most

important reason anyone might have for dismissing the inquiry
and its conclusions would be that one of the consequences
which follows from the conclusion seems to be impossible.
That seemingly impossible consequence is that, by getting rid
of the subjectivity/objectivity distinction, we have now com
pletely lost the basis for distinguishing between science
and non-science.

Few modern thinkers would accept that there

is no difference between science and non-science.

Yet our

inquiry began on the premise that it was objectivity which
distinguished science from non-science.

If we conclude by

saying that objectivity is not possible, then we must find
another basis for distinguishing science from non-science.
We have seen that there is a long-standing tradition which
can be traced at least as far back as Aristotle.

This trad

ition remains essentially true about contemporary theories
of knowledge which make a firm distinction between science and
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other aspects of knowledge.

We discussed this tradition

earlier as the “principle of separation and verification."
According to the principle of separation, only parts of ex
perience can he trusted and, according to the principle of
verification, only science can identify those parts.

Accord

ingly, the scientific method relies on the acquisition of
prediction and control in order to establish the objective
truth of a proposition.

How do the conclusions of this in

quiry affect this traditional model for scientific knowledge?
They indicate that the criteria of verification, for example
prediction and control, are a measure of success rather than
a measure of objectivity.
Scientific descriptions, like perceptions, are human
achievements; not passively received messages from nature.

To

say that scientific method can distinguish success from non
success, rather than distinguishing objective from non-objective,
may at first glance appear to be a very small accomplishment.
In actuality, it represents a very significant step.

There

are at least three major changes which the conclusions of the
inquiry suggest.

The first and most important is the revit

alization of a field of inquiry which had been laid to rest
by the assumption of objectivity.
ology of knowledge.

This field is the psych

Formerly, inquiry into the psychology

of knowledge was, by prescription, bound to be fruitless
since the principle of verification gave us normative stand
ards which defined for all times the standards by which
acceptable knowledge must be judged.
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Under this system,

improvement in our methodology could only come from two
directions:

from improvements in our logical tools of anal

ysis such as probability theory and mathematics, and from
improvements in our technical apparatus of observation.
psychology of knowing was prescriptively defined.

The

Since this

was assumed to be fixed for all times, inquiry into the
question was bound to be fruitless.
The second important change to result from this in
quiry has to do with the identity of three important factors
in the psychology of scientific observation which were hereto
fore prohibited by prescription.

Under the assumption of

objectivity, scientists were not only unaware of certain
psychological factors influencing their observations, but they
were trained to ignore the possibility of such factors.

In

this inquiry, we have seen the influence that assumptions,
wholes and goals can have on perception.

The influence of

these psychological factors on perception was presented in
a negative context.

This was done deliberately in order to

show some of the problems xfith the assumption of objectivity.
There is also a positive aspect to the knowledge obtained in
Chapter V, since what is demonstrated there is that we can
become aware of the influence of these psychological factors.
There is no need to relegate those to the realm of nonconscious influences.

In fact, we shall attempt to advance

the thesis that those influences were relegated to a nonconscious status only by conscious and deliberate prescrip21 5

tions which scientists and others promote in the process of
education.
The third important change results from the fact that
this inquiry represents the viability of a methodology which
is neither analytic nor ejqperimental.

There are reasons to

believe that methods similar to this one could be fruitfully
employed in almost any science.

In particular, there are

reasons to believe that this method will be especially appli
cable to the study of the psychology of knowledge.

If in fact

the methods for the construction and use of knowledge cannot
be exclusively prescriptive, then there is room for improve
ment in this domain.

On the other hand, there is no denying

that knowledge is at least partially prescriptive.

The appro

priate method for studying knowledge will, therefore, have to
include both analysis and observation without giving prefer
ence to one or the other.
We have already discussed the influence that the
whole has on the perception of the parts.

The many conse

quences that result from the conclusions of the inquiry about
the assumptions of objectivity are all "parts" of a "whole"
new picture of science.

In order to properly communicate the

meaning of each particular consequence, we must begin by
presenting the whole to which it belongs.
by making use of two analogies.

This will be done

One is the analogy of puzzle-

solving which we will use to represent the "whole"picture of
science when viewed under the assumption of objectivity.
The other analogy will be that of map-making.
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We shall

use the analogy of map-making to represent the "whole" pic
ture of science viewed without the assumption of objectivity.
As long as we could make the assumption of objectivity,
we assumed that the fundamental job of science was to discover
facts.

These facts, we assumed, represented small pieces of

indubitable information about reality or nature.

The thing

which primarily characterized science was its reliance upon
a method which could establish the factuality of a proposi
tion.

Though we readily admitted that there were many diffi

culties surrounding the enterprise of scientific knowledge
making, these difficulties we thought would be resolved by
the eventual accumulation of the relevant factual information.
The analogy of puzzle-solving is only appropriate if we
assume that, in this particular case, the pieces of the puz
zle are not all available and that before we can put it to
gether, we must discover each piece.

Facts, therefore, are

like the pieces of a puzzle and science is the method for
the discovery of these facts.

How the facts relate to one

another as well as the relevance of any one particular fact
may be theorized about but a final answer must await the
discovery of all the facts.

Consequently, all facts are

assumed to be of eventual relevance and, therefore, of
equal significance.

Similarly, the accuracy of our theor

izing concerning any local area within the puzzle is a
function of the number of facts available in this area.
The puzzle-solver is involved in the processing of informa
tion, the bits of which are given by objective observation.
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If, on the contrary, we cannot assume the independence
and certitude of any observations, then it follows that facts
cannot be clearly identified.

Consequently, what science is

engaged in appears to be more like the art of map-making than
that of puzzle-solving.

The good map-maker must have precise

methods of observation and he must keep a close guard against
misrepresenting any of his observations.

However, none of

his observations is considered an independent unit which he
must somehow accommodate.

In addition to paying attention to

the faithfulness of his observations, his methods must some
how incorporate three other aspects of knowledge besides the
experiential.

First, he must recognize the role of assump

tions and conventions.

This means that he must bridge the

gap between the subject and object of knowledge.

As a good

map-maker, he considers the user of the map as much as he
does the producer.

Second, he must consider the influence of

the whole on the parts of the map.

The meaning of both ob

servations and symbols can only be found in the relationship
of a particular segment to the whole.

Third, the map-maker

must consider the goal or the purpose for which the map is
being constructed, for example, an aviator's map will differ
significantly from a trucker's map of the same region.

The

map-maker, therefore, is seen as a producer, as well as a
processor of information.
The first thing which becomes obvious from comparing
these two analogies is that they are a set of complementary
pictures of a kind familiar to us in this inquiry.

218

Goblets

or faces, pendulums or bodies in constrained fall, wave or
particle, and, finally, puzzle-solving or map-making— each
pair represents complementary wholes which significantly in
fluences our awareness of the parts.

It is not possible in

any case to absolutely establish one over the other.

How

ever, as is clear in the case of some of these, one may have
the predominance over the other for long periods of history.
In the training of scientists in our institutions of higher
education the puzzle-solving picture of scientists has been
so predominant as to virtually exclude the map-making picture
of science.
At this point, we wish to change the course of our
inquiry.

Until the beginning of this Chapter, the focus has

been on a narrowing down of an evaluation of the assumption
of objectivity.

This was done in order to demonstrate the

inherent weakness is an assumption of objectivity.

Having

accomplished this, we are now required to examine the impli
cations of abandoning objectivity.
Understanding the implications of abandoning the
assumption of objectivity will require looking at three kinds
of changes in our view of science.

The first of these in

volves the identification of proscriptions now existing in
scientific culture which are based on a puzzle-solving account,
rather than a map-making account of science (or the origins
of our knowledge).

The second involves changes in require

ments or assumptions that must be made if knowledge is to
be called scientific.

The third involves changes in the
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essential methodology of science.

It is perhaps not correct

to use the word change to refer to these sets of recommenda
tions.

It might he better to call them complementary or

alternative courses of action.

They may be considered com

plementary because the proscriptions and prescriptions, the
requirements and methods, of a science will vary, depending
on whether one views science as map-making or as puzzlesolving.

Our inquiry into objectivity has been undertaken

in order to present the case against the assumption of objec
tivity, and to the extent that it has succeeded it may be
viewed as supporting to the map-making picture.

Understanding

the implications of the study, therefore, requires that we
understand the consequences of this point of view.

Not all

of the epistemological and methodological consequences of
these two divergent views of science can be dealt with in a
single inquiry.

We shall attempt to contrast the complemen

tary sets of consequences which follow from our analysis of
the anomalies in Chapter V.
As was stated above, the first and most important
consequence of accepting the map-making picture of science is
that it makes possible a psychology of science.

Map-making,

unlike puzzle-solving, has no prescript! vely, non-psychological
entities in it.

This means the kind of human creativity which

is possible differs in each of these pictures of science.

As

long as the belief in objective facts prevailed, their prim
acy as the most significant elements in our knowledge forbade
any psychological influences from entering into the shaping
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of these facts.

In recent years, the role of creative

thinking has played an expanding role in accounting for the
discovery of facts in the puzzle-solving picture.

Jlnding

the pieces of the puzzle required elaborate and intelligent
schemes.

Establishing the correctness of a discovery, how

ever, remained a non-psychological enterprise.

The few

vrriters who recognized psychological variables in the con
text of justification put the process of confirmation through
a long series of interpretations.

These writers tried to

establish the verification and falsification principles which
could assure that the facts did not involve any psychological
determinants in their make-up.

Even if creativity was ad

mittedly an important aspect of discovering facts, it could
have nothing to do with what the facts told us about nature.
Analogously, we would say that it is permissible to give
credit for the genius of finding a piece of the puzzle but
it is assumed that the shape of the puzzle piece is indep
endent of the finder.
The kind of creativity which the puzzle-solving pic
ture calls for admits to only two kinds of improvements.
can improve by extending the reach of our senses.

We

This is

accomplished by the proliferation of scientific instrumenta
tion.

This kind of improvement should increase the number

of facts we discover by expanding the area within which we
can search for the pieces.

The other way in which we can

improve according to the puzzle-solving picture, is by the
use of logic and better formal arrangements.
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The organiza-

tion, manipulation, and storage of the facts is done within
logical systems which are theories.

Theories may vary in

their logical exactness from the rigor exemplified by geometry
to the ambiguity of psychological and sociological theory.
Proponents of this view differ as to how precisely we make
progress theoretically, though most agree that the number of
facts available in any particular area influences the exact
ness of our theories.

Psychological variables may be impor

tant in arriving at theories but they are prescriptively
forbidden from being influential in the realm of factuality.
In essence, we are saying that the assumption of ob
jectivity prevents any improvement in the psychology of science.
That which defines science is its non-psychological method of
establishing facts.

This single capacity to establish facts

is the one thing which must remain fixed in the puzzlesolving picture of science.

Logicians may improve our man

ipulation and interpretation of facts, and technicians our
ability to observe them, but the fundamental method of know
ing the facts is fixed.
We will postpone the discussion of the subject matter
and method of the psychology of science as it would appear in
what we are calling the map-making picture.

This discussion

will come more appropriately after a discussion of the limita
tions placed on psychological factors existing in the current
picture of science.

In the puzzle-solving account, there is

always, as we have previously documented, the promotion of
an indubitable fact.

These facts are like the pieces of the
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puzzle.

As we have already said, methods for accounting for

the discovery of such facts have run the gamut from induction
by enumeration (Mills) to induction by intuition (Frank) to,
finally, the creativity of human genius (Einstein).

Likewise,

the methods for verification or confirmation have run the
gamut from sense-data to physical protocols and, finally, to
falsibiability potential.

Regardless of which set of these

alternatives is preferred by any particular philosopher of
scientist, the central question is always one of factual!ty.
This means, in effect, that while there may not be agreement
about how facts are obtained, there is agreement that they
are indeed obtained.

Whatever the currently popular principle

of verification happens to be, be it phenomenal, physicalistic
or operational, it is believed to be a measure of the truth.
It is probably correct to say that currently the criteria of
verification are prediction and control.

Presumably, if we

establish prediction and control over a phenomenon, then that
is a sufficient criterion for asserting that our knowledge is
factual.

That assertion is equivalent to asserting that we

know the truth about that particular phenomenon.
Let us contrast to this picture one in which the ac
count of scientific knowledge must proceed without the
assumption of objectivity.

As we said above, if we do not

believe in the factuality of any assertions, then we must
provide an alternative account of what it is that the prin
ciples of verification do for us.

What exactly do we estab

lish by the experimental verification of a proposition, if
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not its truth?

The alternative suggested by the abandonment

of objectivity is that verification is a measure of success,
rather than a measure of truth.

Prediction and control are

a measure of the fruitfulness of our constructions rather
than the faithfulness of our representations.

Once more it

is important to recognize that success and truth are com
plementary pictures which are so broad in their significance
that neither can be absolutely preferred over the other.
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that these differ
ences are more than linguistic— they are substantive.

Under

standing the substance of the differences between the two
alternatives requires an examination of many aspects, only
some of which are touched upon in this inquiry.

Among these

important differences which can be identified as a result of
this inquiry are three negative proscriptions at work in the
present scientific culture.

These proscriptions are explicit

and implicit patterns of avoidant behavior trained into the
scientific mind because of its acceptance of the assumption
of objectivity.

These proscriptions are an essential part of

the "hard-nosed" attitude which
a good scientist.

is

considered essential in

They are only negative proscriptions if

the conclusions drawn from this inquiry are in fact correct.
Their effect on the product of science is diminishing, only
if one assumes that science is engaged in marking successes,
rather than in discovering truth.. Few will doubt that these
proscriptions do exist; many may argue that they are justified.
It is important to notice, however, than an exact identifi
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cation

of the proscriptions can only come about if we recog

nize the contrast between the two views.
The first of the three proscriptions is that which
proscribes against a consideration of goals.

The proscription

evolves naturally from the belief that science discovers truth
rather than achieving successes.

If science is engaged in

discovering factual truth, then it would be nonsense to ask
"truth for what?"

However, if science is engaged in achieving

successes, it is not nonsense to ask "success at what?"

If

our method reveals facts, then we need only be concerned with
the proper application of this method and rest assured that
the outcome eventually will be significant.

In addition to

the fact that it is illogical to question the significance of
truth, the evaluation of performance by means of established
goals is associated by the scientific community with engin
eering and other applied fields.

Therefore, the proscription

against goals not only is logical but it promotes purity.
The great difficulty which arises as a result of the
goal proscription is that there is a tendency to evaluate all
work of science methodologically.

We cannot question the

values of the pieces of the puzzle being brought forth.
quality is presumably all equal.

Their

We can only criticize the

quantitative productivity of various methods.

Since the one

area in which scientists are open to criticism is method,
they are certain to keep this fixed.

They are more willing

to let the method prescribe what they will study, than let
what they are to study prescribe the methods appropriate to
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its study.

It is on this account that Wertheimer was so

critical of science.
We go from the world of everyday events to that of
science, and not unnaturally assume that in making
this transition we shall gain a deeper and more
precise understanding of essentials. The transi
tion should mark an advance.
And yet, though one
may have learned a great deal, one is poorer than
before. It is the same in psychology. Here too
we find science intent upon a systematic collection
of data, yet often excluding through that very
activity precisely that which is most valid and
real in the living phenomena it studies. Somehow
the thing that matters has eluded us.
(Wertheimer,
1959, P. 1)
At least in some instances, the goals of a science
have been allowed to change beyond our recognition because
the product of science could only be evaluated methodologically.
Psychology is an example of a science in which this is the
case.

The original goal of psychology presumably was to ex

plain knowledge, experience and behavior.

It must be admitted

that psychologists had been applying a methodological criter
ion to their accomplishments which very often means accepting
something far less than this original goal called for.

We

shall see that if science is construed as a method for
achieving success, then the role of goals is returned to a
central position in the psychology of science— one which
permits other than methodological criteria for the evalua
tion of scientific accomplishments.
The second proscription of science which evolves from
the assumption of objectivity is that which calls for ignor
ing the whole.

According to this view, progress in science

is achieved from the discovery of facts.
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How facts relate

to one another within any particular discipline is the problem
of theoreticians.

The status of theoreticians in science is

almost deliberately ambiguous.

In the training of our scien

tists, little or no systematic attention is paid to the expli
cit development of theoreticians.1

There is a mysticism

prevalent around the question of theory within science.
Great theories are the result of genius.

Men like Newton,

Einstein, Freud, Marx, are held up as examples of creative
genius.

The training with respect to the work of these men

differs significantly from the training scientists receive
with respect to the work of great experimenters.

Great ex

periments are held up as examples which the initiate can
someday imitate.

We study their general character and anal

yze them into a systematic body of knowledge which we call
methodology.
ies.
atic.

Methods become separated from their discover

The study of theory and theorizing is far less system
Theories tend to remain associated with the name of

their creators.

Though the initiate is trained to imitate

in the methodological realm, he is trained only to admire in
the theoretical realm.

This is consistent with objective

epistemology since it would be nonsense to imitate creativ
ity and genius.
Within any particular area of scientific inquiry,
placing the facts into meaningful relationship is the prob
lem of theory.

But placing the disciplines in relationship

1The conspicuous exception to this is physics. The
development of theoretical physics as a specialty within the
discipline indicates that this science more than any other has
abandoned the puzzle-solving picture of science.
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with one another, which after all is the next largest whole,
seems to fall completely outside the realm of science.

If

psychologists are hard-pressed to understand the relationship
between all the facts within psychophysics, let them try to
relate psychophysics to personality, psychology to sociology,
and psychology to all other disciplines.
this?

Whose problem is

In theory, one supposes that this is the problem of

philosophy but in practice it becomes a problem of adminis
tration.

If we assume that science is a process by which we

discover objective facts, then there is no need to worry how
academic departments are created and dissolved since even
tually the facts will emerge independently of such adminis
trative decisions.

If, however, we assume that the parts of

knowledge being generated are influenced by the whole from
which they come, the scientists can no longer afford to ig
nore the sociology of science.
The third and final negative proscription is that
which calls for deliberately ignoring the subjective in the
act of knowing.

As long as we believe ourselves to be en

gaged in the objective description of reality we believe it
desirable to eliminate all subjective elements from our des
criptions.

In the past this was accomplished by using

descriptive languages with the greatest amount of logical
explicitness.

It is this aspect more than any other which

makes quantifiability desirable.

In recent years, there has

been increasing awareness that these logical systems of des
cription, such as geometry, are conventions.
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Though they

are public entities, they are nevertheless subjective insofar
as they are something which the observer brings to the ob
served.

They are also arbitrary insofar as there is nothing

about the object which enables us to establish a preference
for using one convention rather than another.

Though this

conventionality of descriptive languages has been recognized,
its most important implications have not been delineated.

In

recognizing that data language is conventional, it becomes
important to establish criteria according to which we may
prefer one convention over another.
In principle at least, it is no longer a question of
how faithfully one convention, rather than another, repre
sents the facts.

Conventions are selected on the basis of

convenience, not on the basis of truth.

The next question

is of the utmost significance— that is, "convenient for
whom?"

The way our scientific knowledge has evolved a class

of e v e r t s in any given domain is necessary in order that
the knowledge in that area can be understood.

As long as

this expertise was a natural outgrowth of the complexity of
the facts, then it could not be questioned.

But, if in fact

the language of scientific knowledge is selected on the basis
of convenience, this means that the user of the knowledge is
being incorporated into the criterion for the selection of
convention systems.

There is a sense in which Einstein rec

ognized this when he chose a non-Euclidean geometry in order
to preserve our conventions of measurement.

To do the

opposite would have meant a far more disruptive effect on
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our picture of the world.

There is a sense also in which

Bohr recognized this point when he insists upon the fact that
we must represent the facts of quantum mechanics in the lang
uage of classical physics, not to preserve a faithful repre
sentation of the facts but to maintain a connection between the
two fields of knowledge.

There are in these positions the

seeds of an obligation which have not yet been recognized.
If scientists do in fact have a choice in the assumptions and
conventions which they make and use in describing the aspect
of the world which they study, then is it not their obliga
tion to amplify the degree of freedom available to them and
make explicit the criteria they use in choosing their conven
tions?

This would mean ultimately that the producers of

knowledge must not only take an interest in what the know
ledge is about, but they must take into account those who
are to profit from that knowledge.
There would appear to be two criteria for evaluating
the worth of a particular contribution.

The first is onto

logical consequences; that is, according to the improvement
that it affords in prediction and control of relevant areas.
We measure a scientific contribution epistemologically in
terms of the number of men who can incorporate the knowledge
into their lives.

The epistemological criterion increases

in significance as the scientific domain in question comes
closer and closer to man.

We are at the present time reaping

the fruit of having ignored this epistemological aspect of
our knowledge in areas such as ecology, sociology and

230

psychology.

By using only our ontological criterion, we

have produced a class of experts who in turn have produced a
great deal of knowledge about each of these domains.

But

since they paid no attention to the user of the knowledge,
the potential significance of their accomplishment was wasted.
What we need in these areas is knowledge for man, not know
ledge about man.

The producer of knowledge must take into

consideration the potential user of knowledge.
We have already pointed out that abandoning the
assumption of objectivity leads us to the conclusion that
science is involved in achieving successes, rather than in
discovering truths.

One of the most significant differences

between these two pictures of science is that we can have
levels or grades of successes, but we cannot have levels or
grades of truth.

This realization is of the utmost sig

nificance since it is helpful in resolving one of the prob
lems which arose repeatedly in this dissertation; namely,
how does one establish a preference among equally objective
descriptions.
From the point of view of the history of science
this is a theoretical problem, not a practical one.

There is

no doubt that we did come to prefer Galileo's pendulum to
Aristotle's body in constrained fall.

There is equally no

doubt that we came to prefer Newton's (a = const 1/r2) to
Galileo's (a = g = const).
establish this preference?

The question is:

how did we

As long as we believed we were

involved in verifying truths, there was no principle by
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which we could discriminate between alternative constructions
of the same verifiable phenomena.
If we recognize that that the processes of perception
and description are achievements instead of representations
of fact, then it is possible to accept a principle of grada
tions among perceptions and descriptions with respect to a
particular set of givens.

We may term this principle the

"inclusiveness of the goal."

That is, we can grade the level

of descriptive achievement by reference to the inclusiveness
of potential achievements which it allows us to accomplish.
We prefer pendulums to bodies in constrained fall because
pendulums allow us to accomplish more in a greater number of
diversified settings than do bodies in constrained fall.

Any

particular description is valid to a degree and can never be
evaluated by itself.

Levels or gradations imply

a process

of rank ordering which requires at least two competing des
criptions.

This is why the establishment of descriptive value

is a theoretical task, not an experimental one.

All exper

iments can ever tell us about Galileo's (a = g = const) is
that it is essentially correct as far as it goes.

One would

never think to look for differences due to altitude until
one is given the competing (a = const 1/r ).

We can grade

the two formulas for acceleration with respect to potential
accomplishment afforded rather than with respect to factual
validity.
Another example of the use of the principle of goal
inclusiveness to grade alternative constructions is provided
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by clinical psychology.

A client complains of aversive

reactions to sexual situations.

This has led in her case to

the dissolution of two marriages and is threatening to destroy
a third.

The Freudian construct of frigidity is available

as a description of the clinical condition.

If we limit our

goal to that of understanding the client's marital sexual re
lations, the construct of frigidity would seem appropriate,
though limited.

But, if we wish to include behaviors outside

the domain specified by this construct, then we find that the
concept is not generally useful.
A preferable construct would be one which would ac
count satisfactorily for the range of behaviors referred to
by the diagnosis of frigidity, and at the same time be capable
of shedding light on other aspects of the client's behavior.
One such alternative assumes that the client avoids situations
in which she is to be evaluated on the ^asis of her physical
performance.

Using this concept we find that she has similar

aversive reactions to sports which are similar to her re
sponses to sex.

It is also noted that she has high standards

of performance in those areas in which she does engage her
self.

We find that she is extremely successful in those things

which she does undertake and avoids situations in which she
does not meet her own standards of performance.

In some

respects this conception is similar to the clinical diagnosis
of frigidity, but it has a much wider range of applicability.
It allows the therapist to recommend preliminary therapeutic
steps outside the range of sexual behavior, the aspect of
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the person's frigidity that is most threatening.

The client

is given an opportunity to learn that the consequences of
failure at playing golf are not as threatening as she had
thought.

Once she has overcome her avoidance behavior to

sports, she has the basis in her experience to begin moving
with confidence in other areas of physical performance.

With

respect to this example, the avoidance construct is preferable
to the frigidity construct, not because one is true and the
other is false but because one is more inclusive of potential
accomplishments than is the other.
This method for evaluating scientific propositions is
offered as a substitute for the various principles of verifi
cation proposed by those philosophies of science which adhere
to the assumption of objectivity.

In combination with the

notion of devices which we discussed previously, it produces
a picture of science significantly different from those avail
able in the objectivist tradition.

According to this picture,

science is engaged in producing devices which are evaluated
according to their ability to actualize potential.

Whenever

two devices are competing within a domain, we prefer that
which includes the widest range of potential accomplishments.
Finally, we return to the first and most significant
implication of abandoning objectivity; namely, that a psychol
ogy of science is provided a most important role in the ex
pansion of knowledge.

As was indicated earlier, the assumption

of objectivity asserted that the fundamental method of knowing
for all science was fixed for all time.
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That method was the

establishment of facts by means of observation.

We could

improve our processes of knowing in all respects except this
one.

It will help to return to our analogies and say that,

in the puzzle-solving picture, we can improve the process by
any method which will improve the processing of the pieces.
According to this view, the scientist
of information.

is only a processor

We may improve by extending the range of

his senses and the logical systems for storing the information,
but nothing must be allowed to interfere with the essential
pieces as they are given to us by reality.
In the map-making picture, the agent of knowing is in
volved in producing information.

According to this picture,

assumptions, wholes and goals, as well as the experimental
actualization, all influence the information produced.

This

latter picture points to the reinterpretation of many of the
traditional methods of science in addition to indicating the
explicit use of methods which, until now, have operated
covertly in science.

According to this map-making picture,

an experiment is a demonstration of the actualizing potential
of certain concepts.

It does not give us a measure of truth,

but it does give us a measure of success.

Consequently,

experiments are not the only method by which scientific aware
ness is extended.

We must develop methods which allow us to

understand how assumptions and conventions influence our
scientific awareness of the world.

Perhaps, the best example

of these methods is the "thought experiment" which allows us
to compare the contrasting influences of alternative sets of
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assumptions on our awareness of a particular domain.

This

dissertation is an example of such a "thought experiment."
There is reason to believe that in physics at least, "thought
experiments" played a crucial role at every major turning
point.

The thought experiments of Galileo, Einstein and

Heisenberg seem to come at those points in the history of
physics when the most basic of assumptions were being ques
tioned.

This method makes possible a form of knowing which

laboratory experiments cannot develop.

It makes possible

an awareness of "what is being omitted," and it allows us
to produce information from "nothing."

Producing information

from "nothing" can only be accomplished by the manipulation
of theoretical entities.
observation.

It cannot result from experimental

We have already discussed an example of this

kind of awareness when we discussed the criterion for pre
ferring one construction over another within a particular
domain.

In that discussion we noted that our rejection of

Aristotle's body in constrained fall and Galileo's acceler
ation was not based on a substantive error in their formulations,
but on the basis of a comparitive omission in their formulation.
It is because Aristotle said nothing about time per swing and
Galileo said nothing about altitude that we eventually pre
ferred competing constructions which did include these omitted
variables.

Becoming aware of these omissions requires bring

ing an alternative set of expectations to the observation.
Such expectations are governed by the constructs we bring to
the observation situation.

This is another way of saying that
236

within any particular construction there is nothing to tip the
observer off about its limitations.

Only when an alternative

set is provided can we become aware of what a construction
does not do for us.
Since this particular dissertation demonstrates the
influences of assumptions, wholes and goals on awareness, it
suggests that the deliberate manipulation of any of these
can improve our awareness within a particular domain.

We

have already noted that the prevalent conception of science
prescribes against the explicit considerations of such fac
tors as assumptions, wholesand goals, and proposes no method
by which we can systematically study their influence.

This

inquiry is thought to be an example of a scientific enter
prise which bears the seeds of a new method which will allow
us to examine the influence of psychological factors— in our
scientific knowing of the world.

In calling for an explicit

consideration of wholes and goals in particular, it seeks to
establish a counterbalancing force of the utmost significance
in contemporary science.

The direction of this force only

begins to emerge from this particular inquiry but its sig
nificance is so important that it must be delineated despite
its inexactness.

The methods suggested by this inquiry aim

at achieving an integration rather than further differentia
tion within science.

They place the stress on the inclusive

ness or breadth of applicability of scientific findings,
rather than on their certainty.

These methods also suggest

that a systematic approach to theoretical work is as feasible as a
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systematic approach to experimental work.

All of which is to

say that methods are available to remove the process of knowing
from the realm of prescriptive philosophy and place it in-the
arena of scientific inquiry where it may undergo progressive
change.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter I, it was asserted that the subjectivity/
objectivity distinction underlies what C.P. Snow has called
"the two culturesw" In particular, the assumption that man
can make objective observations by using scientific methods is
one which is generally made and which is central to under
standing the relationship between scientific and non-scientific
knowledge.

All of this is given as justification for this in

quiry, which attempts to establish whether or not we are
justified in assuming the capacity for objective observation.
This question is seen as central to an eventual understanding
of the psychology of knowledge.
Chapter II briefly reviewed the history of this prob
lem.

This analysis revealed that two principles of scientific

epistemology have remained constant throughout the history of
science.

The first is the principle of separation, according

to which human experience can be separated into subjective and
objective experiencing.

Specific expression of this principle

has changed during various periods of scientific history.

At

times, there was a preference for expressing it in ontologi
cal terms, such as primary and secondary qualities, while at
other times the principle of separation was expressed in
epistemological terms, such as analytic and synthetic.
The second principle of scientific epistemology to
emerge is referred to as the principle of verification.
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According to this principle, the scientific method is held to
be the only one by which one can distinguish the veridical from
the illusory aspects of experience.

In general, changes in the

manner of expression of the principle of separation were
accompanied by appropriate changes in the manner of expression
of the principle of verification.

That is to say, the specific

criteria by which a genuinely scientific procedure was identi
fied changed along with the way in which we separated objec
tive from subjective experience.
The most important conclusion to emerge from the ex
amination of the background of this problem is that the assump
tion of objectivity has played such an important role in
molding our Western ways of knowing that most of the existing
credible methods of inquiry have the assumption embedded in
them.

Contemporary disciplines suited to deal with epistem

ological questions tend to adopt experimental or analytical
methods of inquiry, and the distinction between these kinds of
methods are themselves baeed on the assumption of objectivity.
Since the assumption of objectivity is the subject of this
inquiry, it was concluded that methods which are based on the
subject/object distinction would not be appropriate here.
In Chapter III the method of anomalies was described.
This method was deemed appropriate for this inquiry since un
like most other available methods it is neither analytic nor
experimental.

It is based on the method of thought exper

iments in which facts, theories and assumptions about initial
conditions are viewed together in order to discover new rela
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tionships.

Anomolies-are described as old facts seen in a

new light.

Their utility is in their ability to demonstrate

to us the experiential consequences of particular assumptions.
In the context of this particular inquiry, the method of
anomalies is particularly useful since it allows us to hold
in abeyance the assumption of objectivity.

This in turn allows

us to bring scientific epistemology and the psychology of
perception together, since the assumption of objectivity is
what held them apart.

This is accomplished by asking that

theories of scientific observation be capable of accounting
for the facts of perception, and that theories of perception
be capable of accounting for the facts of scientific observa
tion.
In Chapter IV, models of perception and observation
were reviewed in order to understand the role of the assump
tion of objectivity in the various theories of perception
available.

Five broad models of perception and observation

were identified.

They were realism, logical positivism,

configurationism, neo-realism, and transactionalism.

It was

found that all but the transactional model subscribed to the
assumption of objectivity.

Each of the other models promote

the belief that under special circumstances man is able to
make objective observations and that knowledge obtained in
this manner can be considered factual.

Despite the agreement

concerning the belief in the existence of facts, each of these
models promotes a different description of the nature of facts
and the process of observation.

2*f1

Chapter V presented three specific anomalies to the
assumption of objectivity.

Each anomaly consists of a com

bination of information derived from two sources:
epistemology and the psychology of perception.

scientific

The first

anomaly demonstrates the inseparability of logical and em
pirical elements in perception.

Specifically, it demonstrates

that the real and the illusory can only be separated after
certain logical assumptions are made.

This indicates that

the logical assumptions are as fundamental to the definition
of the real as are the sensory elements.

The second anomaly

demonstrates the influence of the whole on the experience of
the parts in both scientific measurement and in normal per
ception.

Specifically, it shows that concepts or constructs

define and select the appropriate measurements to be taken,
as well as those to be ignored.

The third anomaly demon

strates that the qualitative experience in observation and
perception is, in part, determined by the purpose of the ob
servation or perception.

This means that the act of measure

ment or perception in part determines the result of the
perception or measurement.
In Chapter VI the impact of the anomalies on the
assumption of objectivity was assessed by taking each of
the definitions of fact (which had been identified in the
various models of Chapter IV) and determining how each
definition is affected by the anomalies. It was concluded
that none of the definitions of fact are capable of dealing
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with all of the anomalies.

This was interpreted to mean that

the idea of factuality is misleading, and led to an attempt to
describe an alternative epistemological unit called "devices."
Devices are forwarded as an alternative building block for a
theory of knowledge which would not be based on the assumption
of objectivity.

In defining this unit, we depend a great

deal on the transactional perspective which we found to be
the only existing model that did not depend on the assumption
of objectivity.
Chapter VII concludes the Inquiry by depicting a view
of science which does not depend on the assumption of objec
tivity.

This picture of science differs from the more trad

itional view In two basic ways.

It substitutes for the notion

of facts the concept of devices and it replaces objective
truth with relative success.
dent and certain.

Pacts were held to be indepen

In sharp contrast, devices are demonstrated

to depend upon three sets of psychological variables:

assump

tions which we make about their domain, the influence of
"whole" patterning tendencies of knowledge already existing
in the relevant domain and the goals we wish to achieve in
the particular area.

The criterion of objective truth does

not allow for intermediate degrees of truth, but the criterion
of relative success allows for a variety of degrees of value.
These basic changes which resultNfrom having aban
doned the subject of objectivity also suggest some important
methodological changes.

It suggests a need to expand our

methods for dealing with theoretical problems.
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Methods such

as the thought experiment and the method of anomalies are put
forward as examples of fruitful non-experimental methods.
Abandoning objectivity also places new responsibilities on
the scientist.

It calls upon the scientist

his assumptions, wholes, and goals.

to make explicit

He must develop criteria

for selecting among these psychological variables when a
plurality exists.

He must develop some epistemological

standards to complement his experimental criteria of success.
In addition to pointing to a need for such epistemological
standards, Chapter VII suggests a set of possible standards
which follow from this inquiry.
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